* Say, Vodçek, esteemed keeper of this fine Tavern: where’s your prime regular Abbé Boulah? I haven’t seen him here for some time?
– I’m not sure, Bog-Hubert — but I have a feeling he’s out on this place in the ocean again. This new refugee community on that old oil rig — Rigatopia or whatever they call it. They keep trying new governance schemes out there, and Abbé Boulah seems to take an intense interest in what they are doing, if he’s not actually the one cooking up those things himself. I thought you knew more about that than what I can pick up here while I’m washing cups and glasses?
* You’re right, he often runs his ideas by me when we’re out fishing, or when he’s checking out my latest batch of Eau d’Hole in my swamp refuge — but every once in a while he just gets a new idea and takes off… Hi, Sophie — did you get a sense of what he’s up to this time?
+ No, sorry. But last time I was here, there was a guy who was trying to gather information about one of those Rigatopian ideas — a journalist, or perhaps some government snoop wondering if they are planning to invade the mainland. That was about some new kind of ‘civic credit’ scheme saving democracy or controlling power, I didn’t really understand it since I was there on the other end of the bar having an argument with Renfroe about protecting the sea turtles nesting here on the island. I wanted to join them to find out how all those issues fit together, but you know Renfroe, he just wouldn’t quit. Turtles all the way down to final call. Do you know any of that civic credit scheme, Bog-Hubert?
* Oh yes, they’ve been trying different versions of that idea for some time. I guess it gets confusing because they are trying to use it for so many different aims. Some just see it as an important part of their ‘planning discourse’ support scheme, getting people to contribute important information about a problem or plan, but not clogging the record just repeating the same points over and over. Others see it as the main tool for getting to decisions that are based on the merit of all that information. And then there are those who are most interested in how this scheme can help control power — at least they seem to think it can. To get the whole picture, you have to understand how it relates to their way of running public planning discussions.
+ Can you give us a sense of what it’s all about?
* I can try. Vodçek, can you get that air out of my glass here? I may need some more sustenance fuel to get through the whole thing.
– Sure. Sonoma Zin, right?
* Yes. Thanks. Okay. Let’s start with their planning discourse. They are trying to involve all their citizens in a discussion about important problems and issues out there, to arrive at decisions that everybody or most people can support because they had a chance to voice their opinions, develop and contribute ideas, and have all of those concerns given ‘due consideration’. Ideally, ending up with everybody being comfortable with the outcome. Even if those clean all around ‘win-win’ solutions are hard to achieve.
+ You can say that again. So?
* Okay. They want to encourage everybody who has something to say about a plan to actually bring it up, to enter it into the discussion. Questions, ideas, information about the situation, concerns, arguments pro and con. Participation. So they offer ‘contribution credits points’ for all such entries.
+ Oh boy…
* I know what you are saying: you’ll get flooded with all kinds of repetitious garbage? No; they handle that by making sure you get the point for an entry only if it’s the first of that information content; repetitions don’t get the credit.
– Ah, clever move: It encourages people to hurry up to get their information in, — it speeds up things, and also keeps the record from getting clogged up with all the repetitious stuff. Right?
* Right, Vodçek. You don’t think so, Commissioner?
= How do they decide whether a piece of information is repetitive — that it is essentially the same as another one that has been entered already? Because they may be worded differently and don’t sound the same at all? Is there a machine that does that automatically?
* I guess there are ‘artificial intelligence’ programs that can do that — you’ll have to ask our digital friend Dexter about that — but in a small project where there aren’t too many participants, you can ask the people involved: ‘Hey, aren’t you both talking about the same thing? If their explanation about what their entry ‘means’ uses the same information, it’s likely the same; if not, okay, it’s a separate, different aspect.
– How do you reassure people that those points that have been entered — that can’t be repeated to make sure they’ll be considered — will actually b e given due consideration?
* Good question. It requires that in getting to the decision, there will be a process that transparently guarantees that all entries will factor into the decision judgments. This means that each item must be evaluated and given some measure of significance — plausibility and importance –, and then combined into some measure of performance of the overall issue to be decided. For example, for a proposed plan, all the ‘pro and con’ judgments people have been raising will be merged into an overall plausibility measure.
– Yes: We’ve been talking about that before: Abbé Boulah’s buddy has developed a technique for doing that. It may not be the ultimate solution, but it shows that such a process is possible.
The point is that all contributions to the discussion — all arguments and their premises — must be ‘evaluated’. They won’t all have the same ‘merit’, right?
* Precisely. Some arguments may have a flawed — fallacious — structure; some premises may not be true or plausible; they may not have sufficient supporting evidence or further arguments. We don’t have to go into detail about the details or possible variations of that process here: the outcome is that all entered information items that will be considered in reaching the decision must be given some merit score in that process. A basic claim ends up being given a ‘positive’ score if has been judged to be plausible, sufficiently well supported, or ‘negative’ if it turns out to rest on false or unsupported premises.
= Sounds complicated. But tell me: Who decides that?
* Ah, another good question. You are putting the finger on the problem that people have very different opinions about whether a piece of information has merit or not — is ‘true’ or ‘probable’ or ‘plausible’.
+ Isn’t the idea of the discourse that we hope to straighten outmost of the tricky differences? That the arguments and the evidence people offer to support them will ‘settle’ the issues, that people will end up agreeing on the ‘truth’?
* Sure, Sophie: ideally. That’s the idea behind the grand old parliamentary principle: let’s leave our Uzis outside, let’s talk, try to explain our concerns to each other, and together find the right answer. But the reality is that just as each plan will have ‘costs’ as well as ‘benefits’, a consequence of implementing a plan that is seen as a benefit by some will end up being seen as a ‘cost’ to those who are expected to endure or pay for it.
– So all participants will still end up with their own judgments about each argument and premise?
* Yes. And the question of how to put them all together is always and inevitably a controversial issue that must be agreed upon. Now it’s becoming obvious that the current predominant method for reaching a decision — majority voting — is precisely NOT living up to the aim of getting a decision based on the merit of the information and reasons contributed” the information and concerns of the minority is utterly ignored and discarded.
– I understand Abbé Boulah and his Rigatopians are looking for different ways of making decisions that have a closer and more transparent link between discussion merit and decision? That is a truly important work in progress, but it’s a different issue than Sophie’s question about the credit points, isn’t it? Can we get back to that one?
* Okay. It was just necessary to put that question into the context of the whole discourse process. Well, there may be different ways of getting to an assessment of the merit of the information items that people contribute to the discourse. But the upshot is that each contribution by a person, that has now been evaluated — by the whole group of participants, or a separate task force that will devote the necessary time and effort to do that — all those merit scores of the contributions a person has made to the project can be added up into a kind of ‘civic credit’ account for that person.
+ So? What good will that do? What are those points good for?
* That is the beauty of the idea: — yes, the account is useless and a waste of time unless it’s a game and you can boast of your credit score — but you are right: The credits have to be fungible — you’ll have to be able to exchange them for something. So how about adding them to your resume, as an added qualification aspect for jobs? Especially if you are applying for a job where you have to make decisions on behalf of the public — remember, there are many such positions where decisions have to be made that can’t wait for a lengthy public discussion. So perhaps it’s useful to have some evidence of the kind of judgment you will bring to such tasks: If your account shows a lot of entries that have gotten high merit scores (say, a ratio between total merit scores and the number of entries you made), would we be more confident that you’ll make good decisions than if you have a record of a lot of entries but a negative overall credit tally? Or no such credits at all?
+ Hmm. That may be a good basis for electing people to public office, do you think?
* Abbé Boulah couldn’t have said it better! And that idea can still be extended into some ‘unexpected corollary benefit’ opportunities.
= Huh? Not just those ‘unexpected consequences’ — usually of the unpleasant kind? Do explain.
* Well, how about two possibilities. Connected, related possibilities. One is the idea of requiring people in such ‘power decision positions’ to ‘pay’ for such decisions. With credit points.
= Oh boy. Paying for doing the job they were elected or appointed to do?
* I knew that one would get your attention, Commissioner. Don’t worry though: not with money, with credit points. Consider: Part of the reason people want to get elected or appointed to such exalted positions is because they want power. Isn’t the desire for power almost something like a human ‘need’? Or ‘right’? If you are campaigning with and for the ‘downtrodden’, what are they asking for? Empowerment! Power to the people! and all that. But in this here awkward reality, all the other needs we have, like food or housing, we are asked to pay for. So why not power? And asking people to pay for the opportunity to make power decisions with credits they ‘earned’ with plausible and useful judgments — is that too much to ask?
+ Hmm, It’s something to think about. As opposed to having them buy those positions — with real campaign money they asked us to chip in — as if they didn’t have enough money they scrounged off the profits they made from selling our work in the first place?
– You are beginning to sound like some candidate, Sophie. Are you planning to run for something? Meanwhile: What’s the other aspect you were mentioning, Bog-Hubert ?
* Right: First, let me ask you if this first idea isn’t one way to make people in power ‘accountable’: meaning that they have an account from which they put up some kind of security they’d lose if their decisions don’t work out. So the idea is this: depending on the importance of the decision: put up an amount of your credit points you are willing to bet on the success of that decision, and as a ticket for being such an important person. If it works out, you may earn more credits; if it doesn’t, you lose those credits you put up. And if you have gambled away all your credits on foolish decisions, step aside. So isn’t this scheme another — innovative and, I’d say much needed — way to control power?Not a complete panacea, of course, but then our traditional means of power control don’t seem to be working too well anymore: there’s work to do on that issue, I think. Some different thinking?
+ Interesting idea. We should discuss that some more, maybe tomorrow night? Any chance Abbé Boulah might be back? But for now: …
* Yes, yes, I know, Sophie: about the second point. It also has to do with accountability. But this is about the accountability of the supporters of candidates and people in power positions. Consider that, as a form of support for a candidate, people might transfer some of their own credits to a candidate’s campaign, or to a person in a power position. Instead of money that currently is just used to buy expensive repetitions of inane campaign slogans and mudslinging accusations of competitors, your transferred credit points ’empower’ the candidate with your confidence in her or his judgment. If the person starts making stupid judgments, you can withdraw your contributions before losing them all to the Caligula-infected schemes of leaders whose power has actually made them sick, poisoned their judgment. In a sense, you ‘invest’ your precious credits, your own reputation, in the candidate’s future judgment. If the decisions work out, the candidate may pay you some ‘dividends’ on your investment. If the decisions flop, you lose it. Not only the official. It makes you accountable as well.
– Ah, I can see a whole new market emerging: Candidate power decision gut-feeling futures: selling short, selling long; candidate future decisions hedge funds…
+ Good grief, Vodçek: Please pour us another round here instead of scaring us with these grim visions…
* I’ll second that. I can see you guys aren’t quite ready for this kind of creative thinking yet. But just let me ask you this: For those issues we mentioned: getting people to participate meaningfully in planning decision discourse, rewarding them for meaningful contributions, not for uninformed rehashing of others lies; for making decisions based on the merit of discourse contributions, for evaluating that merit in the first place, for reducing the role of money in politics, for developing better controls of power: do you have better schemes up your sleeves? Then let’s hear them. Cheers, by Abbé Boulah!
The idea of an unconditional basic income looks like a good idea – a plausible extension of the common concept of life-supporting infrastructure — roads, communication, water supply, sanitation, police protection, defense are all part of that concept of providing essential conditions for all citizens.
One of the most frequent arguments is that such a guaranteed basic income would replace dozens of other support programs with their expensive and dignity-destroying bureaucracy, and provide recipients ‘freedom’ to allocate their funds in the way that corresponds best to their different individual needs, and pursue their own creative preferences.
The obvious question of how it would be financed is usually brushed off with that comment on savings from replacement of those programs, and seems to shut off further questions – as well as further investigation and discussion.
Since the devil often hides in the details of such noble endeavors, it seems necessary to look at some of those questions that aren’t being discussed.
At the risk of oversimplification, would it be useful to start with some basic assumptions and a very simple diagram of the main aspects, and their specific implications?
One assumption is that such a Basic Income should be sufficient to support a citizen’s needs for living a reasonably dignified life, providing the essential means for shelter, nourishment, clothing, health care, education, and so on. It should represent an adequate ‘life support’ package of life in a civilized society. Obviously, determining the size of such an income will require some investigation and discussion; it seems that it will not be easy to settle upon one size that will adequately but not extravagantly support residents in all locations, climates, and life situations. But some analysis of basic provisions for such a program it can be assumed as settled somehow.
Another assumption is that it should be ‘universal’ – that is, that all citizens should receive it regardless of their other economic or other situation. So some proposals – such as one providing the income for citizens over 21 years of age – already seem to twist that assumption somewhat.
A somewhat obvious assumption is that this basic income cannot be taxed — it is indeed sometimes being described as a ‘negative income tax’. The obvious implication that it therefore must be financed out of government income from other sources – in an economy consisting only of the components of producing the ingredients of that basic life support bundle, but no further production of ‘luxury’ items that would not be attainable with that income, the government distributing the Basic Income would have to tax everybody’s entire Basic Income to run the program – or just print money, which would end up in the pockets of the producers, and irresponsibly cause unstoppable inflation. But this raises the question of what items should be considered as ‘luxury’ and therefore taxed to supply the revenues for the UBI.
The question of financing might be started — to reveal some disturbing issues — with some very simplified assumption about such an economy. Considering the main components: The population would consist of
1) People who are working and producing – as a first simple assumption, only the ingredients of the basic life support system; let’s call this group ‘P’;
2) People who do not produce anything: ‘NP’;
3) The Government – ‘G’– that distributes the UBI income to everybody (for the sake of simplicity, it could be assumed that this is all done by computers, and that ‘the Government’ would not also consist of people receiving the UBI;
4) An element that might be called ‘Distribution’ – ‘D’ — (it might also be just a ‘machine’; but it is necessary to assume such an institution or ‘market’ where the actual products of the life support package LS can be exchanged for the money of the UBI (and vice versa).
The simple ‘system’ of this economy could now be crudely diagrammed as follows:
Figure 1 UBI ‘self-financed’ with only LS production?
P produces (P+NP)*LS and transfer this to D,
Having receiving $P*Bi from the government, this sum is transferred to D in return for P*LS life support packages (the content of individual packages may differ according to people’s different preferences) but the entire package is P*LS and ‘worth’ $P*Bi; so P’s are ‘paying’ $P*Bi to the distributor D. The P population ‘consumes’ P packages of LS.
NP are receiving $NP*Bi from the government and buy NP*LS worth this much from D, so transferring that sum to D. This part of society ‘consumes’ NP units of LS.
G To be able to pay out the next ‘round’ of Bi payments, the Government must receive the sums $P*Bi + $NP*Bi back from the Distributor D.
So far, so good; this ‘system’ seems to be ‘sustainable’. But is it? What, if anything, is P getting for producing all the life support packages? Just the amount needed for the P people involved in production to stay alive — $P*Bi?
The UBI proponents will argue that the UBI can’t be financed (as the scheme of Fig. 1 does) from the UBI payments: it must come from the production and payments of goods and services NOT in the LS package description: ‘luxury’ items ‘LX’.
The diagram for this arrangement might now look like the following (Fig. 2):
Fig. 2 UBI financed (only?) by taxes on ‘Luxury’ products
Now P is producing not only the needed LS packages for everybody in that society, but also an indeterminate amount of ‘luxury’ goods and services. These items are also transferred (sold) to the Distributor D, and then sold back to members of the Producer group P. These people must now have earned some additional funds – of course, from their profits of having produced some of the PX goods. That is, D must have paid them for those. (Shouldn’t they have been paid something for producing the excess number of LS packages for the NP group? This would of course mean that the total sum of payments to P for LS must be larger than $P*Bi – but where does the difference come from?)
If the assumption is to be satisfied that the whole UBI scheme must be financed from the ‘luxury’ items part of the economy, this will determine the total amount of payments—and thus the price of the luxury items – involved in this sector: For the scheme to be viable under the stated assumption, the sum (LX ‘taxes’) to be paid to the government must equal (at least) $ (P+NP)*Bi – regardless of the size of this sector, the number and quality of luxury items produced and sold. Question: How can the UBI-mandated price of a luxury item be established / predicted based on how much it will contribute to the needed government UBI Payments? This seems to fly in the face of standard views of economics, such as that the price for a good or service should be determined by the cost of producing it, a reasonable profit margin, and from then on by demand.
I am sure these and similar questions can be answered by better qualified experts. For example, the overall problem that the viable financing of the UBI system will be inexorably linked to the ratio of P to NP – which is likely to change over time – and therefore likely demand adjustments to those changes even in the amount of UBI payment the government can ‘afford’? or in the purchasing value of those payments – in violation of the ‘guaranteed’ part of the BIG promise of ‘Basic Income Guarantee’?
I’d like to see the proponents of the idea spend some effort in answering these admittedly annoying little detail questions – even to the public who may not have had the chance to review any more detailed proposals than the PR propaganda pieces focusing only on the main ‘reduce government’ and similar arguments. Including questions I have blanked out from this little inquiry: the issue of the resources going into the production of all these goods and services, the question of different amounts of time, skills, education etc. to produce them, and the role of the entire ‘distribution’ segment, including transportation, interim financing, advertising, and selling, the aspect of ‘consumed’ goods (e.g. food’) as opposed to durable goods (houses), and the whole wicked issue of insurance to deal with randomly occurring needs whose costs exceed anybody’s ability to pay for them out of an UBI Payment. It seems that the public discussion of this concept has not covered all pertinent issues yet.
In the discourse about collective plans, the process of evaluation – making judgments about whether a plan is ‘good enough’ or which of several plans is the better, — differences of opinions occur, which can be resolved by mutual explanation of the basis of evaluation judgments. The discussion here is focused on the role of ‘criterion functions’ in this process. These functions – showing how ones subjective ‘goodness’ judgments depend on ‘objectively’ measurable criteria – make it possible to explain one’s basis of judgment in much more specific detail than is usually done even in the most cooperative group processes. Some key insights of the discussion are the following:
While such detailed explanation is possible and conceptually not overly challenging, including this process in actual decision-making procedures would add cumbersome provisions to a planning discourse already calling for more structure than many participants are used to and feel comfortable with. The issues of ‘aggregation’ – of individuals’ partial judgments into overall judgments, and especially of individual judgments into ‘group’ evaluation measures are potential sources of controversy.
It becomes clear that any overall ‘measures’ or judgments that can meaningfully guide decisions cannot be derived in ‘top-down’ fashion from general ‘meta values’ and ‘common good’ concepts but must be constructed ‘bottom-up’ from individual participants’ concerns and understanding of specific situations and context.
Familiar claims of planning decision makers ‘to act on behalf of others (clients, users), with adequate knowledge of those others’ concerns and basis of judgment, but not having gone to the trouble of doing this, are unfounded and should be viewed with reserve.
Examination of criterion functions make it obvious that the quest for and claim of having found ‘optimal’ solutions is unrealistic: no plan will achieve the ‘best possible’ scores on all evaluation aspects even for individuals, and different people will have very different but legitimate criterion functions.
Considering plans or policies whose effects will occur – and change – over time, adds another level of complexity. System simulation models can track the performance of variables (criteria) over time, but do not show associated ‘goodness’ judgments (obviously, since this would either be just one person’s assessment, of some aggregated measure of judgments that have not been included in the system modeler’s data.
The examination of how evaluation judgments for different plans could be tracked over time (as a function of the simulated variable tracks) suggests a different decision guide: the (time-discounted) degree of improvement of a plan over the current or predicted problem situation under the ‘do nothing’ option.
The discussion takes place in the hypothetical ‘Fog Island Tavern’.
– Hey Bog-Hubert – what kind of critters are you guys talking about? I couldn’t quite get it coming in, but it sounds like serious wildlife?
– Good morning Renfroe. Well, I guess you could call them critters, but not the kind you mean. Actually, we were talking about criterion functions. About how we can explain what we mean when we’re making judgments about, say, proposed plans. Calling them good, so-so, or bad, or anything in-between.
– Huh. Plans, as in what to do about saving the beaches where each storm washes away more of the sand?
– Yes, or about what to do about the climate change that makes the storms worse and the oceans rise.
– What, you guys can’t even come up with a plan for beach preservation on this little island, and now you want to talk about the oceans and global climate?
– Well, Renfroe, it looks like the problems of coming to some agreements about what to do are the same everywhere, just at a different scale.
– So where do your critters come in on that one?
– I guess we need to back track a little on that. It has to do with evaluation, say of different proposed plans, to decide which one is best, or whether any of them should be implemented. You could start by looking at them and then make an offhand judgment, say ‘good’; ‘not good’. If there are several proposals, you may want to use a more detailed scale, for example one with seven points ranging from ‘couldn’t be worse = – 3, to ‘couldn’t be better’: +3, with a midpoint of zero meaning ‘don’t know’ or ‘so-so’. In a group you’ll have to agree on some common scale. Now somebody asks you why you rate proposal X so high, and solution Y so low, since they came up with very different ratings from yours. So you may want to talk about the reasons, the basis of your judgments, maybe you each know something the other doesn’t know or see, that should be considered in making the decision. What do you do? How do you explain what makes a solution good or bad, in your view?
– Well, you could look at the various costs and benefits, and how well the plan will work for what it is meant to do?
– And how good it looks, if its’ a building or some thing we are looking at or living in?
– Yes, Sophie.
– And don’t we also have to worry about those ‘unexpected side-and-after-effects’ of plans, that people always talk about but keep forgetting?
– Good point. Next we list all those considerations or ‘aspects’ and make sure that we all mean the same thing when we name them. But we can only consider what people bring up in the discourse, so it’s important to make sure that is organized so as to let everybody put in their views. Now you can give each plan a ‘goodness’ judgment score – on the same scale — for each of those aspects. Let’s call those ‘partial’ judgments – all together they make up your ‘overall’, whole judgment for each plan. You’ll then have to explain how exactly all of those scores make up the overall judgment.
– And looking at the different aspects, you may want to reconsider the first overall, offhand judgment you made?
– Good point, Vodçek. Deliberating already. Learning. Excellent. But to get to the criterion functions: You realize how an explanation of a judgment the goodness score always consists of showing how the judgment relates to something else. That something else can be another judgment – look at how Sophie suggested that her overall ‘goodness’ judgment of, say, a building, should depend in part on the beauty of that building – which of course would be another judgment, and people may have different opinions about that. But the relationship would be that of some ‘degree of beauty’ about which she would have to make another ‘goodness’ judgment to explain how it contributes to the overall building goodness judgment.
– That’s not much on an explanation though, is it?
– Right. So you could ask her what, in her mind, makes a building beautiful. What would be you answer, Sophie?
– Well, if I got the sense that he just wants to annoy me with all these questions – because I can see how each answer will just lead to another one, and where will that end – I could just say that if he can’t see it he just doesn’t understand beauty and tell him to get lost. But if I think he really wants to learn what I see as beautiful, I might suggest that it has to do with, say, its proportions.
– Ah. Now we are getting closer to the criterion issue. Because proportions are really measurement relations: in a rectangle, the length of the short side to the length of the longer one. The relationship is now something we can ‘objectively’ measure. Quantitative. And many people are really adamant about making our decisions based on objective ‘facts’ and measures. So would it satisfy those folks to show them a graph that has the ‘objective’ measure on one axis – the horizontal one, say, and our judgment scale on the vertical one: If you are convinced that the most beautiful proportion is the ‘golden ratio’ – 1:1.618… the graph would touch the + 3 line at that 1.618… point, and go down from there in both directions. Like this, for example: Down to 1:1 (the proportion of the square) on one side, and down to -3 for infinitely long rectangles: 1:∞
Fig 1. A criterion function for proportion judgments
– Hey, didn’t we look at that proportion thing a while back? But then we looked at both sides on the 1:1 point – if the right side is for ‘vertical’ rectangles, the left one continues past the 1:1 point for horizontal ones.
– And if I remember correctly, didn’t somebody point out that there are many people who feel that the square, or the one based on the diagonal of the square, the √2 relationship, is the most beautiful proportion?
– You’re right. But that was in another book, a fat one, if I recall? So let’s not get too distracted by the details here. But perhaps we should just remember that there are many different forms of such functions: the one where ‘zero’ on the variable represents -3 on the judgment scale, which goes on to approach +3 at infinity, its opposite that starts with +3 at zero on the criterion scale and approaches -3 at infinity, the opposite of the golden ratio curve that goes from -3 at some value of our criterion and rises towards +3 on both sides.
– Can’t think of an example for that one though. Except perhaps weird ones like people’s appreciation for apartment levels going up towards the higher floors and +3 at the penthouse – but with a sudden drop to -3 at floor 13?
– Goes to show that people’s preferences can take strange contortions… But those are personal judgments. I guess they are entitled to hold those, privately. Now, what about collective decisions?
– Yes, Vodçek. That is the point where we left off when Renfroe came in. We can explain how our subjective goodness judgment relates to some objective measurement. And this is useful: I can ask somebody to make a decision on my behalf if I give him my criterion function to make a selection – even though I know that his criterion function likely has a different shape and the high +3 judgment score is in a different place. But the issue we started from was the idea that there should be measurements – expressing values – that everybody should agree on, so that collective decisions could be guided by those values and measurements. ‘Meta-values’?
– Yes, that notion seems to make perfect sense to many people – for example the feel that trying to stop climate change is so important for the survival of human civilization – that it is such a meta-value that everybody should agree on so that we can start taking more effective action. And that this is even an ethical, a moral duty. So they can’t understand why there are some people who don’t agree.
– Right. So we were trying to untangle the possible reasons why they don’t.
– Short of declaring them all just blindly indoctrinated by political or religious views or outright fraudulent misrepresentations, eh?
– Yes, let’s not go there. I guess there may have been some confusion because at first there was no distinction between the ‘meta-values – that were quite general and abstract – and the corresponding measures one would need to actually guide decisions: You can’t really argue against a concept like the Common Good as a guiding value – but when it comes to pin down just what that common good is, and how to get an ‘objective’ measure for it, history shows that there’s plenty of disagreement both about the ‘common’ part – my family, tribe, town, country, my religion, humanity, all life on the planet? And even more vicious: about the part what the ‘good’ might be.
– I agree; and the attempt to justify those different views have led to some pretty desperate contortions of moral guidelines for decisions to meet those good things: I remember the old ‘dulce et decorum est pro patria mori’ (‘sweet and decorous it is to die for one’s country’), or promising all kinds of heavenly rewards in the hereafter to those willing to fight and kill and die for religious ideas.
– Well, if your tribe or country or your faith is your ‘common’, and somebody is attacking it, what’s wrong with that?
– I guess it becomes questionable when these definitions lead to more of the good is ending up with some people – the fellows who are spouting these glorious quotes and values and then get to make the decisions ‘on behalf’ of everybody else, while many of the everybody else are doing the dying and sacrificing. If it becomes apparent that these value leaders and doers have actually been acting more on behalf of their own good, the trust in those values is eroded. No matter how they are justified: by philosophical theories, by divine revelations (mostly revealed only to some special prophets), by political theories, or scientific theories. Or systems thinking. Or holistic thinking and awareness.
– Even scientific and systemic investigations?
That’s the tragedy, right. You may argue that science and systems tools are our best available tools for guiding action, based on objective measurements and facts, and have all the evidence and replicable observations to support them: if they then are used by leaders, — governments or ‘movements’ — to postulate ‘meta values’ to guide actions ‘on behalf of’ others, they will run into the same trust issues as all the other attempts to do the same, — unless…
– Unless what?
Well: unless they can also offer guarantees that those leaders are not just acting on their own behalf. Even if Congress were full of scientists and systems thinkers: if they make laws to deprive people of health insurance while themselves enjoying the best insurance and health care, no matter what justification they offer for their actions, they would run into trust problems. So that would be one condition.
– One condition, Vodçek? Are there others?
– In theory, yes. Its’ actually part of the job of the legislature: isn’t it in the constitution, even, that they should make laws on behalf of their constituents. And the representative notion is, of course, that representatives should be part of the communities they represent and communicate with then so that they know what the community wants? And then go and vote for laws that realize those preferences.
– Which they should do even if they don’t agree with them? Even if they know better? Doesn’t the constitution also state that they should vote according to their own conscience?
– Right: there seems to be some contradiction there. And it’s leading to that constant tug-of-war between the principle of electing representatives whose judgment we trust — to vote in view of the common good – even if we don’t agree, — because we don’t have all the information? Or because we are suffering from doctrinaire blindness or stupidity, or ethical or moral depravity? And to the alternative of passing laws by referendum, regardless of what the representatives are saying.
– Well, there’s the practical issue: we can’t possibly make all laws by referendum, can we? And if we are too ignorant to give our representatives proper guidance about how to vote so they have to vote by their own better knowledge and information and conscience, should we be allowed to vote on laws?
– But we are allowed to vote for the representatives? Isn’t there an expectation that the representatives should provide enough information to their constituents to know and understand the best available basis of judgment for the needed actions and also be confident that the representatives’ basis of judgment is sound enough to let them vote according to their own judgment conscience if and when necessary?
– Right. Theory, perhaps; current practice of governance looks a bit different. But that’s where our question about the criterion functions come in, again: They are part of the process of not only making up our minds about what actions to take or to support, but also of explaining our basis of judgment to each other. In the extreme, so that we can trust somebody else to make judgments and take action on our behalf – because we have conveyed our mutual basis of judgment well enough, as well as made sure it does give adequate consideration to all available information and concerns.
– So what we are trying to clear up for ourselves is this question: Are there general or universal ‘meta-values’ that can give us adequate criteria to guide effective action — not only let leaders invoke those values without an way of checking whether they actually are served by the proposed actions? And how would those criteria / measures come to be identified and agreed upon?
– Even more specifically, whether those measures should be determined by objective measurement, and then used by some people who are able or entitled to initiate ‘effective action’ to not only do so, — on behalf of everybody else – but to claim that this is ethically and morally defensible and necessary.
– And to declare everybody who disagrees to be ethically misguided – really: to be ‘bad’ or ‘evil’ people.
– Do they come right out and say so?
– I think both sides are, in so many words, unfortunately. So the question of whether there are ‘meta-values’ with related performance measures that everybody should adopt and thus support the resulting actions, is an important one. The sticking part being, to support collective actions taken on our behalf, and perhaps compelling us to take certain everyday actions ourselves, in pursuit of those meta-values. Didn’t we say, a little while ago, that somebody can take action on my behalf if I have given him my criterion functions? – But now it looks like the suggestion is the other way around: that there are criterion functions people tell us we should adopt, to comply with the ethical demands of the Meta Values. So we are trying to understand what that really means.
– Okay: so, let us assume that we have persuaded the participants in the climate change debate to explain their basis of judgment to each other, as much as possible by use of criterion functions. Diagrams that explain how or subjective ‘goodness’ judgments g about proposed plans relate to some ‘objective’, measurable properties of climate change aspects. Take the example of the ‘evil’ CO2 that we are adding to the atmosphere. Assuming that there is some agreement about how much that matters – a different scientific question that also needs sorting out in many people’s minds. And assuming there’s some meaningful agreement about how and where those levels of CO2 will be measured.
– What do you mean – are agreements about CO2 needed? Isn’t that just a simple scientific fact?
– No, Sophie: It makes a difference whether you measure CO2 content in the atmosphere, and at what height, or in the oceans. All those things must be sorted out. Then: is the ‘amount’ or ‘percentage’ of CO2 a good choice of criterion for explaining our judgments about the quality of a plan to improve things?
+ Sure: Haven’t scientists found out, in may serious studies, that the amount of CO2, at the time when we began so see substantial human-based climate change, was some value ‘c*’? Whether you wish to use the actual measure of the amount of CO2 in the atmosphere or its percentage, does not really matter, at least for the sake of this question. Now, say a plan or policy P1 has been proposed to try to get things back in line, whatever that means. So a person tries to explain how her judgment score on some scale +U, to –U, say +3 to -3 depends on how close a proposed plan comes to that ‘goal’ of c*. Would you say that to get a ‘goodness score of +3 (meaning ‘couldn’t possibly get any better’, on a ‘goodness scale of +3 ‘couldn’t possibly get any better, to -3 meaning ‘couldn’t possibly get any worse’ with a midpoint of zero ‘’so-so’, do don’t know’), the plan would have to achieve a return to that value ‘c*’? So you’d draw up a criterion function with the top of the curve touching the +3 line at c*. But another person B thinks that a slightly higher level of CO2 would be OK given some measures in the plan to mitigate it faster. It looks like this:
Figure 3: Criterion functions of two persons, for a plan to return the CO2 value to a desirable CO2 level
It shows their different judgment basis regarding what that level c* should be, showing the CO2-measure on the x-axis and the judgment score on the y-axis. Any lower or higher than that would get a lower score.
– Okay; I see. And you are saying that in principle, every participant in the evaluation would be entitled to his or her own curve? Even one that doesn’t have the highest score at ‘c*’?
– Now why would you – or anybody – put the highest score anywhere else?
– Well, aren’t you guys saying that having spewed so much CO2 into the atmosphere since it was at that benign level ‘c*’ has done a lot of damage already? So to repair that damage – to get the glaciers to grow back, for example, or to cool down the oceans, – it would be necessary to reduce the CO2 to a lower level than ‘c*’ – at least for a while? If you could calculate that level, that’s where a person B might put the +3 score. And give that score to another plan P2 that would achieve that level. Does that make sense?
– Wait a minute: wouldn’t it be better to look at the effectiveness of a plan to reduce the amount of CO2 – at least, as you say, for a while, until the effects of increased CO2 level have been ‘repaired’?
– Good question, at least for showing that even the choice of criterion is a controversial issue. You could say that it might be even better to look at how close to the ideal CO2 level a plan can get with its reduction effectiveness, and show how that relates to what would happen if nothing is done? Which is always an alternative ‘plan’?
– Good. But the question is really about whether the criterion of ‘c*’ or ‘c•’ is an appropriate one to base you judgment upon: Both plans are claiming to reach those values – claims that should be assessed for their plausibility, don’t forget – but at different points in time. So which one is ‘better’?
– I guess we should say: the plan that gets there ‘sooner’ – all other aspects being equal, for the sake of the argument.
– Yes, but doesn’t that mean you really have a different criterion? Specifically: the criterion of ‘time for the plan to get to c* — or c•? Which really is a different criterion, so which one are you going to use?
– Does it matter whether we use different levels of desirable c’s as long as we all come up with a goodness judgment g, and we each have explained what that judgment depends upon?
– If the outcome is that your judgment will support P1 while –‘s score will prefer P2 as the better plan – all else being equal, as you say: the problem isn’t really solved yet, is it?
– Hey guys, aren’t you missing something essential here? Well, you did sort of stumble on it, – with your remark ‘at least for a while’.
– Huh? Explain, Vodçek. What’s missing?
– Time, of course. In your criterion functions so far, you seem to make an assumption that your plans P1 and P2 will somehow ‘achieve’ some level of CO2 one they got implemented, and that things would then stay that way? But come on, that’s not how things work, is it? Even a plan for this kind of issue would have to involve activities, policies, processes, all continuing over time. It can’t be a sudden magic spell to change things overnight. And then it would take time for the actual CO2 level to change back to whatever level you’d have in mind — if the plan works. But how long is that going to take? And is it going to stay at that level? Shouldn’t that be part of your systemic ‘due consideration’?
– You are right. So let me see – looks like we have to draw up a kind of three-dimensional criterion function, is that what you are implying?
– Right. If you are serious about this idea of ‘explaining how your subjective judgment relates to objective criteria’. Not everybody does…
– Okay, I see your point. So we draw the diagram like this: Time on the horizontal right-left axis, CO2 – level on the horizontal up-down axis y, and your judgment on the vertical axis z.
– And before you ask, I think Dexter would say simulation models to predict the track of the CO2 levels for each plan over time can and have been developed, given reliable data…
– But now, what’s your score for those plans? If the CO2 levels and judgments change all the time? By the way, wouldn’t you have to also include a simulated track for the ‘current’ state of affairs and its future track if nothing is done?
+ Right. So we have the time CO2 simulation with three tracks – like this?
– Okay, what about instead looking at the difference between the desired targets and what the plans are actually achieving, over time? It would require looking at the total measure of those differences over time, and I agree that it would also require an agreement about the time frame we are willing to look at. People keep talking about the world we are going to leave for our grandchildren, from a more systemic and holistic perspective – but don’t offer any specifics about how we might distinguish one plan from another, or even from just doing nothing?
– I like your point about looking at the difference, the degree of improvement we can expect from a plan. What would that look like in your diagram?
– Well, the measure would have to be one like the area of the judgment ‘surface’ between two alternatives? Because we agree that in order to reach some kind of meaningful overall measure, it will have to be made up of judgment’ measures, right? But I’m sure that at least for individual judgment systems, ways can be found to calculate that, just as there are equations that describe the simple line functions in the previous examples. But for the time assessment, it will have to include some feature of ‘discounting’ the judgments over time – like calculating the ‘present’ value of a series of income or cost payments over time. Work to do, eh? Because you can see in the diagram that if a plan ‘works’, the improvement judgment area will get wider and wider over time – but after since the probabilities / plausibility judgments will also get more and more uncertain for long future time periods, they will become less and less important factors in the final overall judgment.
– I see what you mean. Not because we don’t care about future generations, mind you – but simply because we just can’t be certain about our predictions about the future.
– Right. Meanwhile, the discourse may become more productive if we threw more of these kinds of diagrams into the fray? Like this one about the judgment surfaces – I agree it needs discussion?
– So you may have to look at the actual results that those changes in CO2 will bring about, over time? Like: levels of ocean rise expected until the remedy sets in – will it actually recede if the plans are any good? I haven’t heard anybody even mention that yet… And provisions for what to do about sea level change until it stops rising?
– Coming to think of that – have there been any plans put out there with that kind of details?
– I admit, I haven’t been following all the reports on that controversy – but I am not aware of any.
– Hey, here’s a test for promoters of a plan: ask them whether they are willing to put up down payments for new ocean front real estate that will emerge if their plan works as intended?
– Renfroe… Ah well, maybe you’ve got something there. Get Al to put down money for property on the beach in front of Mar-a-Lago?
– You guys are giving me a headache. How are we ever going to get moving on the problem if you keep analyzing things to death and wasting time with stupid pranks?
– Well, who was claiming and boasting about taking a more systemic and holistic look at these problems, and of making decisions based on objective facts? It may be useful to turn that big talk down a notch, and focus on the painful nitty-gritty aspects of how to make these decisions. So that people can agree on something specific instead of calling each other names, and resisting plans because of distrust – deserved or not – about what the promoters for plan P1 or P2 are really after? Like power? The next election? More profit for one industry rather than another? That lack of trust may be the real reason why people keep resisting plans to do something about problems. But can’t talk about them because those suspected motives or their lack of them aren’t being part of the discourse?
– Ah: the discourse. Yes. How to talk about all that without starting to call each other names or throwing rocks at each other and storefronts… What does that take? Where’s Abbé Boulah?
Small scale planning discourse platform and process – Draft (‘Planning Discourse Support System’ PDSS)Posted: July 8, 2017
I n t r o d u c t i o n
The crises and challenges facing humanity are increasingly global in scope and nature. They call for planning and policy decisions based on wide (ultimately global) participation, aiming at better understanding of the problems by all participants, best available information and evidence, and due consideration of the concerns of all parties affected by the problems and proposed solutions.
To my knowledge, there is currently no platform available that exhibits all requirements and functions of such a global platform. The following suggestions for an experimental, small scale planning discourse framework are seen as a bare-bones ‘pilot’ project for the development of such a ‘global’ (large scale) platform and process, using the provisions of current social network platforms such as Facebook. The hope is to start a discussion clarifying needed provisions and agreements for the design of the global platform, using a discussion of the setup and procedural rules of its own discussion as a vehicle. The experiences of this experiment will then guide the design of the global platform.
Overview of the Process – Main steps / phases of planning projects:
The diagram shows a rough overview of the main phases or tasks of a planning project discourse, as a framework for discussion of the needed provisions for the platform and discourse at each stage:
Project Initiation Any planning project, by an individual or a collective, is initiated in some form, leading to a discussion or discourse. The initiating move can be a ‘problem’, a proposal for a ‘solution’ (a ‘plan’) or just a question;
Discussion The discussion – contribution of information, data, exchanges of opinion, is seen as consisting of several main tasks, which may or may not be addressed in an orderly sequence;
Problem /situation ’Problem definition’, description and
Exploration, understanding of the situation, its
Understanding ‘givens’ (‘data’) and the relationships among the variables, forces, and entities involved;
Response ideas, Exploration of ideas, possible means of
Solution changing the ‘problem’ situation into a
Development desired state; solution proposals and their descriptions and refinement;
Assessment Intertwined with the other discussion
Evaluation aspects will be the examination of the
Judgment merit of contributions, the expected performance of proposed solutions
“Next step?’ The discussion will be interrupted (or ended) by calls for a decision, for returning to a previous step, for more information, f or changing a proposed plan, or dropping it;
Decision The discourse will reach a preliminary or final conclusion: a decision or recommendation to adopt or reject a plan or agreement.
Implementation, monitoring, maintenance and the need for repairs and modification are seen as extensions of the discourse, to be studied later. Aspects of these tasks may be considered in the discussion of the platform design, but the aim and focus of the current discussion at this stage is the design of the discourse platform aiming at a decision about its configuration.
The main assumptions guiding the project are the following:
Human societies are (and will be) faced with conflicts, challenges and problems for which traditional and current tools, methods and responses are no longer adequate.
Responses by societies (or parts of societies) that are not acceptable to other parts or societies will lead to conflicts
The human tradition of ‘resolving’ conflicts by force – violence, wars, coercion, or deception, — will lead to more conflicts. Given the destructive potential and long duration of the damage inflicted by today’s weapons, wars and coercion is seen as increasingly counterproductive and endangering the well-being and survival not only of the ‘losers’ of such conflicts but also that of the ‘victors’ as well as other societies – indeed, the survival of human civilization on the planet.
The ‘economies’ of human societies have relied on techniques and resource exploitation that have already led to the extinction of many other living species, endangered many more; and caused significant ecological damage. Thus, new approaches are urgently needed. They must be coordinated globally to avoid counterproductive results and more conflicts.
While scientific research and technological development have created information and tools of unprecedented quantity and quality, this knowledge is not adequately brought to bear on planning problem-solving processes. It is not contributing to development of constructive and sustainable solutions by being embedded into a planning discourse aiming at decisions reliably based on adequate understanding of the problems, on valid information and on the aims and concerns of affected parties.
To the extent meaningful discourse takes place for these challenges, current decision-making tools and methods do not guarantee that decisions are based on the merit of discussion contributions, and arguably encourage the dismissals of valid concerns of large groups by ostensibly ‘democratic’ methods such as majority voting.
The proposal aims at eventually developing a better planning discourse support system to deal with these challenges.
Current technology, methods and tools for a fully functional PDSS system are not yet available; the proposed development of a small-scale ‘pilot’ system aims at facilitating its development by means of experiments using currently available tools.
While the internet, current communication and social media technology might be expected to offer adequate resources for the needed planning discourse platform, there are significant shortcomings in current practice that call for improvement and innovation.
Examples of problems that the proposed platform tries to address:
– Discourse too often facilitated by partisan interests
– Poorly organized discourse:
– ‘Debates’ focus on election of candidates not on merit of plans
– Discussions on ‘social media’ favor ‘conversation’ not conclusions, decisions – just airing ‘opinions’
– Powerful partisan institutions constrain discourse:
– By controlling media
– By controlling ‘narrative’
– By controlling ‘perspective’
– Decisions ignoring discourse
– Public participation
– Constrained by ‘voter apathy’; (a sense that participation won’t make much difference
– Insufficient incentive (not worth the effort);
Effort of participation too high
– Disciplinary ‘expert’ jargon
– Core of information drowned in repetitious comments (overload)
– Lack of adequate overview
– Of all concerns and factors (complexity)
– Of relationships between topics, issues,
forces and variables
– Confusing multitude of ‘new’ approaches, techniques
– Offered as overall framework for discourse but mostly focusing on single aspects of overall planning process
– Lack of measures of quality / merit of discourse contributions
– Even ‘fact-checking’ does not cover all claims
– Inadequate connection between discourse merit and decisions
– Decision modes allowing disregard of discussion merit
– Voting overrides minority concerns
– ‘Leadership’ authority to decide
– Inadequate provisions to ensure adherence to agreements / decisions.
T h e p r o p o s e d ‘p i l o t’ p l a t f o r m
Responses to a first proposal for such a framework on the Facebook page ‘Ecology of Systems Thinking’ (EoST) suggested some simplifications. A first suggestion was to keep the effort within the EoST group instead of starting a new group, though this would generate fewer options for the hierarchy of sub-threads of different discussion topics. This option remains open for discussion: the description below assumes a separate group for each new ‘project.
For this basic version, no provisions for contribution ‘reward’ credits are made, and ‘decisions’ will be determined by the number of ‘likes’ and negative emojis for an issue position. Nor are provisions for systematic evaluation of planning arguments included in the main process, since the FB platform does not facilitate the needed formatting. Options for these provision swill be offered as ‘special techniques.
A key assumption is that participants in the project discussions will be committed to reach a ‘decision’ (a recommendation, or an agreement for further coordinated work, at least a ‘resolution’ about a controversial issue). This will generate structural requirements that prevent the discourse from degenerating into the kind of interesting but rambling, poorly coordinated conversation we see on social networks even for significant issues.
The structure of the resulting revised framework will be as follows:
1 A new Group (or EoST subgroup) will be started for selected planning projects. The first project will be the discussion, refinement and testing of its own planning discourse provisions and procedures, building on the following proposal.
2 The project’s starting thread will provide a brief introduction and aim of the project. A listing of achieved ‘decisions’ for each raised issue will be added here as the discussion proceeds and yields decisions. Several ‘standard’ threads will then be started:
A ‘Procedural agreements’ thread.
These agreements outline the procedural steps and decision ‘rules’ governing the process. Participants are assumed to agree with these provisions by entering to the discussion. A ‘standard’ set of agreements can be adjusted to the requirements of each project, and can be changed later if needed. (> ‘Next step’ below)
A ‘General Comments’ thread
Participants will begin to raise questions, make suggestions, seek clarification etc. There will be no special format requirements other than general ‘netiquette’ and expected relevance to the project.
A thread for ‘candidate issues’, ‘raised issues’ and overview maps
Drawing from the material in the ‘General comments’, moderator or participants enter suggested topics or issues for detailed discussion. Simple overview maps listing the topics or issues, distinguishing ‘candidate issues and ‘raised issues’ aim to inform members of the state of the discourse. ‘Raised issues’ are questions for which members are starting a separate thread discussion. (>> #3 below).
A ‘Reference and links’ thread
Many posts and comments include links to other sources, pages, and literature. These will stay with the original post but be assembled in one comprehensive list for easy reference and to avoidi repetition.
3 Each ‘raised issue’ will receive a separate thread; participants will then begin discussion of that specific issue in that thread.
Posts should focus on the subject of the thread and avoid ‘off-topic’ comments. Comments introducing new topics should be posted in the ‘general comments’ thread.
4 ‘Next Step?’ call or motion. Within each thread, at any time, or when the discussion about an issue appears to converge or dries up, a ‘Next step?’ motion can be entered, to proceed to one of the following steps:
– Decision; (see next item 5)
– Entering a ‘special techniques’ process; (>> Special techniques examples, Appendix)
– Request for special information (research);
– Further discussion;
– Changing procedural agreements (e.g. decision criteria / voting majorities);
– Ending discussion without further steps or decision (‘dropping the issue’).
The ‘next step’ motion should specify the next step called for.
Each of these steps may have to be decided based on different rules (e.g. ‘like’ ratios) as specified in the procedural agreements.
After completing the requested steps (except ‘decision’ and ‘stop’) the process will return to the ‘Next step’ phase.
5 Decision. Within each thread or for the main project, ‘next step’ calls for a ‘decision or agreement should spell out the proposition or plan feature to be ‘voted’ upon.
While the aim of the entire effort is to eventually develop better decision procedures that will forge a closer link between the merit of contributions and the decision, the proposals for such procedures require platform features that are not yet available on social network platforms. Thus, the procedure agreements draft below only provides steps that merely ‘nudge’ a discussion group to make decisions after careful consideration of all concerns entered, (for example by presenting core concerns in concise but comprehensive overview diagrams. The decisions would then be made by conventional means such as majority-rule means, using features such as the FB ’like’ or emoji tools. Examples include agreed-upon ratios between the number of ‘likes’ and the total number of participants in a given process. Each project group is encouraged to craft its own rules – innovative or traditional – about how it will reach agreements.
Decision results will be entered in the main project overview thread, gradually building up a summary of the discussion’s outcome.
A p p e n d i x
A1 Procedural agreements (draft)
These procedural agreements are written for projects using the Facebook platform as a familiar example, using FB provisions, simply because the first discussions were carried out on FB. Such discourses can of course be conducted on other platforms; the agreements would then have to be adapted as necessary given the provisions and constraints of the respective platform.
It should be kept in mind that the proposed platform aims at facilitating problem-solving, planning, design, policy-making discussions that are expected to result in some form of decision or recommendation to adopt plans for action, rather than mere conversation, however insightful and enlightening those may be.
For each planning or problem-solving ‘Project’, a separate FB group with the respective title will be started by its moderator.
Participants or ‘group members’ are assumed to have read and agreed to these provisions.
Project discussion can be ‘started’ with a Problem Statement, a Plan Proposal, or a general question or issue. The project will be briefly described in the first thread. Another thread labeled ‘Project (or issue)… General comments’ will then be set up, for comment on the topic or issue with questions of explanation clarification, re-phrasing, answers, arguments and suggestions for decisions. Links or references should be accompanied by a brief statement of the answer or argument made or supported by the reference.
Participants and moderator can suggest candidate topics or issues (potentially controversial questions about which divergent positions and opinions exist or are expected, that should be clarified or settled before a decision is made). These will be listed in a thread of Candidate and Raised Issues. There, participants can enter ‘Likes’ to indicate whether they consider it necessary to ‘raise’ the issue for a detailed discussion. Likely issue candidates are questions about which members have posted significantly different positions in the ‘General comments’ thread; such that the nature of the eventual plan would significantly change depending on which positions are adopted.
Issue candidates supported by at least __ % of the number of registered ‘member’ participants become Raised issues; highlighted as such in the thread. Each ‘raised’ issue will then become the subject of a separate thread, where participants post comments (answers, arguments, questions) to that issue.
It will be helpful to clearly identify the type of issue or question, so that posts can be clearly stated (and eventually evaluated) as answers or arguments: for example:
– Explanations, definitions, meaning and details of concepts to ‘Explanatory questions’;
– Statements of ‘facts’ (data, answers, relationship claims) to Factual questions;
– Suggestions for (cause-effect or means to ends) relationships, to Instrumental questions;
– Arguments to deontic (ought-) questions or claims such as ‘Plan A should be adopted’, for example: ‘Yes, because A will bring about B given conditions C , B ought to be pursued, and conditions C are present’).
‘Next step’ motion
Participants and moderator can request a ‘Next Step?’ interruption of the discussion, for example when the flow of comments seems to have dried up and a decision or a more systematic treatment of analysis or evaluation is called for. The ‘Next step’ call should specify the type of next step requested. It will be decided by getting a minimum number of __ % ‘likes’ of the total number of participants. A ‘failed’ next step motion will automatically activate the motion of continuing the discussion. Failing that motion or subsequent lack of new post will end discussion of that issue.
Decisions (to adopt or reject a plan or proposition) are ‘settled’ by a minimum of __% of the total number of participants. The outcome of decisions of ‘next step?’ motions will be recorded in the Introduction thread as Results, whether they lead to an adoption, modification, rejection of the proposed measure or not.
In the main ‘basic’ version of the s∏ process, no special analysis, solution development, or evaluation procedures are provided, mainly because the FB platform does not easily accommodate the formatting needed. The goal of preparing decisions or recommendations may make it necessary to include such tools – especially more systematic evaluation –than just reviewing pro and con arguments. If such techniques are called for in a ‘Next step?’ motion, special technique teams must be formed to carry out the work involved and report the result back to the group, followed by a ‘next step’ consideration. A few examples of such tools are described in the following Appendix 2.
A2 Special techniques and procedures’ – Examples
While the proposal is acknowledged to be based on a view of planning as an ‘argumentative’ process, the platform itself will have to be as ‘perspective-neutral’ as possible. This means that structural or procedural provisions of the platform should not prevent members from introducing different perspectives, paradigms, approaches, into the discourse but facilitate such efforts. Even the creation of new ways of approaching a problem situation can be an integral part of an individual or group’s response: the approach becomes an integral part of the final ‘solution’ and defines ‘who we are’ as part of the emerging situation.
The introduction of other perspectives will always occur through communication – Discourse – which therefore is the most open ‘perspective’ we can think of that can accommodate all other vocabularies.
The ‘Special techniques’ component of the platform can be seen as a ‘tool kit’ of techniques and perspectives that can be introduced into a planning process, but which require format provisions not accommodated by the Facebook platform. The following examples are just that, examples of techniques or procedures that require slightly different, more structured work and output patterns than the sequence of posts in the discourse thread.
Examples of techniques or services that cannot easily be done in regular thread discussion format include:
+ Information and data-gathering searches and experiments, including AI-based data analysis programs;
+ Idea-generating small group techniques such as brainstorming and related approaches;
+ ‘Pattern Language’ and related approaches;
+ ‘Counterplanning’ (Churchman) approaches;
+ Evaluation techniques such as
– The systematic assessment of planning arguments; (>>A3)
– Formal evaluation procedures to evaluate solution alternatives;
– ‘Benefit-Cost Analysis’ and related approaches;
– Examination of proposed plans for compliance with rules, regulations, ‘best practice’ principles;
+ Problem explorations and analysis techniques such as
– Root cause analysis;
– ‘Systematic Doubt’ analysis of a problem’s necessary conditions and contributing factors;
– Systems modeling techniques of various kinds;
+ Participation Incentive provisions (‘Contribution credits’ modified by merit assessment;
(e.g. based on plausibility or argument weight measures derived from argument assessment)
A3 Evaluation of planning arguments
If the group decides (upon a ‘next step’ move) to perform a systematic evaluation of the pro and con arguments about an issue or a plan proposal, two worksheets will be prepared:
a) A listing of all the deontic claims (goals, objectives, concerns) referred to in all the arguments offered about the issue in which all arguments are listed; and
b) An argument assessment worksheet listing all arguments with all their premises stated explicitly (including premises that were left instated as ‘taken for granted’ in the original post).
Each participant will first assign weight of relative importance w to the goals in sheet (a), on a scale 0 to +1 such that all weight add up to 1.
These weights will then be entered in sheets (b) for the respective deontic premises. All premises will then be given a plausibility score pl, on a scale -1 (totally implausible) to +1 (totally plausible, virtually crtain) with centerpoint 0 meaning ‘don’t know, can’t decide’ to all premises.
From these judgments, argument plausibility scores argpl (product of all pl scores), argument weights argw (argpl times w of the respective deontic premise) and Plan plausibility Plpl (sum of all argw) will be calculated. These scores are all individual judgments. Statistics of judgments across the group of evaluators (Mean scores, maximum and minimum scores, range, variance) can be derived for analysis and discussion.
The results will be reported and explained back to the group, for another ‘next step?’ decision. How the results will be used in the decision process is a matter to be agreed upon by the group and set down in the procedural agreements ahead of running the evaluation.
A4 Discourse contribution points
The feature of awarding discourse contribution points to participants in the pilot version of the platform discourse is up for discussion. It would be desirable for various reasons, but is not yet supported by the standard provisions of the FB platform. It would therefore have to be done outside of the regular discussion platform as a ‘special techniques’ task. The basic steps involved are the following:
1 Participants in the discussion receive a ‘basic’ contribution credit point for every contribution. This is an ‘empty’ point at first; signifying that the participant has made a contribution; but the point will become an actual ‘reward’ if the content of the post is the ‘first’ to the discussion. Repetitions (posts conveying essentially the same content) will not receive awards. (This encourages not only participation itself, but also speedy contributions).
2 Either by means of other / all participants assigning ‘plausibility’ judgments (on the scale of -1 to +1) to each contribution point, or by applying the plausibility values assigned to arguments / argument premises in the course of systematic argument assessment (see A3) the reward points will be modified by multiplying them with the mean group plausibility values. (This will discourage unsupported and flawed contributions).
3 Participants will build up an ‘account’ of contribution merit points – its total value will represent a ‘reputation’ score based on the group’s assessment of the merit of a participant’s contributions.
The contribution merit accounts should become a fungible ‘currency’ used for a variety of possible purposes, but this is beyond the scope of the experimental discussions on the ‘basic’ pilot platform, where those possibilities might merely be explored in detail and discussed.
Process of contribution credit use
The feature of rewarding discourse participants with ‘contribution credits’ can take different forms, depending on the range of uses and the main priorities aimed at:
– providing incentives for speedy participation, reducing redundancy: a minimal version;
– increasing depth of consideration by adding plausibility assessment to items contributed;
– strengthening the connection between evaluated merit of contributions and final decisions.
The initial assignment of a reward marker or ‘container’ for reward is necessary for all subsequent features.
1 The first time a participant posts a comment (e.g. a argument) to the discussion, a ‘contribution credit account is established. Subsequently, the participant is assigned a ‘neutral’ credit point for each substantial content claim of a post IF that claim is ‘new’, meaning that it (or an essentially identical but differently worded claim) has not already been entered by another participant. (Claims or proposals posted after another post has been entered but not yet displayed for other participants to see may receive partial credit.)
2 The contribution will be entered into a ‘formatted’ display such as an argument assessment worksheet, for evaluation by the entire group of participants. For arguments, each participant will assign a ‘plausibility’ score pl – on a scale from -1 (totally implausible) to +1 (totally plausible) with the midpoint ‘zero’ meaning ‘don’t know’, ‘can’t judge’, to all premises of all arguments. Deontic (ought-) claims will also be given a ‘weight of relative importance’ judgment w, on a scale from zero to +1 such that the sum of weights of all deontics equals +1. Other contributions – e.g. plan proposals, or proposals for details of plans, are just given plausibility scores.
3 A statistical value of all these (e.g. mean value) of these assessments will be used to modify the initial credit point (e.g. by multiplying the latter with the plausibility average.
4 The statistical analysis (e.g. range of scores, or variance) may reveal considerable differences of opinion about the item, in which case more discussion, more research or information search may be called for. Step 3 may then be repeated if, for example, an initial plausibility score is revised after the author has presented further evidence in its favor, or another comment has shown it to be incorrect or implausible. The ‘final’ adjusted value is added to the author’s credit account.
5 One possible use of the resulting credit account may be its use as a complement to standard voting. If the size of the credit account can be seen as a measure of the merit of a participant’s contribution, the participant’s vote might be ‘weighted’ according to the size of the account. The result would be an indication of the impact of valuable information on the decision, giving more of a ‘say’ to participants who have demonstrated not only participation but having provided valuable information (in the view of all participants).
6 The credit account can become an added criterion for the appointment of candidates for offices whose holders will have to make decisions that cannot be validated by lengthy discussions.
7 A potential tool for helping to prevent such office holders from falling victim to the temptations of power might be to require that each ‘power decision’ must be ‘paid’ for with an appropriate amount of credit points. When an officer’s credit account is exhausted, that person will have no more ‘power’ to make important decisions – unless other citizens transfer credit points from their accounts, a step that will also make those supporters ‘accountable’ for the decisions, to the extent of their own contributions.
The curious news surrounding the CRA related agencies of the City prompt us to review a lament by Abbé Boulah from almost a decade ago, presented to the revered public among other strange tales in the book ‘Abbe´ Boulah!’ (XLibris 2009) which the revered public as the respective agencies have lamentably ignored, (just like similar reminders of unsavory real-estate goings-on in our City earlier on — actually last millennium — that were laid out, somewhat disguised in befogged discussions about architecture, building economics, planning discourse and other fascinating ruminations in a more recent book ‘Rigatopia’ – Lambert Academic Publishing 2015). Here is the premonition-laden text of the CRA chapter in ‘Abbé Boulah!:
“CRA Sticking in Abbé Boulah’s CRAw”
(From a letter by Abbé Boulah to his friend, a learned consultant on municipal government)
… By the whiskers of Holy Apostrophoulos of Kalambaka! Enlighten me on this latest conundrumous invention of the government of the City of Our Stuckness.
What elicits this degree of raging curiosity — or curious rage — about the intricacies of city governance, you ask? Today, it is the phenomenon of CRA, a device that seems uniquely suited to generate confusion in the minds of citizens. Why, isn’t it enough that those acrimonious acronyms which stick in my CRAw refer both to an agency (the Community Redevelopment Agency) AND the area (Community Redevelopment Area) designated by that agency for its selective and devious financial machinations? Wise knowleati tell me that those machinations are an instance of TIF — tax increment financing — which involve a commitment to set aside the taxes that accrue on the increase of property values as a result of the beneficial planning the CRAgency intends to unleash on the designated CRArea, to be spent solely on further infrastructure improvements in that specific area, so that it will prosper and become attractive and thereby benefit the entire community.
Sounds good, you say? I will agree that everybody should be interested in furthering the welfare and prosperity of all sectors of our town, and especially the downtown area. I do love wandering around in lively and mysterious cities, savoring their sights and smells and temptations of all senses. And I do lament, in my most high-pitched wailing voice, the way American cities seem to engage in an competition to eradicate those temptations from the walkable cityscape.
But today, dear friend and connoisseur of magistrative secrets, tell me this: Does the City not have as its main purpose to collect taxes to provide services and improvements for its residents in all its neighborhoods? And the County as well? So is the City in its entirety not a kind of CRA(rea) by definition? And the respective Government a CRA(gency)? And the same for the County?
Now, there seem to be areas in the City with problems that warrant special attention. Correct my naive ignorance: does this not strongly suggest either that those areas have been neglected (by comparison with other, better off areas) or that such special attention intends to bestow above-average benefits on those designated areas? In brief: that the government has been negligent in its duty to fairly distribute its resources, so that some areas are falling behind whatever expectations might be appropriate? Or intends to commit unfairness by future uneven distribution of resources?
While waiting expectantly for satisfactory answers to this question, there arises another in my curioucynical mind: Ready to praise and applaud the government for its insight that something has not gone right, we are stopped short, confounded and baffled by the measures taken with these CRA’s. Do the city, as well as the county governments, not have several departments toiling away on their charges to manage growth, to plan, to enhance economic development, to enforce its regulations, to attract new enterprises and financial investment here? Do we not have a Downtown Improvement Agency striving for the same admirable goals? Does the Chamber of Commerce not have committees racking their brains about the same conundrums? Did we not have blue-ribbon and zerostudded (1) volunteer citizens task forces attempting to provide our illustrious governments with guidance about all these issues?
So why do the venerable City Deadbeat Dads (Holy Chinchindra of Calcutta, forgive me for these unkind thoughts that intrude upon my inquiry) come up with this scheme of yet another agency to deal with these problems? Another agency, to be staffed and founded, housed and supplied with printer ink, toiling away making surveys one would have thought would fall under the regular monitoring duties of one or the other of the existing departments, making plans that either agree with or differ from the plans made by other agencies, which either way then have to be checked, negotiated and coordinated with all those other folks?
Why cannot the simple commitment to spend the tax money fairly and wisely on all areas of this great Town and County be achieved with a simple policy change and declaration by the governments involved — or with a statement of constitutional analysis that this is after all the basic charge of the government in the first place? Would this require too much in the way of admitting past misdeeds? We are not even asking for contrition, by all the scarecrows of Vladivostok!
Or could it be, Heaven forbid, that they are ever so slyly conceding the UNthinkable notion that such a policy declaration can’t be trusted to be adhered to in the long run? That in fact, policy statements by government aren’t worth the papyrus they are printed on, unless they come complete with fully funded new agencies and trust funds to guarantee the orderly distribution of monies? There are, to be sure, other questions besides these, that rob me of my deserved slumber. It may be too paranoid to spell them out, but some do require clarification. For example, why is nobody even conceiving of the possibility that citizens residing just outside the gerrymanderingly drawn borders of the CRA(reas) might begin harboring suspicions and concerns? To the effect, for example, that they will be comparatively less well-served by the combined efforts of governmental agencies? that they are at the mercy of the very agencies whose work has led to the deficiencies inside the CRA’s, instead of now becoming the beneficiaries of the superior wisdom, attention and benevolence of the surely infinitely more highly qualified CRAgents?
I shall not even entertain the mischievous and Danaherous (2) notion that some may be as suspicious of the competence of the CRAgents as they have by now been led (by the nose) to be of the existing agencies. What is the guarantee that there might not be areas within the respective CRA’s that might be as comparatively neglected or unfairly bestowed with preferential treatment, as the entire CRA has been in the city as a whole? I have heard the argument that the CRA is needed to instill confidence in potential investors and business leaders we’d like to attract: confidence they are now lacking? confidence that they will make a decent profit on their investment. Do we really want to attract investors who fall for this kind of tomfoolery? Unless the term ‘confidence’ be associated with ‘scheme’…
My head, dear friend, is spinning with those questions. And what makes me most suspicious is that I have not been able to pull up and read the full information the City has claimed to have posted on the CRA, on its website, and that the ‘citizen comment’ section there has a mere three brief, enthusiastic testimonials that contain no real argument or information, just pollyannic praise, posted by members of the very agency itself.
Yours in exasperation
Abbé Boulahghpfght (with a silent ghpfght).
1) The reference is to a task force called Blueprint 2000, an entity once looking boldly forward in developing plans and priorities for big infrastructure projects around the city — but not, it turns out, looking far enough into the
future and thus inadvertently condemning itself to instant obsolescence as soon as the millennium was reached. Quite apart from the fact that blueprints themselves have been a thing of ancient history for decades…)
2) This word-butchering creation refers to the late Eugene Danaher, a self-appointed Government Watchdog who has made a considerable nuisance of himself by habitually and heroically asking such uncomfortable questions; it will never be known how much mischief he has prevented doing this. (At the time of the CRAcreation he was still around; may he rest in peace in a realm where his meritorious efforts are no longer needed).
In the Fog Island Tavern:
– Bog-Hubert, I hear you had a big argument you had in here with Professor Balthus last night? Sounds like I missed a lot of fun?
– Well, Sophie, I’m not sure it was all fun; at least the good prof seemed quite put out about it.
– Oh? Did you actually admit you haven’t read his latest fat book yet?
– No. Well, uh, I haven’t read the book yet. And he knows it. But it actually was about one of Abbé Boulah’s pet peeves, or should i say his buddy’s curious findings, that got him all upset.
– Come on, do tell. What about those could upset the professor — I thought he was generally in favor of the weird theories of Abbe Boulah’s buddy?
– Yes — but it seems he had gotten some hopes up about some of their possibilities — mistakenly, as I foolishly started to point out to him. He thought that the recommendations about planning discourse and argument evaluation they keep talking about might help collective decision-making achieve more confidence and certainty about the issues they have to resolve, the plans they have to adopt or reject.
– Well, isn’t that what they are trying to do?
– Sure — at least that was what the research started out to do, from what I know. But they ran into a kind of paradoxical effect: It looks like the more carefully you try to evaluate the pros and cons about a proposed plan, the less sure you end up being about the decision you have to make. Not at all the more certain.
– Huh. That doesn’t sound right. And the professor didn’t straighten you out on that?
– I don’t think so. Funny thing: I started out agreeing that he must be right: Don’t we all expect decision-makers to carefully examine all those pros and cons, how people feel about a proposed plan, until they become confident enough — and can explain that to everybody else — that the decision is the right one? But when I began to explain Abbé Boulah’s concern — as he had mentioned it to me some time ago — I became more convinced that there’s something wrong with that happy expectation. And that is what Abbé Boulah’s research seems to have found out.
– You are speaking strangely here: on examination, you became more convinced that the more we examine the pros and cons, the less convinced we will get? Can you have it both ways?
– Yeah, it’s strange. Somebody should do some research on that — but then again, if it’s right, will the research come up with anything to convince us?
– I wish you’d explain that to me. I’ll buy you a glass of Zinfandel…
– Okay, maybe I need to rethink the whole thing again myself. Well, let me try: Somebody has proposed a plan of action, call it A, to remedy some problem or improve some condition. Or just to do something. Make a difference. So now you try to decide whether you’d support that plan, or if you were king, whether you’d go ahead with it. What do you do?
– Well, as you said: get everybody to tell you what they see as the advantages and disadvantages of the plan. The pros and cons.
– Right. Good start. And now you have to examine and ‘weigh’ them, carefully, like your glorious leaders always promise. You know how to do that? Other than to toss a coin?
– Hmm. I never heard anybody explain how that’s done. Have to think about it.
– Well, that’s what Abbé Boulah’s buddy had looked at and developed a story about how it could be done more thoroughly. He looked at the kinds of arguments people make, and found the general pattern of what he calls he ‘standard planning argument’.
– I’ve read some logic books back in school, never heard about that one.
– That’s because logic never did look at and identified let alone studied those. Not sure why, in all the years since ol’ Aristotle…
– What do they look like?
– You’ve used them all your life, just like you’ve spoken prose all your life and didn’t know it. The basic pattern is something like this: Say you want to argue for a proposed plan A: You start with the ‘conclusion’ or proposal:
“Yes, let’s implement plan A
1. Plan A will result in outcome B — given some conditions C;
and we assume that
2. Conditions C will be present;
3. We ought to aim for outcome B.”
– It sounds a little more elaborate than…
– Than what you probably are used to? Yes, because you usually don’t bother to state the premises you think people already accept so you ‘take them for granted’.
– Okay, I understand and take it for granted. And that argument is a ‘pro’ one; I assume that a ‘con’ argument is basically using the same pattern but with the conclusion and some premises negated. So?
– What you want to find out is whether the decision ‘Do A’ is plausible. Or better: whether or to what extent it is more plausible than not to do A. And you are looking at the arguments pro and con because you think that they will tell you which one is ‘more plausible’ than the other.
– Didn’t you guys talk about a slightly different recipe a while back — something about an adapted Poppa’s rule about refutation?
– Amazing: you remember that one? Well, almost: it was about adapting Sir Karl Raimund Popper’s philosophy of science principle to planning: that we are entitled to accept a scientific hypothesis as tentatively supported or ‘corroborated’ as they say in the science lab, to the extent we have done our very best to refute it, — show that it is NOT true, — and it has resisted all those attempts and tests. Since no supporting evidence’ can ever conclusively ‘prove’ the hypothesis but one true observation of the contrary can conclusively disprove it. It’s the hypothesis of that all swans are white — never proved by any number of white swans you see, but conclusively shot down by just one black swan.
– So how does it get adapted to planning? And why does it have to be adapted, not just adopted?
– Good question. In planning, your proposed plan ‘hypothesis’ isn’t true or false — just more or less plausible. So refutation doesn’t apply. But the attitude is basically the same. So Abbé Boulah’s buddy’s adapted rule says: “We can accept a plan proposal as tentatively supported only to the extent we have not only examined all the arguments in its favor, but more importantly, all the arguments against it — and all those ‘con’ arguments have been shown to be less plausible or outweighed by the ‘pro’ arguments.”
– Never heard that one before either, but it sounds right. But you keep saying ‘plausible’? Aren’t we looking for ‘truth’? For ‘correct’ or ‘false’?
– That’s what Abbé Boulah and his buddy are railing against — planning decisions just are not ‘correct’ or ‘false’, not ‘true’ or false. We are arguing about plans precisely because they aren’t ‘true’ or ‘false’ — yet. Nor ‘correct or ‘false’, like a math problem. Planning problems are ‘wicked problems’; the decisions are not right or wrong, they are ‘good or bad’. Or, to use a term that applies to all the premises: more or less plausible, which can be interpreted as true or false only for the rare ‘factual’ claims or premises, or more likely ‘probable’ for the factual-instrumental premises 1 and factual claims, premise 2, but as just plausible, or good or bad, for the ought claims, premise 3, and the ‘conclusion’.
– Okay, I go along with that. For now. It sounds… plausible?
– Ahh. Getting there, Sophie; good. It’s also a matter of degrees, like probability. If you want to express how ‘sure’ you are about the decision or about one of the premises, just the terms ‘plausible and ‘implausible’ are not expressing that degree at all. You need a scale with more judgments. One that goes from ‘totally plausible’ on one side to ‘totally implausible’ on the other, with some ‘more or less’ scores in-between. One with a midpoint of ‘don’t know, can’t decide’. For example, a scale from +1 to -1 with midpoint zero.
– Hmm, It’s a lot to swallow, all at once. But go on. I guess the next task is to make some of your ‘plausibility’ judgments about each of the premises, to see how the plausibility of the whole argument depends on those?
– Couldn’t have said it better myself. Now consider: if the argument as a whole is to be ‘totally plausible’ — with a plausibility value of +1 — wouldn’t that require that all the premise plausibility values also were +1?
– Well — and if one of those plausibility values turns out to be ‘less that ‘totally plausible, let’s say with a pl value of 0.9 — wouldn’t that reduce the overall argument plausibility?
– Stands to reason. And I guess you’ll say that if one of them had a negative value, the overall argument plausibility value would turn negative as well?
– Very good! If someone assigns a -.8 plausibility value to the premise 1 or 3, for example, in the above argument that is intended as a ‘pro’ argument, that argument would turn into a ‘con’ argument — for that person. So to express that as a mathematical function, you might say that the argument plausibility is equal to either the lowest of the premise plausibility values, or a product of all those values. (Let’s deal with the issue of what to do with cases of several negative plausibilities later on, to keep things simple. Also, some people might have questions about the overall ‘validity’ or plausibility of the entire argument pattern, and how it ‘fits’ the case at hand; so we might have to assign a pl-value to the whole pattern; but that doesn’t affect the issue of the paradox that much here.)
– So, Bog-Hubert, lets get back to where you left off. Now you have argument plausibility values; okay. Weren’t we talking about argument ‘weight’ somewhere? Weighing the arguments? Where does that come in?
– Good question! Okay — consider just two arguments, one ‘pro’ and one ‘con’. You may even assume that they both have good overall plausibilities, so that both have close to +1 (for the ‘pro’ argument) and -1 (for the ‘con’ argument). You might consider how important they are, by comparison, and thus how much of a ‘weight’ each should have towards the overall Plan plausibility. It’s the ‘ought’ premise — the goal or concern of the consequence of implementing the plan, that carries the weight. You decide which one is more important than the other, and give if a higher weight number.
– Something like ‘is it more important to get the benefit, the advantage of the plan, than to avoid the possible disadvantage?
– Right. And to express that difference in importance, you could use a scale from zero to +1, and a rule that all the weight numbers add up to +1. The ‘+1’ simply means that it carried the whole decision judgment.
– That’s a whole separate operation, isn’t it? and wouldn’t each person doing this come up with different weights? And, coming to think about it, different plausibility values?
– Yes: All those judgments are personal, subjective judgments. I know that many people will be quite disappointed by that — they want ‘objective’ measures of performance, about which there’s no quibbling. Sorry. But that’s a different issue, too — we’ll have to devote another evening and a good part of Vodçek’s Zinfandel supply for that one.
– Okay, so what you are saying is that, subjective or objective, we’re heading for the same paradox?
– Right again. First, let’s review the remaining steps in the assessments. We have the argument plausibility values — each person separately — and the weight or relative importance for each of the ‘ought premises. We can multiply the argument plausibility with the weight of the goal or concern in the ‘ought’ premise, and you have your argument weight. Adding them all up — remember that all the ‘con’ arguments will have negative plausibility values — will give you one measure of ‘plan plausibility’. You might then use that as a guide to making the decision — for example: to be adopted, a plan should have at least a positive pl-value, or at least a pl-value you’ve specified as a minimum threshold value for plan adoption.
– And that’s better than voting?
– I think so — but again, that’s a different issue too, also worth serious discussion. Depending on the problem and the institutional circumstances, decisions may have to be made by traditional means such as voting, or left to a ‘leader’ person in authority to make decisions. A plan-pl value would then just be a guide to the decision.
– So what’s the problem, the paradox?
– The problem is this: It turns out that the more arguments you consider in such a process, the more you examine each of the premises of the arguments (by applying the same method to the premises) and the more honest you are about your confidence in the plausibility of all the premises — they’re all about the future, remember, none can be determined to be 100% certain — the closer the overall pl-result will approach the midpoint ‘don’t know’ value, close to zero.
– That’s what the experiments and simulations of such evaluations show?
– Yes. You could see that already with our example above of just two arguments, equally plausible but one pro and the other con. If they also have the same weight, the plan plausibility would be zero, point blank. Not at all what the dear professor wanted to get from such a thorough analysis; very disappointing.
– Ahh. I see. Is he one of those management consultants who advise companies how to deal with difficult problems, and get the commissions by having to promise that his approaches will produce decisively convincing results?
– Oh Sophie — Let’s not go there…
– So the professor, he’s in denial about that?
– At least in a funk…
– Does he have any ideas about what to do about this? Or how to avoid it?
– Well, we agreed that the only remedy we could think of so far is to tweak the plan until it has fewer features that people will feel as ‘con’ arguments: until the plan -pl will at least be more visibly on the plus side of the scale.
– Makes you wonder whether in the old days, when people relied on auspices and ‘divine judgments’ to tip the scales, were having a wiser attitude about this.
– At least they were smart enough to give those tricks a sense of mystery and ritual — more impressive than just rolling dice — which some folks can see as a kind of prosaic, crude divine judgment?
– Hmm. If they made sure that all the concerns leading affected people to have concerns about a plan, what would be wrong with that?
– Other than that you’d have to load the dice — and worry about being found out? What’s the matter, Vodçek?
– You guys — I’ll have to cut you off…