WRONG QUESTION?

(Thorbjørn Mann overhearing a conversation in The Fog Island Tavern)

– What in three twisters’ names is wrong with you today, Bog-Hubert? How many times have I told you that reading those papers from the mainland in the morning will just ruin your attitude for an otherwise glorious foggy day on the island? And furiously stirring your weird habitual dose of crushed red peppers your coffee with nothing in it except will n o t improve its taste! At least let the grounds and the peppers settle to the bottom where they belong!

– Ah Vodçek, quit your nagging. But you’re right, I should have left reading the paper to the evening when a dose of guilt for imbibing too much of your Zin would balance out the outrage this so-called news creates in any righteously reading man’s mind. Well, too late now: What is wrong with these people?

– All right then, I’ll let you vent yer spleen this time. Let’s get this out of your system before the others come in so you won’t ruin their moods too. What dismal news gets your temper up today?

– Well, it’s not really news. It’s that they can’t come up with some useful new ideas. I was just reading this column, some right-wing think tank guy, pontificating about the stupidity of the leftists who want to overturn the capitalist system of free enterprise and replace it with socialism, big government and taxes for free welfare for everyone.

– Right, sounds like the old battle cries: capitalism versus socialism, less government, more government, old hat slogans, but they still work, getting people worked up, right? So can you really blame the politicians to use them? If they don’t have any better ideas?

– You’re putting the finger on the sore spot: better ideas. Or the lack of any.

– Well, if you are worried about the size and power of government, and the issue hasn’t been resolved yet – which I agree it doesn’t look like they have, yet – what’s wrong with hammering away on the question to get some better answers about it? Or are you finally deciding which side you are going to root for now? Which side you’re on?

– Vodçek, you know me better than that. There are well-intentioned ism-ists on both sides, equally exasperating. Isn’t the problem that they all, right and left, each blinded by the alleged flaws and misdeeds of the other side, are missing the real problems? Capitalism-socialism, big government – small government:  all

w r o n g   q u e s t i o n!?

– I see. I have some ideas about that myself. But please enlighten me: what, in your mind, is the right question?

Misrepresentation, polarization

– Or questions – there is never just one. The first problem – before getting to the better questions — is the way those issues are framed in the first place – both deliberately misrepresenting the other. Needless polarization. Nobody on the right really wants a regime with a government so feeble that it can’t effectively deal with any common problems we can’t address as the rugged individualists we are supposed to be; nobody on the left really wants a big government so big that it would tyrannical control every aspect of our lives, along the lines of older feudal, monarchist, soviet-style communist, fascist, maoist, militarist let alone mono-religious and other dictatorial regimes. So the first step would be to quit that misrepresentation and begin to focus on the underlying and shared problems.

– Shared problems? Ad several of those? Explain.

The control of power

– Just a few, for starters, should be enough. One main feature that truly bugs me is that none of those regime models have yet found a good way to deal with the problem of power.

– You don’t think the provisions of western really democratic constitutions are adequate?

– Yes and no. – Yes, I think it can’t be said too often that those provisions – based on the separation and balance of powers in the political governance system – are important and impressive achievements of civilization; the best we have seen in history. When they work properly.

– And you are saying they don’t?

– Yes. Compared to some regimes that emulated these trappings but ended up turning autocratic, the mechanics of which remain to be fully understood, I think you can argue they are still valid. But —

– I agree. The assumption of some revolutionary regimes that it would be enough to wrest the power away from the current powers and just proclaim that thereby power has been returned to ‘the people’, it is rather childish if not deliberately deceptive.

– Yes: they ignore that in whatever regime that needs positions of power – which every society does need, regardless of its policy-decision-making process: any ship at sea suddenly encountering an iceberg must have a captain who decides whether to pass it on starboard or port, the decision can’t wait for a lengthy deliberative process – such power becomes addictive and self-serving. And therefore must be controlled.

– But, you were going to say?

– Yes: Even in so-called democratic systems, the traditional power control provisions in the governance system are losing their effectiveness, because the military and private enterprise sector that has morphed into huge near–monopolistic, transnational corporate monsters, and financial entities, as well as the media conglomerates, where the governance system controls do not apply, have intruded and overwhelmed the governance control systems. To the point where legislatures can now without constraint pass laws that ignore and contradict even explicit popular opinion and referendum results. Do I have to give you more detailed examples?

– I get the idea. How did this happen?

– That is one of the questions that need to be asked and explored. But even the governance system based on the parliamentary principle of deliberation before deciding – remember, the old civilized gentlemen’s agreement of “let’s leave our weapons outside, sit down and talk, each side listen to the other, and then decide”, is fatally incomplete and flawed in one crucial respect.

– Ah, I see. Majority voting.

Voting as a decision criterion

– Yes. Majority voting; where votes are determined less by reasoning, communication and deliberation than by propaganda, partisan news reporting of the media, if not outright censorship, and ignorance. When voters are led by government and media misinformation and lack of adequate news reporting, to vote for going to wars in faraway countries they can’t even find on a map, let alone explain what threat those countries pose to our national interests, what is the value or merit of those votes? But that is what we get decisions based on the count of votes where there’s no distinction between the votes of well-informed people who have been listening to each other, getting the supporting evidence before making their judgment, and votes by totally uninformed folks who may just have been getting one side of the issues, if any.

– You’re getting yourself on thin ice there, my friend.

– I know, I know. As if all this global warming will even get us any ice on which to get ourselves in trouble. Yes, the last thing we should aim for is a system that denies any person the right to make their opinion count, however ill-or well-informed. But that does not mean that we should stop looking for better ways to inform each other, to get people involved in the discourse, to get a better overview of all the opinions on each side, to eventually get decisions better influenced by the merit of all entries into the discussion? To even refrain from looking for better ways?

– Calm down, Bog-Hubert. I applaud your exasperation. Yes, it’s curious that we don’t hear more about such improvement efforts.

– Yes, Vodçek – all we hear about is the constant battle-cry of ‘getting the vote out’ and the controversies about gerrymandering and other obstacles to people’s voting rights. But isn’t there another aspect to this that deserves attention and suggests looking for alternative measures of merit of discussion entries that should influence decisions?

– What’s that, besides the issue of finding out who can be trusted to make the decisions we don’t have time to even discuss?

Issues transcending traditional governance boundaries

– Well, think about it. The challenges we are facing, increasingly, are not neatly confined to the geographical governance boundaries where we can (if we really want to, which is another question) count voters and determine majorities. Where law-makers like those I heard about in North Carolina can make fools of themselves (and apparently even get voter support) for proposed legislation such as denying state funding for research on global warming and rising sea levels that might result in predictions of more that three or four feet of sea level rise. Which well illustrates your point about who to trust with such decisions…

– Yes, they may have very powerful legislators there? Or governors? That can stop global warming single-handedly?

– Don’t you wish? For one, that gets back to our power issue. But more importantly: when problems like global warming, or ocean pollution, transcend the borders of our arbitrary governance entities and their governing institutions – what are you going to do to get decisions based on citizen participation, with the majority voting system? Whose information – concerns, fears, ideas, votes or judgments — are going to be invited to contribute to the discussion, to the formation of decisions?

– I see. How do you determine who will or should have the voting rights, or even legitimate polling credentials, to calculate majorities. So you are saying that for such issues, there should be different decision criteria?

– Right. For example, criteria such as the plausibility measures we could derive from the systematic assessment of the pro and con arguments people raise in planning discussions, in policy-making discussions. As I said, for example: the abbeboulistic ideas we have discussed in this very tavern should be seen as challenges to all the better funded think tanks to come up with better ideas, if they don’t think these proposals are worth trying out?

– Hmm. I see. So what do you think should be done about all this? That you are so disappointed not seeing in your morning paper?

– Good question. Well, even with my fortifications, your coffee isn’t powerful enough to make me conjure up all the answers by my lil’ ol’ self, I’m sorry. But didn’t we discuss some ideas here in this very Tavern, that should be considered as first step items on a better agenda than trying to figure out how to get candidates elected to ensure party majorities – majorities by party discipline, by Abbé Boulah’s drooping mustache!! — in the bought and paid-for institutions that we have determined to be systemically incapable of dealing with the problems?

Agenda?
Discourse platform

– Agenda? Let me guess. The development of the better discourse for planning and political decision-making would be right on the top of that one, if I know you.

Participation incentives
Assessment of contribution merit

– Right. A platform that includes meaningful incentives for participating, and at least the possibility for a more systematic assessment of the pro and con arguments and their supporting evidence.

Overview display

– Is that complication really necessary? I’d have thought that a good, concise display of all the pertinent aspects and opinions would be the more important addition to current practice to inform participants?

Development of measures of proposal merit to guide decisions

– I agree – it’s an important item – but the key to develop different measures of merit of the information to guide the overall decisions is the combination of the incentive provisions with the assessment results. And …

Control of power

– I see where you are headed with this: These provisions are part of your Abbeboulistic schemes of having people in power p a y for the privilege of making power decisions?

– Right. At least that is one partial idea for getting at the problems. I don’t know if the fact that these provisions are all interrelated tools serving different purposes, if that is a problem or an advantage. But as I said before, isn’t it at least a challenge to come up with better ideas if you don’t like these suggestions? O buckle down and engage with this agenda, discuss them, work out the details, do some experiments?

– Bog-Hubert, I don’t know if I should congratulate or feel sorry for you guys who keep harping on this. Well, here’s a shot of Fundador to fortify your coffee. And give you the strength to do what needs to be done, as they say in Minnesota. Okay if I don’t light it first?

– By all means, if you join me. Cheers.

–0–

Advertisements

About public planning discourse contribution credits

A Fog Island Tavern Discussion. Thorbjoern Mann 2019

 

– Bog-Hubert: Got a minute? I want to ask you something…

– Hi Sophie — sure — if it’s not too complex and involving long-term memory this early in the morning…

– Coffee hasn’t taken yet?

– Well,  It’s the third cup, so there’s a chance…. What’s the question?

– Planning discourse contribution credit points. Remember the other day, there was a lively discussion here about the credit points in that planning discourse platform you guys — I mean Abbé Boulah and his buddy up in town have been cooking up — and I’ve been telling my email friend over in Europe about it. He is politely asking to get to know more about it, but I have a feeling he’s, well, not outright against it, but very skeptical about the idea.

– Well, I wouldn’t blame him; it is a bit involved, if you’d try to apply all parts of what it might be used for. Any feelings about what specifically is bothering him?

-It could be that I haven’t been able to explain it well enough; the discussion was mainly about the use of those credits outside of the planning discussions itself. The idea of those credits replacing the rile of money in the political process. I got the impression he sees it as elitist. So he may have lost sight of their basic purpose in the planning discourse itself, that as I understand it establishes their value in the first place. So maybe you can help me go through the basic benefits or uses of those points from the very beginning of the process? What they are for, again?

– Well, I’m glad you’re asking, because since that discussion, I’ve gotten kind of confused about it myself: it can get kind of complicated, and there are some questions that aren’t quite worked out yet, as far as I can see. So it gives me the chance to clarify things in my mind as well, I hope. As that old German professor said that Abbé Boulah keeps invoking: If you are not quite certain about something, it helps to give a lecture about it. Or better, a discussion, so you can interrupt and ask questions any time it’s getting derailed.

– Okay.

– Hmm. Let’s see. So we assume somebody has raised an issue, started a discussion about some problem or plan that needs attention; asking that something needs to be done about it, because it’s an an issue that affects, bothers, hurts many people in different ways. A community problem, perhaps even in a community that isn’t clearly defined — in that people in several different governance entities — state, countries — are affected and not at all clear what can be done about it and who is supposed to do it. And we optimistically assume that there is something like that discourse platform where all that can be discussed, eh?

-If you say so.

Participation: getting all pertinent information

– Well, there’s got to be some talk about it, whether it’s properly public and organized is a different question. Now the first thing that needs to happen is to get the information about that issue. What’s going on, who is getting affected, and how? And who has the knowledge, — call it expertise or just common sense — about what could be done about it — and then how that in turn would affect people. The common cry and demand is for public ‘participation’. The principle is that all the concerns of all the affected and interested parties must be brought into the discussion so that that can be given ‘due consideration’ in making plans and decisions, right?

– Right. Shouldn’t that be a matter of course, by now?

Credit points as incentives to contribute

– Sure. Well, governments don’t seem to like it much. But it’s also a bit of a problem for the public. You can make all kinds of provisions for citizen participation, but the fact is that that requires time and effort on the part of those citizens, time and effort that the ordinary citizen doesn’t always can afford and doesn’t get paid for, right? And some folks may have their suspicions about whether and how their concerns will actually make much if any difference in the decision. So shouldn’t there be some incentives — for everybody who has something meaningful to contribute to the issue, to contribute that information?

– Hmm. I see the problem: you can’t do it with money, it isn’t in anybody’s budget yet. So you are saying that it should be done with those credit points?

– Yes. At the very least, there should be some form of public recognition, appreciation for bringing in pertinent information. So you’d reward any such contribution with a ‘civic credit’ unit. And that credit should actually be ‘worth’ something, not just an empty and useless gesture. We’ll get to that later.

– Oh boy. That looks like more of a problem than a solution to me — now everybody comes in with all kinds of silly information, all the same ‘concerns’ or demands — what a mess.

Avoiding duplication, repetition

– You are quite right. That’s why full credit should be given only to the first entry of the same essential content — not to repetitions of the same point. This provision, incidentally, serves another purpose besides keeping the mass of incoming information manageable: it encourages people to enter the information fast, not to wait and let the discussion go around in circles missing a vital item of information.

– Okay, that makes sense. But is it a problem that some people who have made an effort to enter information but don’t get it in fast enough, will be annoyed at having their effort ignored?

Getting the information ‘fast’

– Good point. This makes it supremely important to have a good public display of information entered, updated as fast as possible, ideally of course, in ’real time’ so that a new item is instantly seen the moment it’s posted. The technology for doing that is available today, but if you want to allow information to get entered by different means — letters, phone calls, email etc. there will necessarily be some delay in getting it posted. So if there’s such a delay, you may want to have people who enter the same point before it gets posted for everybody to see, share that reward.

– Uh. Okay, but…

Decisions based on the merit of contributions

– Ah, I think I see what bothers you. It looks like something like restricting people’s ‘voting rights’ or ‘rights to free speech, does it? Yes. That impression would be bad, not necessarily justified. There must be a clear distinction between entering an information item, and making it ‘count’ in the decision. As long as decisions are made on the basis of vote counts, that impression is understandable, sure. But what we are after, is to reach decisions based on the merit of the information, not just on the number of votes — votes that may be un-informed , ill-informed, or deliberately ignoring the concerns of many other parties — the losing minority of the voting process. And to determine the merit of a piece of information or argument pro or con a plan, it only needs to the stated once. But now we have to deal with the issue of the method by which the merit of a piece of information can be determined.

– Yes. Just another question, before we get into that: what about intentionally ‘bad’ information? Wrong or unintentionally ill-informed claims, as you said — even deliberately false, misleading, confusing information? Trolls? Obscene language? Shouldn’t there be some boundaries on that in public discourse? — You agree, Vodçek?

– Well, Sophie, my responsibility as the keeper of this establishment is a little different than what’s going on in a public discourse. See, I am very much in favor of freedom of speech, in principle. But I also have a great interest in keeping this tavern somewhat civilized. So here, I feel entitled to ask people who start that kind of thing to please shut up or leave, before it degenerates into physical brawls. And I’m using my personal judgment on drawing the boundary, such as it may be, and I’m okay with some people thinking it’s not strict enough, and others steamed up about my stuffy old-timer attitude. Now in a public discussion, I’m not sure my standards should be imposed on everybody. So who’s entitled to set those standards? In fact, shouldn’t everybody have the right to publicly make fools or buffoons out of themselves?

– Huh. Never looked at it that way. Some people seem to get a kick out of doing that. A right to offend?

‘Empty’ acknowledgement points and later judgments

– I think Vodçek has a point there, Sophie. Whether you want to call it a right or not. But the platform process is actually dealing with that in a different way. It doesn’t try to finagle the distinction between acceptable and unacceptable entries — by language or content. So it accepts all entries as they come, stores them and makes them accessible in what it calls the ‘Verbatim’ file. And it acknowledges an entry as a contribution with a ‘point’ that is not much more than that: an acknowledgement: You participated. But then it gives all the other participants the opportunity to respond to it, either by making another verbal entry, or by assigning the original — offending — entry a judgment score. One on a scale of, say, minus 3 (for totally offensive, unacceptable, useless) to plus 3 for totally valuable and proper content. So if there is an actual ‘account’ for those contributions, that contribution point will add to — or diminish — a person’s public credit account, as judged by the public, by all participants in that discourse.

– Well, how will that be done? Are you saying that everybody gives every such contribution a judgments score?

– That would be one way, or a first step towards such a credit point account. Sure, it’s a little more involved that the current practice of ‘liking’ or adding another kind of emoticon to a person’s comment. But some such evaluation, actually a somewhat more specific evaluation, will be necessary further on in the process if the participants are going to be serious about getting a decision based on the merit of all contributions. Then the adjustment of a person’s initial entry will just be result of that systematic deliberation.

– Sounds good, but you’ll have to give me some more detail about that, Bog-Hubert.

Plausibility and importance judgments of argument premises

– Patience, Sophie. First let me ask you, were you here to listen to Abbé Boulah about his buddy’s method for evaluation planning arguments?

– You mean that story about looking at all the premises of those arguments and giving them plausibility scores?

– Right. Plausibility scores, on a scale of -1 (for ‘totally implausible’) to +1 (for ‘totally plausible, virtually certain) and the midpoint of zero (for ‘don’t know, can’t judge without more evidence…). But also weights of relative importance of all the ‘ought’ premises in the entire set of arguments pro and con a plan proposal. That one would be on a scale of zero (for totally unimportant) to +1 (for totally important) such that all the weights of all the ought-premises in that set of arguments will add up to 1.

– Right,  I got that part. I remember there was some math involved in getting from that bunch of scores to an overall measure of plausibility of the plan being discussed — I’m not sure I really understand that.

– We can go over that part separately some other time. Can you have some faith, for now, that some such equations can be developed that explain how your overall plan assessment should depend on those scores for the argument premises?

– Well… I’m not sure I’m ready for buying that cat in a bag, but let’s hear the rest of the story about the credit points.

– Okay. Remember, a person’s comments to the planning discourse, that is, to a discussion about whether a proposed plan should be adopted for implementation, can be roughly distinguished as three kinds of claims, premises, of arguments: One that claims that the plan A (or some plan detail) will lead to some outcome, result, consequence. B, given some conditions C. Another claim is about whether B ought to be aimed for or not; and the third is about whether the conditions C under which A will produce B are actually present or will be present when the plan is implemented.

Premise plausibility and importance scores are merit judgments

– Yes I remember now. And the plausibility and importance scores actually are judgments about the merit of those claims — is that what you are saying?

– Bravo! That is precisely it: those assessment scores are another way of saying how much someone’s comment providing those claims is worth, in that planning discussion. So if we now get some overall statistic of the whole group’s assessment scores of those contribution items, we are not only getting a measure of that item’s merit or weight towards the group’s plan decision, which is also a measure of that entry’s merit in the entire discourse. And the original ‘credit point’ acknowledgement can now be adjusted up or down according to those scores. If the scores as plausible, truthful, supported by evidence, and the ought-premise is important, the entry credit will shift from just ‘present’ upwards to a positive value, but if the claims are less credible, untrustworthy, the entry credit will become negative.

– I see, It’s beginning to sound interesting. But won’t everything now depend on the math shenanigans you’ll use to add up or whatever you are doing to the scores?

– True. But as we said, let’s assume for now that this can be made to work. Because then, there are more interesting things that can be done with these credits.

– Well, go on.

Calculation of overall plan plausibility
Versus
Calculation of group’s judgment of premise merit

– Fine. Where were we? Okay. With a little help from our computers, we have calculated the overall judgment scores for the proposed plan, from all the personal scores of discourse participants. And along the way, the computer has stored and used all the judgment scores for the set of argument premises that the participants have made. So we can also calculate the group scores for each premise judgment, don’t you see? And that would be one way to express the value, the merit of that piece of information in the opinion of that group. So now the original contribution credit can be adjusted up or down according to that score.

Negative credit scores discouraging poor or unsupported contributions

– Ah, I see. So that will become part of the contributor’s credit point account. And you think that will be some kind of encouragement to make valuable, constructive comments?

– Yes. And discouraging information that is misleading, false, unsupported by evidence or further plausible arguments, that will reduce your credit account.

– So why should people care about that? Is that account made public?

– Good question. I guess that needs to be discussed, or left to each participant to decide, whether to make it public or not. But the real question is how that account can be really useful to a person, other than giving them the personal satisfaction of having made useful contributions. Can you think of ways that could happen?

– Credit points influence on overall decision?

– Well, now that you mention it: would it make any difference in how the decision is made for the plan?

– Hmm. I guess it could. It depends on how each decision has to be made, legitimately, in each case. You could argue, for example, that the total public score for a plan should determine the decision. In the sense that if that final score is positive (somewhere between zero and plus one, or above a threshold that must be agreed upon, the plan is approved. If it falls below that, it’s rejected? Then, of course an individual’s contribution merit will be part of that final score.

– But that’s not very visible, right?  I remember those equations or ‘aggregation functions’, I think you called them, to  somehow add up all the individual judgments  to some overall score and then to a group score?

– Yes, that part needs discussion, sure. For now, let’s say that this overall score is just a recommendation to guide an official’s decision or elected committee’s final, traditional yes/no vote (that may be mandated by law or constitution), then somebody might suggest that the vote of each member of the voting entity could be ‘weighted’ according to that person’s credit score: If you have a high contribution credit score, your vote could be ‘worth’ more than the vote of somebody whose credit account is low or negative because of a lot of bad contributions to public discourse. Okay, okay, don’t hit me. That calls for a lot more discussion, and perhaps agreements in each case. But it offers some interesting possibilities that do need discussion, don’t you agree?

– Interesting, yes. I’m not sure I see how it would really improve things, perhaps I need to look at some actual examples. By the way, isn’t this why my friend was worrying about this scheme being, wait, what did he call it: some kind of meritocracy? Is that bad?

– Well, it’s a valid concern if in a society power and income is going mainly to people who have been declared as ‘meriting’, at the expense of all the other folks who never evened a chance to build up a merit for anything. Where ‘merit’ is mainly measures in financial terms.  The kind of measure we are talking about here is a very different  thing, isn’t it? Actually moving away from the power of money, wouldn’t you say? But I’ d say there is an issue of balancing the concern for getting decisions based on the merit — value, truth, plausibility, appeal, quality — of information brought into the discussion about plans, and making sure that the concerns of people who don’t have the time or opportunity to earn those credits aren’t being neglected.

– Yes, Bog-hubert: balancing is the problems sounds like the key. I agree that this open planning discourse platform seems to aim at making that easier. The concerns may be articulated and entered into the record to be considered by representatives of people who can’t do that for themselves for one reason or another — children, people too worn out by their work to get as well-informed as the democratic ideals want us to assume. But maybe there should be more robust safeguards to ensure that the meritocracy aspect doesn’t get out if line?

– I agree. As I said, there are many aspects that need more detail work and discussion, or better ideas…

Credit account use ‘outside of project discourse

– Now, those issues were all potential uses ‘within’ the discourse about a specific plan. Perhaps looking at how your contribution credits might be used ‘outside’ the particular project, in general, might be more useful?

– What do you mean?

– Well, think about it. Your financial credit score makes a difference in your ability to get a mortgage or a business loan. Could your public discourse contribution credit score make a difference in landing a job, say, or a public office? As part of your qualification for such offices? Sort of indicating how much you can be trusted to use sound judgment in decisions that can’t wait for a lengthy public discussion? A more quantitative indicator of your reputation?

– I see, yes. People are looking at a candidate’s voting record in previous positions, already — but that can be misleading, not very clear information. So yes, such a contribution credit record may be useful.

– Hey, I’m not so sure about that. One way of looking at it is how single incidents can destroy years of apparently trustworthy behavior and judgments: Like your famous Zinfandel: One glass of Zin poured into a sinkful of dishwater doesn’t do much to the essence of dishwater — but what do you get if you pour one glass of dishwater  into a bottle of Zin, eh? One big case of defrauding Medicare by millions of dollars should make you ineligible for any job in the government’s health departments, shouldn’t it?

– You’d think.

– Well. Those details must be ironed out, but I’d say that’s one way your credit account can be come ‘fungible’ — worth something, in everyday social life. Can you think of other ways?

– I think I need more coffee to cope with all these unusual issues. Vodçek, can you help with that? Too early for Zin, anyway, after that story of yours.

– Sure, Sophie, here you go. I remember hearing Abbé Boulah mention some real unusual ways to apply that credit account — something about making officials pay for their privilege to make decisions?

      Contribution credits versus money and power in public governance:  

PAYING for power decisions? 

– Right, I heard that too. I thought he and his buddy were really going out in utopia-land with those ideas. But it’s sticking in my mind: If you really are looking for ways to get some better control of the role of money and the temptations for less than beneficial public use of its power in public governance: do you see many promising innovative ideas out there? Better ideas than the traditional venerable ‘balance of power’, term limits, re-election, and in the extreme: impeachment tools? That all are more and more losing their effectiveness to the power of money from the private sector that is undermining those provisions? Because they don’t cover the relations between private sector money and public controls well enough?

– Well, how could ‘paying for decisions’ make a dent in that? You are making me curious.

– Okay. See, It’s really based on a different understanding of power. It’s not only the ability to make important decisions about your own life — where we call it ‘empowerment’, as a good thing, right? — but also about projects that involve others, that are too big for just one person to decide for themselves. So what if we look at the desire for power as a human kind of need, just like the need for food and shelter?  Getting those are considered close to human rights — but we make folks pay for them. So why should we treat power differently from those needs? But we also need to find better ways of preventing power from becoming addictive and abusive. Now, can we say that the general social concern regarding needs is to first make sure that people will be able to earn the means to satisfy those needs, that is, to p a y for them, and then actually make them pay. So why not apply that pattern to the power issue?

– But, uh. But…

– But but. Yes, I hear you: Pay? But with money, no: that would just dig our hole deeper? Well,  perhaps we can use a different currency?  Now that we have one: what about paying for public power decisions with your discourse contribution credit points? The more important a decision, the more points you need as an office holder, to make it. And you use up your credits with each decision. There might be a way to treat it like a kind of investment by providing a way to earn credits back with the public appreciation of successful, beneficial decisions, which means that if it was a poor decision, you lost your credit investment and some of your power to make more decisions. If it’s all gone: time to step down from the power office, hmm?

– What about decisions that require more credit points than a single person can ever come up with?

– Good question! But doesn’t the very question contain the core of the answer? See, if you are a faithful supporter of an office holder, meaning that you’re confident that this person will make good judgments in power decisions, you can transfer some of your own hard-earned judgment credits to that person, to enable them to make those big decisions on your behalf. Not money: judgment credits. Instead of all the election financing ending up in the advertising media coffers…

– Hey, great idea! Perhaps I could even specify the kind of programs and decisions my points should be used for?

– Power to your kind of people! Yes! There might be a way to build that into the system — with the possibility of your taking your credits back if the person makes decisions you don’t approve of, huh?

– Bog-Hubert, Sophie, do I have to point out to you that this devious scheme will make you, the supplier of credit point power, just as a c c o u n t a b l e for the decisions you support? Because you too, would lose your points for poor decisions? With the possibility that you too might lose your credit investment in an incompetent power holder?

– Trying to scare us now, Vodçek? Yes, it makes sense: I guess it will make people more careful with their credit point contributions, besides being able to ‘punish’ politicians who win elections with promises like ‘no more taxes’ but then go ahead and raise taxes anyway once they are in office. If you can withdraw your credit points, that is.

Power and accountability

– Yes: If your glorious leader has squandered all his own and your points on lousy decisions, there may be nothing to get back. Unless we can make those fellows go back to regular status to earn more points to pay back their credit point debts… I guess the point is: all the talk about power and accountability is rather meaningless without an account whose wealth you could lose is you use your power unwisely or irresponsibly.

– This is getting way too futuristic to have a chance to be realized any time soon, Bog-Hubert, don’t you think?

– Well, that’s what they said about those crazy fools who said let’s build flying machines… Abbé Boulah says that the technology for doing these things is already available, so now it’s just about working out the details, getting the system programmed and set up, and getting public support for putting it into practice. But perhaps there are better ways to do those things — public planning discourse, better control of power, — could better ideas be triggered into the open by the very outrageous nature of these proposals?

The discourse platform as a first needed step

– Sounds like what we need as a first step is that planning discourse platform itself, to run the public discussion needed to reach agreement about what to do. And to work out the details?

– Couldn’t have said it better myself, Sophie.

Overview

–o–


‘CONNECTING THE DOTS’ OF SOME GOVERNANCE PROBLEMS

There is much discussion about flaws of ‘democratic’ governance systems, supposedly leading to increasingly threatening crises. Calls for ‘fixing’ these challenges tend to focus on single problems, urging single ‘solutions’. Even recommendations for application of ‘systems thinking’ tools seem to be fixated on the phase of ‘problem understanding’ of the process; while promotions of AI (artificial / augmented intelligence) sound like solutions are likely to be found by improved collection and analysis of data, of information in existing ‘knowledge bases’. Little effort seems devoted to actually ‘connecting the dots’ – linking the different aspects and problems, making key improvements that serve multiple purposes. The following attempt is an example of such an effort to develop comprehensive ‘connecting the dots’ remedies – one that itself arguably would help realize the ambitious dream of democracy, proposed for discussion. A selection (not a comprehensive account) of some often invoked problems, briefly:

“Voter apathy” The problem of diminishing participation in current citizen participation in political discourse and decisions / elections, leading to unequal representation of all citizens’ interests;

“Getting all needed information”
The problem of eliciting and assembling all pertinent ‘documented’ information (‘data’) but also critical ‘distributed’ information especially for ‘wicked problems’, – but:

“Avoiding information overload”
The phenomenon of ‘too much information’, much of which may be repetitive, overly rhetorical, judgmental, misleading (untruthful) or irrelevant;

“Obstacles to citizens’ ability to voice concerns”
The constraints to citizens’ awareness of problems, plans, overview of discourse, ability to voice concerns;

“Understanding the problem”
Social problems are increasingly complex, interconnected, ill-structured, explained in different, often contradicting ways, without ‘true’ (‘correct) or ‘false’ answers, and thus hard to understand, leading to solution proposals which may result in unexpected consequences that can even make the situation worse;

“Developing better solutions”
The problem of effectively utilizing all available tools to the development of better (innovative) solutions;

“Meaningful discussion”
The problem of conducting meaningful (less ‘partisan’ and vitriolic, more cooperative, constructive) discussion of proposed plans and their pros and cons;

“Better evaluation of proposed plans”
The task of meaningful evaluation of proposed plans;

“Developing decisions based on the merit of discourse contributions”
Current decision methods do not guarantee ‘due consideration’ of all citizens’ concerns but tend to ignore and override as much as the contributions and concerns of half of the population (voting minority);

“The lack of meaningful measures of merit of discourse contributions”
Lack of convincing measures of the merit of discourse contributions: ideas, information, strength of evidence, weight of arguments and judgments;

“Appointing qualified people to positions of power”
Finding qualified people for positions of power to make decisions that cannot be determined by lengthy public discourse — especially those charged with ensuring

“Adherence to decisions / laws / agreements”
The problem of ‘sanctions’ ensuring adherence to decisions reached or issued by governance agencies: ‘enforcement’ – (requiring government ‘force’ greater than potential violators leading to ‘force’ escalation;

“Control of power”
To prevent people in positions of power from falling victim to temptations of abusing their power, better controls of power must be developed.

Some connections and responses:

Problems and remedies network

Details of possible remedies / responses to problems, using information technology, aiming at having specific provisions (‘contribution credits’) work together with new methodological tools (argument and quality evaluation) to serve multiple purposes:

“Voter apathy”

Participation and contribution incentives: for example, offering ‘credit points’ for contributions to the planning discourse, saved in participants’ ‘contribution credit account’ as mere ‘contribution’ or participation markers, (to be evaluated for merit later.)

“Getting all needed information”
A public projects ‘bulletin board’ announcing proposed projects / plans, inviting interested and affected parties to contribute comments, information, not only from knowledge bases of ‘documented’ information (supported by technology) but also ‘distributed, not yet documented information from parties affected by the problem and proposed plans.

“Avoiding information overload”
Points given only for ‘first’ entries of the same content and relevance to the topic
(This also contributes to speedy contributions and assembling information)

“Obstacles to citizens’ ability to voice concerns”
The public planning discourse platform accepts entries in all media, with entries displayed on public easily accessible and regularly (ideally real-time) updated media, non-partisan

“Understanding the problem”
The platform encourages representation of the project’s problem, intent and ‘explanation’ from different perspectives. Systems models contribute visual representation of relationships between the various aspects, causes and consequences, agents, intents and variables, supported by translation not only between different languages but also from discipline ‘jargon’ to natural conversational language.

“Developing better solutions”
Techniques of creative problem analysis and solution development, (carried out by ‘special techniques’ teams reporting results to the pain platform) as well as information about precedents and scientific and technology knowledge support the development of solutions for discussion

“Meaningful discussion”
While all entries are stored for reference in the ‘Verbatim’ repository, the discussion process will be structured according to topics and issues, with contributions condensed to ‘essential content’, separating information claims from judgmental characterization (evaluation to be added separately, below) and rhetoric, for overview display (‘IBIS’ format, issue maps) and facilitating systematic assessment.

“Better evaluation of proposed plans”
Systematic evaluation procedures facilitate assessment of plan plausibility (argument evaluation) and quality (formal evaluation to mutually explain participants’ basis of judgment) or combined plausibility-weighted quality assessment.

“Meaningful measures of merit”
The evaluation procedures produce ‘judgment based’ measures of plan proposal merit that guide individual and collective decision judgments. The assessment results also are used to add merit judgments (veracity, significance, plausibility, quality of proposal) to individuals’ first ‘contribution credit’ points, added to their ‘public credit accounts’.

“Decision based on merit”
For large public (at the extreme, global) planning projects, new decision modes and criteria are developed to replace traditional tools (e.g. majority voting)

“Qualified people to positions of power”
Not all public governance decisions need to or can wait for the result of lengthy discourse, thus, people will have to be appointed (elected) to positions of power to make such decisions. The ‘public contribution credits’ of candidates are used as additional qualification indicators for such positions.

“Control of power”

Better controls of power can be developed using the results of procedures proposed above: Having decision makers ‘pay’ for the privilege of making power decisions using their contribution credits as the currency for ‘investments’ in their decision: Good decision will ‘earn’ future credits based on public assessment of outcomes; poor decisions will reduce the credit accounts of officials, forcing their resignation if depleted. ‘Supporters’ of officials can transfer credits from their own accounts to the official’s account to support the official’s ability to make important decisions requiring credits exceeding their own account. They can also withdraw such contributions if the official’s performance has disappointed the supporter.
This provision may help reduce the detrimental influence of money in governance, and corresponding corruption.

“Adherence to decisions / laws / agreements”
One of the duties of public governance is ‘enforcement’ of laws and decisions. The very word indicates the narrow view of tools for this: force, coercion. Since government force must necessarily exceed that of any would-be violator to be effective, this contributes both to the temptation of corruption, — to abuse their power because there is no greater power to prevent it, and to the escalation of enforcement means (weaponry) by enforces and violators alike. For the problem of global conflicts, treaties, and agreements, this becomes a danger of use of weapons of mass destruction if not defused. The possibility of using provisions of ‘credit accounts’ to develop ‘sanctions’ that do not have to be ‘enforced’ but triggered automatically by the very attempt of violation, might help this important task.


 


Artificial Intelligence for the Planning Discourse?

The discussion about whether and to what extent Artificial Intelligence technology can meaningfully support the planning process with contributions similar or equivalent to human thinking is largely dominated by controversies about what constitutes thinking. An exploration of the reasoning patterns in the various phases of human planning discourse could produce examples for that discussion, leaving the determination of that definition label ‘thinking’ open for the time being.

One specific example (only one of several different and equally significant aspects of planning):
People propose plans for action, e.g. to solve problems, and then engage in discussion of the ‘pros and cons’ of those plans: arguments. A typical planning argument can be represented as follows:
“Plan A should be adopted for implementation, because
i) Plan A will produce consequences B, given certain conditions C, and
ii) Consequences B ought to be pursued (are desirable); and
iii) Conditions C are present (or will be, at implementation).

Question 1: could such an argument be produced by automated technological means?
This question is usually followed up by question 2: Would or could the ‘machine’ doing this be able (or should it be allowed) to also make decisions to accept or reject the plan?

Can meaningful answer to these questions be found? (Currently or definitively?)

Beginning with question 1: Formulating such an argument in their minds, humans draw on their memory — or on explanations and information provided during the discourse itself — for items of knowledge that could become premises of arguments:

‘Factual-instrumental’ knowledge of the form “FI (A –> X)”, for example (“A will cause X’, given conditions C;
‘Deontic’ Knowledge: of the form “D(X)” or “X ought to be’ (is desirable)”, and
Factual Knowledge of the form “F ( C)” or “Conditions C are given”.
‘Argumentation-pattern knowledge’: Recognition that any of the three knowledge items above can be inserted into an argument pattern of the form
D(A) <– ((A–> X)|C)) & D(X) & F( C)).

(There are of course many variations of such argument patterns, depending on assertion or negation of the premises, and different kinds of relations between A and X.)

It does not seem to be very difficult to develop a Knowledge Base (collection) of such knowledge items and a search-and-match program that would assemble ‘arguments’ of this pattern.

Any difficulties arguably would be more related to the task of recognizing and suitably extracting such items (‘translating’ it into the form recognizable to the program) from the human recorded and documented sources of knowledge, than to the mechanics of the search-and-match process itself. Interpretation of meaning: is an item expressed in different words equivalent to other terms that are appropriate to the other potential premises in an argument?

Another slight quibble relates to the question whether and to what extent the consequence qualifies as one that ‘ought to be’ (or not) — but this can be dealt with by reformulating the argument as follows:
“If (FI(A –> X|C) & D(X) & F( C)) then D(A)”.

(It should be accompanied by the warning that this formulation that ‘looks’ like a valid logic argument pattern is in fact not really applicable to arguments containing deontic premises, and that a plan’s plausibility does not rest on one single argument but on the weight of all its pros and cons.)

But assuming that these difficulties can be adequately dealt with, the answer to question 1) seems obvious: yes, the machine would be able to construct such arguments. Whether that already qualifies as ‘thinking’ or ‘reasoning’ can be left open; the significant realization is equally obvious: that such contributions could be potentially helpful contributions to the discourse. For example, by contributing arguments human participants had not thought of, they could be helping to meet the aim of ensuring — as much as possible — that the plan will not have ‘unexpected’ undesirable side-and-after-effects. (One important part of H. Rittel’s very definition of design and planning.)

The same cannot as easily be said about question 2.

The answer to that question hinges on whether the human ‘thinking’ activities needed to make a decision to accept or reject the proposed plan can be matched by ‘the machine’. The reason is, of course, that not only the plausibility of each argument will have to be ‘evaluated’, judged, (by assessing the plausibility of each premise) but also that the arguments must be weighed against one another. (A method for doing that has been described e.g  in ‘The Fog Island Argument” and  several papers.)

So a ‘search and match’ process as the first part of such a judgment process would have to look for those judgments in the data base, and the difficulty here has to do with where such judgments would come from.

The prevailing answers for factual-instrumental premises as well as for fact-premises — premises i) and iii) — are drawing on ‘documented’ and commonly accepted truth, probability, or validity. Differences of opinion about claims drawn from ‘scientific’ and technical work, if any, are decided by a version of ‘majority voting’ — ‘prevailing knowledge’, accepted by the community of scientists or domain experts, ‘settled’ controversies, derived from sufficiently ‘big data’ (“95% of climate scientists…”) can serve as the basis of such judgments. It is often overlooked that the premises of planning arguments, however securely based on ‘past’ measurements, observations etc, are inherently predictions. So any certainty about their past truth must at least be qualified with a somewhat lesser degree of confidence that they will be equally reliably true in future: will the conditions under which the A –> X relationships are assumed to hold, be equally likely to hold in the future? Including the conditions that may be — intentionally or inadvertently — changed as a result of future human activities pursuing different aims than those of the plan?

The question becomes even more controversial for the deontic (ought-) premises of the planning arguments. Where do the judgments come from by which their plausibility and importance can be determined? Humans can be asked to express their opinions — and prevalent social conventions consider the freedom to not only express such judgments but to have them given ‘due consideration’ in public decision-making (however roundabout and murky the actual mechanisms for realizing this may be) as a human right.

Equally commonly accepted is the principle that machines do not ‘have’ such rights. Thus, any judgment about deontic premises that might be used by a program for evaluating planning arguments would have to be based on information about human judgments that can be found in the data base the program is using. There are areas where this is possible and even plausible. Not only is it prudent to assign a decidedly negative plausibility to deontic claims whose realization contradicts natural laws established by science (and considered still valid…like ‘any being heavier than air can’t fly…’). But there also are human agreements — regulations and laws, and predominant moral codes — that summarily prohibit or mandate certain plans or parts of plans; supported by subsequent arguments to the effect that we all ought not break the law, regardless of our own opinions. This will effectively ‘settle’ some arguments.

And there are various approaches in design and planning that seem to aim at finding — or establishing — enough such mandates or prohibitions that, taken together, would make it possible to ‘mechanically’ determine at least whether a plan is ‘admissible’ or not — e.g. for buildings, whether its developer should get a building permit.

This pattern is supported in theory by modal logic branches that seek to resolve deontic claims on the basis of ‘true/false’ judgments (that must have been made somewhere by some authority) of ‘obligatory’, ‘prohibited’, ‘permissible’ etc. It can be seen to be extended by at last two different ‘movements’ that must be seen as sidestepping the judgment question.

One is the call for society as a whole to adopt (collectively agree upon) moral, ethical codes whose function is equivalent to ‘laws’ — from which the deontic judgment about plans could be derived by mechanically applying the appropriate reasoning steps — invoking ‘Common Good’ mandates supposedly accepted unanimously by everybody. The question whether and how this relates to the principle of granting the ‘right’ of freely holding and happily pursuing one’s own deontic opinions is usually not examined in this context.

Another example is the ‘movement’ of Alexander’s ‘Pattern Language’. Contrary to claims that it is a radically ‘new’ theory, it stands in a long and venerable tradition of many trades and disciplines to establish codes and collections of ‘best practice’ rules of ‘patterns’ — learned by apprentices in years of observing the masters, or compiled in large volumes of proper patterns. The basic idea is that of postulating ‘elements’ (patterns) of the realm of plans, and relationships between these, by means of which plans can be generated. The ‘validity’ or ‘quality’ of the generated plan is then guaranteed by the claim that each of the patterns (rules) are ‘valid’ (‘true’, or having that elusive ‘quality without a name’). This is supported by showing examples of environments judged (by intuition, i.e. needing no further justification) to be exhibiting ‘quality’, by  applications of the patterns. The remaining ‘solution space’ left open by e.g.  the different combinations of patterns, then serves as the basis for claims that the theory offers ‘participation’ by prospective users. However, it hardly needs pointing out that individual ‘different’ judgments — e.g. based on the appropriateness of a given pattern or relationship — are effectively eliminated by such approaches. (This assessment should not be seen as a wholesale criticism of the approach, whose unquestionable merit is to introduce quality considerations into the discourse about built environment that ‘common practice’ has neglected.)

The relevance of discussing these approaches for the two questions above now becomes clear: If a ‘machine’ (which could of course just be a human, untiringly pedantic bureaucrat assiduously checking plans for adherence to rules or patterns) were able to draw upon a sufficiently comprehensive data base of factual-instrumental knowledge and ‘patterns or rules’, it could conceivably be able to generate solutions. And if the deontic judgments have been inherently attached to those rules, it could claim that no further evaluation (i.e. inconvenient intrusion of differing individual judgments would be necessary.

The development of ‘AI’ tools of automated support for planning discourse — will have to make a choice. It could follow this vision of ‘common good’ and valid truth of solution elements, universally accepted by all members of society. Or it could accept the challenge of a view that it either should refrain from intruding on the task of making judgments, or going to the trouble of obtaining those judgments from human participants in the process, before using them in the task of deriving decisions. Depending on which course is followed, I suspect the agenda and tasks of current and further research and development and programming will be very different. This is, in my opinion, a controversial issue of prime significance.


Levels of assessment depth in planning discourse: A three-tier experimental (‘pilot’) version of a planning discourse support system

Thorbjoern Mann, February 2018

Overview

A ‘pilot’ version of a needed full scale Planning Discourse Support System (‘PDSS’)
to be run on current social media platforms such as Facebook

The following are suggestions for an experimental application of a ‘pilot’ version of the structured planning discourse platform that should be developed for planning projects with wide public participation, at scales ranging from local issues to global projects.

Currently available platforms do not yet offer all desirable features of a viable PDSS

The eventual ‘global’ platform will require research, development and integrated programming features that current social media platforms do not yet offer. The ‘pilot’ project is aiming at producing adequate material to guide further work and attract support and funding a limited ‘pilot’ version of the eventual platform, that can be run on currently available platforms.

Provisions for realization of key aims of planning: wide participation;
decisions based on merit of discourse contribution;
recognition of contribution merit;
presented as optional add-on features
leading to a three-tier presentation of the pilot platform

One of the key aims of the overall project is the development of a planning process leading to decisions based on the assessed merit of participants’ contributions to the discourse. The procedural provisions for realizing that aim are precisely those that are not supported by current platforms, and will have to be implemented as optional add-on processes (‘special techniques’) by smaller teams, outside of the main discourse. Therefore, the proposal is presented as a set of three optional ‘levels’ of depth of analysis and evaluation. Actual projects may choose the appropriate level inconsideration of the project’s complexity and importance, of the degree of consensus or controversy emerging during the discourse, and the team’s familiarity with the entire approach and the techniques involved.

Contents:
1 General provisions
2 Basic structured discourse
3 Structured discourse with argument plausibility assessment
4 Assessment of plausibility-adjusted Quality assessment
5 Sample ‘procedural’ agreements
6 Possible decision modes based on contribution merit
7 Discourse contribution merit rewards

—-
1 General Provisions

Main (e.g. Facebook) Group Page

Assuming a venue like Facebook, a new ‘group’ page will be opened for the experiment. It will serve as a forum to discuss the approach and platform provisions, and to propose and select ‘projects’ for discussion under the agreed-upon procedures.

Project proposals and selection

Group members can propose ‘projects’ for discussion. To avoid project discussions being overwhelmed by references to previous research and literature, the projects selected for this experiment should be as ‘new’ (‘unprecedented’) and limited in scope as possible. (Regrettably, this will make many urgent and important issues ineligible for selection.)

Separate Project Page for selected projects

For each selected project, a new group page will be opened to ensure sufficient hierarchical organization options within the project. There will be specific designated threads within each group, providing the basic structure of each discourse. A key feature not seen in social media discussions is the ‘Next step’ interruption of the process, in which participants can choose between several options of continuing or ending the process.

Project participants
‘Participants’ in projects will be selected from the number of ‘group members’ having signed up, expressing an interest in participating, and agree to proceed according to the procedural agreements for the project.

Main Process and ‘Special Techniques’

The basic process of project discourse is the same for all three levels; the argument plausibility assessment and project quality assessment procedures are easily added to the simple sequence of steps of the ‘basic’ versions described in section 2.
In previous drafts of the proposal, these assessment tools have been described as ‘special techniques’ that would require provisions of formatting, programming and calculation. For any pilot version, they would have to be conducted by ‘special teams’ outside of the main discourse process. This also applies to the proposed three-level versions and the two additional ‘levels’ of assessment presented here. Smaller ‘special techniques teams’ will have to be designated to work outside of the main group discussion, (e.g. by email); they will report their results back to the main project group for consideration and discussion.

For the first implementation of the pilot experiment, only two such special techniques: the technique of argument plausibility assessment, and the evaluation process for plan proposal ‘quality’ (‘goodness’) are considered; they are seen as key components of the effort to link decisions to the merit of discourse contributions.


2 Basic structured discourse

Project selection Group members post suggestions for projects (‘project candidates) on the group’s main ‘bulletin board’. If a candidate is selected, the posting member will act as its ‘facilitator’ or co-facilitator. Selection is done by posting an agreed-upon minimum of ‘likes’ for a project candidate. By posting a ‘like’, group members signal their intention to become ‘project participants’ and actively contribute to the discussion.

Project bulletin page, Project description

For selected projects, a new page serving as introduction and ‘bulletin board’ for the project will be opened. It will contain a description of the project (which will be updated as modifications are agreed upon). For the first pilot exercise, the projects should be an actual plan or action proposals.

Procedural agreements

On a separate thread, a ‘default’ version of procedural agreements will be posted. They may be modified in response to project conditions and expected level of depth, ideally before the discussion starts. The agreements will specify the selection criteria for issues, and the decision modes for reaching recommendations or decisions on the project proposals. (See section 5 for a default set of agreements).

General discussion thread (unstructured)

A ‘General discussion’ thread will be started for the project, inviting comments from all group members. For this thread, there are no special format expectation other than general ‘netiquette’.

Issue candidates
On a ‘bulletin board’ subthread of the project intro thread, participants can propose ‘issue’ or ‘thread’ candidates, about questions or issues that emerge as needing discussion in the ‘general discussion’ thread. Selection will be based on an agreed-upon number of ‘likes, ‘dislikes’ or comments about the respective issue in the ‘general discussion’ thread.

Issue threads: For each selected issue, a separate issue thread will be opened. The questions or claims of issue threads should be stated more specifically in the expectation of clear answers or arguments, and comments should meet those expectations.

It may be helpful to distinguish different types of questions, and their expected responses:

– “Explanatory” questions (Explanations, descriptions, definitions);
– “Factual’ questions (‘Factual’ claims, data, arguments)
– “Instrumental questions” (Instrumental claims” “how to do …”)
– “Deontic” (‘Ought’- questions) (Arguments pro / con proposals)

Links and References thread

Comments containing links and references should provide brief explanations about what positions the link addresses or supports; the links should also be posted on a ‘links and references’ thread.

Visual material: diagrams and maps

Comments can be accompanied by diagrams, maps, photos, or other visual material. Comments should briefly explain the gist of the message supported by the picture. (“What is the ‘argument’ of the image?) For complex discussions, overview ‘maps’ of the evolving network of issues should be posted on the project ‘bulletin’ thread.

‘Next Step?’
Anytime participants sense that the discussion has exhausted itself or needs input of other information or analysis, they can make a motion for a ‘Next step?’ interruption, specifying the suggested next step:

– a decision on the main proposal or a part,
– call for more information, analysis;
– call for a ‘special technique’ (with or without postponement of further discussion)
– call for modifying the proposal, or
– changing procedural rules;
– continuing the discussion or
– dropping the issue, ending the discussion without decision.

These will be decided upon according to the procedural rules ‘currently’ in force.

Decision on the plan proposal

The decision about the proposed plan — or partial decisions about features that should be part of the plan — will be posted on the project’s ‘bulletin board’ thread., together with a brief report. Reports about the process experience, problems and successes, etc. will be of special interest for further development of the tool.

3    Structured discourse with argument plausibility assessment

The sequence of steps for the discourse with added argument plausibility assessment is the same as those of the ‘basic’ process described in section 2 above. At each major step, participants can make interim judgments about the plausibility of the proposed plan, (for comparison with later, more deliberated judgments). At each of these steps, there also exists the option of responding to a ‘Next step?’ motion with a decision to cut the process short, based on emerging consensus or other insights such as ‘wrong question’ that suggest dropping the issue. Without these intermediate judgments, the sequence of steps will proceed to construct an overall judgment of proposal plausibility ‘bottom-up-fashion’ from the plausibility judgments of individual argument premises.

Presenting the proposal

The proposal for which the argument assessment is called, is presented and described in as much detail as is available.
(Optional: Before having studied the arguments, participants make first offhand, overall judgments of proposal plausibility Planploo’ on a +1 / -1 scale, (for comparison with later judgments). Group statistics: e.g. GPlanploo’ are calculated (Mean, range…) and examined for consensus or significant differences. )

Displaying all pro/con arguments

The pro / con arguments having been raised about the issue , displayed in the respective ‘issue’ thread, are displayed and studied, if possible with the assistance of ‘issue maps’ showing the emerging network of interrelated issues. (Optional:) Participants assign a second overall offhand plan plausibility judgment: Planploo”, GPlanploo”)

Preparation of formal argument display and worksheets

For the formal argument plausibility assessment, worksheets are prepared that list
a) the deontic premises of each argument (goals, concerns), and
b) the key premises of all arguments ((including those left unstated as ‘taken for granted’)

Assignment of ‘Weights of Relative Importance’ w

Participants assign ‘weights of relative importance’ w to the deontics in list (a), such that 0 ≤ wi ≤ 1, and ∑wi = 1, for all i arguments.

Assignment of premise plausibility judgments prempl to all argument premises

Participants assign plausibility judgments to all argument premises, on a scale of -1 (totally implausible) via 0 –zero – (don’t know) to +1 (totally plausible)

Calculation of Argpl Argument plausibility

For each participant and argument, the ‘Argument plausibility’ Argpl is calculated from the premises plausibility judgments. E,g. Argplod = ∏ (premplj) for all j premises of the argument.

Calculation of Argument Weight Argw

From the argument plausibility judgment s and the weight of the deontic premise for that argument, the ‘weight of the respective argument Argw is calculated. E.g. Argwi = Argplod * wi.

Calculation of Plan plausibility Planpld

The Argument weights Argw of all arguments pro and con are aggregated into the deliberated plan plausibility score Planplod for each participant. E.g. Planpld = ∑(Argwi) for all i arguments.

Calculating group statistics of results

Statistics of the Plan plausibility judgment scores across the group (Mean, Median, Range, Min /Max) are calculated and discussed. Areas of emerging consensus are identified, as well as areas of disagreements of lack of adequate information. The interim judgments designated as ‘optional’ above can serve to illustrate the learning process participants go through.

Argument assessment team develops recommendations for decision or improvement of proposed plan

The argument assessment team reports its findings and analysis, makes recommendations to the entire group in a ‘Next Step?’ deliberation.

4 Assessment of plausibility-adjusted plan Quality

Assigning quality judgments

Because pro / con arguments usually refer to the deontic concerns (goals, objectives) in qualitative terms, they do not generally generate adequate information about the actual quality or ‘goodness’ that may be achieved by a plan proposal. A more fine-grain assessment is especially important for the comparison of several proposed plan alternatives. It should be obvious that all predictions about the future performance of plans will be subject to the plausibility qualifications examined in section 3 above. So a goodness or quality assessment may be grafted onto the respective steps of the argument plausibility assessment. The following steps describe one version of the resulting process.

Proposal presentation and first offhand quality judgment

(Optional step:) Upon presentation of a proposal, participants can offer a first overall offhand goodness or quality judgment PlanQoo, e.g. on a +3 / -3 scale, for future comparison with deliberated results.

Listing deontic claims (goals, concerns)

From the pro / con arguments compiled in the argument assessment process (section 3) the goals, concerns (deontic premises) are assembled. These represent ‘goodness evaluation aspects’ against which competing plans will be evaluated.

Adding other aspects not mentioned in arguments

Participants may want to add other ‘standard’ as well as situation-specific aspects that may not have been mentioned in the discussion. (There is no guarantee that all concerns that influence participants’ sense of quality of a plan will actually be brought up and made explicit in a discussion).

Determining criteria (measures of performance) for all aspects

For all aspects, ‘measures of performance’ will be determined that allow assessment about how well a plan will have met the goal or concern. These may be ‘objective’ criteria or more subjective distinctions. For some criteria, ‘criterion functions’ can show how a person’s ‘quality’ score depends on the corresponding criterion.
Example: plan proposals will usually be compared and evaluated according to their
expected ‘cost’; and usually ‘lower cost’ is considered ‘better’ (all else being equal)
than ‘higher cost’. But while participants may agree that ‘zero cost’ would be
best so as to deserve a +3 (couldn’t be better’) score, they can differ significantly
about what level of cost would be ‘acceptable’, and at what level the score should
become negative: Participant x would consider a much higher cost to be still
‘so/so’, or acceptable, than participant o.
+3 –xo————————————————–
+2 ———–o–x—————————————
+1 —————-o—–x——————————-
+/-0 ——————o———x———————–
-1 ———————–o————x—————–
-2 ——————————o———x————-
-3 ——————————————————- ($∞ would be -3 ‘couldn’t be worse’)
$0 |       |        |        |        |         |        |        |         |  > Cost criterion function.

“Weighting’ of aspects, subaspects etc.

The ‘weight’ assignments of aspects (deontics) should correspond to the weighting of deontic premises in the process of argument assessment. However, if more aspects have been added to the aspect list, the ‘weighting’ established in the argument assessment process must be revised: Aspects weights are on a zero to +1 scale, 0 ≤ w ≤ 1 and ∑wi = +1 for all i aspects. For complex plans, the aspect list may have several ‘levels’ and resemble an ‘aspect tree’. The weighing at each level should follow the same rule of 0 ≤ w ≤ 1 and ∑w=1.

Assigning quality judgment scores

Each participant will assign ‘quality’ or ‘goodness’ judgments, on a +3 to -3 scale (+3 meaning ‘could not possibly be better’, -3 ‘couldn’t possibly be worse’, with zero (0) meaning ‘so-so’ or ‘can’t decide’, not applicable) to all aspects / subaspects of the evaluation worksheet, for all competing plan proposals.

Combining quality with plausibility score for a ‘weighted plausibility-adjusted quality score Argqw

Each (partial) quality score q will be combined with the respective argument plausibility score Argpl from the process in section 3, resulting in a ‘weighted plausibility-adjusted quality score’ Argqplwi = Argpli * qi * wi .

Aggregating scores into Plan quality score PlanQ

The weighted partial scores can be aggregated into overall plan quality scores: e.g. :
PlanQ = ∑i (Argqplwi) for all n aspects. or
PlanQ = Min (Argqplw) or
PlanQ = ∏ (Argqpli +3)wi -3
(The appropriateness of these functions for a given case must be discussed!)

Group statistics: GArgqpl and GPlanQ

Like the statistics of the plausibility assessments, statistical analysis of these these scores can be calculated. Whether a resulting measure such as Mean (PlanQ) should be accepted as a ‘group judgment’ is questionable, but such measures can become helpful guides for any decisions the group will have to make. Again, calculation of interim results can provide information about the ‘learning process of team members, ‘weaknesses’ of plans that are responsible for specific poor judgment scores, and guide suggestions for plan improvements.

Team reports results back to main forum

A team report should be prepared for presentation back to the main discussion.

5     Sample procedural agreements

The proposed platform aims at facilitating problem-solving, planning, design, policy-making discussions that are expected to result in some form of decision or recommendation to adopt plans for action. To achieve decisions in groups, it is necessary to have some basic agreements as to how those decisions will be determined. Traditional decision modes such as voting are not appropriate for any large asynchronous online process with wide but unspecified participation (Parties affected by proposed plans may be located across traditional voting eligibility boundaries; who are ‘legitimate’ voters?). The proposed approach aims at examining how decisions might be based on the quality of content contributions to the discourse rather than the mere number of voters or supporters.

Default agreements.

The following are proposed ‘default’ agreements; they should be confirmed (or adapted to circumstances) at the outset of a discourse. Later changes should be avoided as much as possible; ‘motions’ for such changes can be made as part of a ‘Next step’ pause in the discussion; they will be decided upon by a agreed upon majority of participants having ‘enlisted’ for the project, or agreements ‘currently’ in place.

Project groups.

Members of the Planning Discourse FB group (Group members) can propose ‘projects’ for discussion on the Main group’s ‘Bulletin Board’ Thread. Authors of group project proposals are assumed to moderate / facilitate the process for that project. Projects are approved for discussion if an appropriate number __ of group members ‘sign up for ‘participation’ in the project.

Project Participants

Project participants are assumed to have read and agreed to these agreements, and expressed willingness to engage in sustained participation. The moderator may choose to limit the number of project participants, to keep the work manageable.

Discussion

Project discussion can be ‘started’ with a Problem Statement, a Plan Proposal, or a general question or issue. The project will be briefly described in the first thread. Another thread labeled ‘Project (or issue) ___ General comments’ will then be set up, for comment on the topic or issue with questions of explanation clarification, re-phrasing, answers, arguments and suggestions for decisions. Links or references should be accompanied by a brief statement of the answer or argument made or supported by the reference.

Candidate Issues

Participants and moderator can suggest candidate issues: potentially controversial questions about which divergent positions and opinions exist or are expected, that should be clarified or settled before a decision is made. These will be listed in the project introduction thread as Candidate Issues. There, participants can enter ‘Likes’ to indicate whether they consider it necessary to ‘raise’ the issue for a detailed discussion. Likely issue candidates are questions about which members have posted significantly different positions in the ‘General comments’ thread; such that the nature of the eventual plan would significantly change depending on which positions are adopted.

‘Raised’ issues

Issue Candidates receiving an agreed upon number of support (likes, or opposing comments, are accepted and labeled as ‘Raised’. Each ‘raised’ issue will then become the subject of a separate thread, where participants post comments (answers, arguments, questions) to that issue.
It will be helpful to clearly identify the type of issue or question, so that posts can be clearly stated (and evaluated) as answers or arguments: for example:
– Explanations, definitions, meaning and details of concepts to ‘Explanatory questions’;
– Statements of ‘facts’ (data, answers, relationship claims) to Factual questions;
– Suggestions for (cause-effect or means to ends) relationships, to Instrumental questions;
– Arguments to deontic (ought-) questions or claims such as ‘Plan A should be adopted’, for example:
‘Yes, because A will bring about B given conditions C , B ought to be pursued, and conditions C are present’).

‘Next step?’ motion

At any time after the discussion has produced some entries, participants or moderator can request a ‘Next Step?’ interruption of the discussion, for example when the flow of comments seems to have dried up and a decision or a more systematic treatment of analysis or evaluation is called for. The ‘Next step’ call should specify the type of next step requested. It will be decided by getting agreed-upon number of ‘likes’ of the total number of participants. A ‘failed’ next step motion will automatically activate the motion of continuing the discussion. Failing that motion or subsequent lack of new posts will end discussion of that issue or project.

Decisions

Decisions (to adopt or reject a plan or proposition) are ‘settled’ by an agreed-upon decision criterion (e.g. vote percentage) total number of participants. The outcome of decisions of ‘next step?’ motions will be recorded in the Introduction thread as Results, whether they lead to an adoption, modification, rejection of the proposed measure or not.

Decision modes

As indicated before, traditional decision modes such as voting, with specified decision criteria such as percentages of ‘legitimate’ participants, are going to be inapplicable for large (global’) planning projects whose affected parties are not determined by e.g. citizenship or residency in defined geometric governance entitites. It is therefore necessary to explore other decision modes using different decision criteria, with the notion of criteria based on the assessed merit of discourse contributions being an obvious choice to replace or complement the ‘democratic’ one-person, one-vote’ principle, or the principle of decisions made by elected representatives (again, by voting.)
Participants are therefore encouraged to explore and adopt alternative decision modes. The assessment procedures in sections 3 and 4 have produced some ‘candidates’ for decision criteria, which cannot at this time be recommended as decisive alternatives to traditional tools, but might serve as guidance results for discussion:
– Group Plan plausibility score GPlanpl;
– Group Quality assessment score GPlanQ
– Group plausibility-adjusted quality score GPlnQpl;
The controversial aspect of all these ‘group scores is the method for deriving these from the respective individual scores.

These measures also provide the opportunity for measuring the degree of improvement achieved by a proposed plan over the ‘initial’ problem situation a plan is expected to remedy: leading to possible decision rules such as that rejecting plans that do not achieve adequate improvement for some participants (people being ‘worse off ‘after plan implementation) or selecting plans that achieve the greatest degree of improvement overall. This of course requires that the existing situation be included in the assessment, as the basis for comparison.

Special techniques

In the ‘basic’ version of the process, no special analysis, solution development, or evaluation procedures are provided, mainly because the FB platform does not easily accommodate the formatting needed. The goal of preparing decisions or recommendations based on contribution merit or assessed quality of solutions may make it necessary to include such tools – especially more systematic evaluation than just reviewing pro and con arguments. If such techniques are called for in a ‘Next step?’ motion, special technique teams must be formed to carry out the work involved and report the result back to the group, followed by a ‘next step’ consideration. The techniques of systematic argument assessment (see section 3) and evaluation of solution ‘goodness’ or ‘quality’ (section 4) are shown as essential tools to achieve decisions based on the merit of discourse contributions above.
Special techniques teams will have to be designated to work on these tasks ‘outside’ of the main discourse; they should be limited to small size, and will require somewhat more special engagement than the regular project participation.
Other special techniques, to be added from the literature or developed by actual project teams, will be added to the ‘manual’ of tools available for projects. The role of techniques for problem analysis, solution idea generation, as well as that of systems modeling and simulation (recognizing the fact that the premise of ‘conditions’ under which the cause-effect assumption of the factual-instrumental premise of planning arguments can be assumed to hold, really will be the assumed state of the entire system (model) of interrelated variables and context conditions; an aspect that has not been adequately dealt with in the literature nor in the practice of systems consulting to planning projects.)

6 Decision modes

For the smaller groups likely to be involved in ‘pilot’ applications of the proposed structured discourse ideas described, traditional decision modes such as ‘consensus’, ‘no objection’ to decision motion, or majority voting may well be acceptable because familiar tools. For large scale planning projects spanning many ordinary ‘jurisdictions’ (deriving the legitimacy of decisions from the number of legitimate ‘residents, these modes become meaningless. This calls for different decision modes and criteria: an urgent task that has not received sufficient attention. The following summary only mentions traditional modes for comparison without going into details of their respective merit or demerits, but explores potential decision criteria that are derived from the assessment processes of argument and proposal plausibility, or evaluation of proposal quality, above.

Voting:
Proposals receiving an agreed-upon percentage of approval votes from the body of ‘legitimate’ voters. The approval percentages can range from simple majority, to specified plurality or supermajority such as 2/3 or 3/4 to full ‘consensus’ (which means that a lone dissenter has the equivalent of veto power.) Variations: voting by designated bodies of representatives, determined by elections, or by appointment based on qualifications of training, expertise, etc.

Decision based on meeting (minimum) qualification rules and regulations.
Plans for building projects will traditionally receive ‘approval’ upon review of whether they meet standard ‘regulations’ specified by law. Regulations describe ‘minimum’ expectations mandated by public safety concerns or zoning conventions but don’t address other ‘quality’ concerns. They will lead to ‘automatic’ rejection (e.g. of a building permit application) if only one regulation is not met.

Decision based on specified performance measures
Decision-making groups can decide to select plans based on assessed or calculated ‘performance’. Thus, real estate developers look for plan versions that promise a high return on investment ratio (over a specified) ‘planning horizon’. A well known approach for public projects is the ‘Benefit/Cost’ approach calculating the Benefit minus Cost (B-C) or Benefit-Cost ration B/C (and variations thereof).

Plan proposal plausibility
The argument assessment approach described in section 3 results in (individual) measures of proposal plausibility. For the individual, the resulting proposal plausibility could meaningfully serve as a decision guide: a proposal can be accepted if its plausibility exceeds a certain threshold – e.g. the ‘so-so’-value of ‘zero’ or the plausibility value of the existing situation or ‘do nothing’ option. For a set of competing proposals: select the one with the highest plausibility.

It is tempting but controversial to use statistical aggregation of these pl-measures as group decision criteria; for example, the Mean group plausibility value GPlanpld. For various reasons, (e.g. the issue of overriding minority concerns), this should be resisted. A better approach would be to develop a measure of improvement of pl-conditions for all parties compared to the existing condition, with the proviso that plans resulting in ‘negative improvement’ should be rejected (or modified until showing improvement for all affected parties).

Plausibility-adjusted ‘Quality’ assessment measures.
Similar considerations apply to the measures derived from the approach to evaluate plans for ‘goodness or ‘quality’ but adjust the implied performance claims with the plausibility assessments. The resulting group statistics, again, can guide(but should not in their pure form determine) decisions, especially efforts to modify proposals to achieve better results for all affected parties (the interim results pinpointing the specific areas of potential improvement.

7 Contribution merit rewards

The proposal to offer reward points for discourse contributions is strongly suggested for the eventual overall platform but one difficult to implement in the pilot versions (without resorting to additional work and accounting means ‘outside’ of the main discussion). Its potential ‘side benefits’ deserve some consideration even for the ‘pilot’ version.

Participants are awarded ‘basic contribution points’ for entries to the discussion, provided that they are ‘new’ (to the respective discussion) and no mere repetition of entries offering essentially the same content that have already been made. If the discussion later uses assessment methods such as the argument plausibility evaluation, these basic ‘neutral’ credits are then modified by the group’s plausibility or importance assessment results – for example, by simply multiplying the basic credit point (e.g. ‘1’) with the group’s pl-assessment of that claim.

The immediate benefits of this are:
– Such rewards will represent an incentive for participation,
– for speedy assembly of needed information (since delayed entries of the same content will not get credit).
– They help eliminate repetitious comments that often overwhelm many discussions on social media: the same content will only be ‘counted and presented once;
– The prospect of later plausibility or quality assessment by the group – that can turn the credit for an ill-considered, false or insufficiently supported claim into a negative value (by being multiplied by a negative pl-value) – will also discourage contributions of lacking or dubious merit. ‘Troll’ entries will not only occur but once, but will then receive appropriate negative appraisal, and thus discouraged;
– Sincere participants will be encouraged to provide adequate support for their claims.
Together with the increased discipline introduced by the assessment exercises, his can help improve the overall quality of discourse.

Credit point accounts built up in this fashion are of little value if they are not ‘fungible’, that is, have value beyond the participation in the discourse. This may be remedied
a) within the process: by considering their uses to adjust the ‘weight’ of participant’s ‘votes’ or other factors in determining decisions;
b) beyond the process: By using contribution merit accounts as additional signs of qualification for employment or public office. An idea for using such currencies as a means of controlling power has been suggested, acknowledging both that there are public positions calling for ‘fast’ decisions that can’t wait for the outcome of lengthy discussions, and that people are seeking power (‘empowerment’) almost as a kind of human need, but like most other needs we are asked to pay for meeting (in one way or other), introducing a requirement that power decisions will be ‘paid for’ with credit points. (One of the several issues for discussion.)

—ooo—


On the use of criterion functions to explain our basis of judgment. A Tavern Talk

Summary:
In the discourse about collective plans, the process of evaluation – making judgments about whether a plan is ‘good enough’ or which of several plans is the better, — differences of opinions occur, which can be resolved by mutual explanation of the basis of evaluation judgments. The discussion here is focused on the role of ‘criterion functions’ in this process. These functions – showing how ones subjective ‘goodness’ judgments depend on ‘objectively’ measurable criteria – make it possible to explain one’s basis of judgment in much more specific detail than is usually done even in the most cooperative group processes. Some key insights of the discussion are the following:

While such detailed explanation is possible and conceptually not overly challenging, including this process in actual decision-making procedures would add cumbersome provisions to a planning discourse already calling for more structure than many participants are used to and feel comfortable with. The issues of ‘aggregation’ – of individuals’ partial judgments into overall judgments, and especially of individual judgments into ‘group’ evaluation measures are potential sources of controversy.
It becomes clear that any overall ‘measures’ or judgments that can meaningfully guide decisions cannot be derived in ‘top-down’ fashion from general ‘meta values’ and ‘common good’ concepts but must be constructed ‘bottom-up’ from individual participants’ concerns and understanding of specific situations and context.

Familiar claims of planning decision makers ‘to act on behalf of others (clients, users), with adequate knowledge of those others’ concerns and basis of judgment, but not having gone to the trouble of doing this, are unfounded and should be viewed with reserve.
Examination of criterion functions make it obvious that the quest for and claim of having found ‘optimal’ solutions is unrealistic: no plan will achieve the ‘best possible’ scores on all evaluation aspects even for individuals, and different people will have very different but legitimate criterion functions.

Considering plans or policies whose effects will occur – and change – over time, adds another level of complexity. System simulation models can track the performance of variables (criteria) over time, but do not show associated ‘goodness’ judgments (obviously, since this would either be just one person’s assessment, of some aggregated measure of judgments that have not been included in the system modeler’s data.

The examination of how evaluation judgments for different plans could be tracked over time (as a function of the simulated variable tracks) suggests a different decision guide: the (time-discounted) degree of improvement of a plan over the current or predicted problem situation under the ‘do nothing’ option.

ooo

The discussion takes place in the hypothetical ‘Fog Island Tavern’.

– Hey Bog-Hubert – what kind of critters are you guys talking about? I couldn’t quite get it coming in, but it sounds like serious wildlife?

– Good morning Renfroe. Well, I guess you could call them critters, but not the kind you mean. Actually, we were talking about criterion functions. About how we can explain what we mean when we’re making judgments about, say, proposed plans. Calling them good, so-so, or bad, or anything in-between.

– Huh. Plans, as in what to do about saving the beaches where each storm washes away more of the sand?

– Yes, or about what to do about the climate change that makes the storms worse and the oceans rise.

– What, you guys can’t even come up with a plan for beach preservation on this little island, and now you want to talk about the oceans and global climate?

– Well, Renfroe, it looks like the problems of coming to some agreements about what to do are the same everywhere, just at a different scale.

– So where do your critters come in on that one?

– I guess we need to back track a little on that. It has to do with evaluation, say of different proposed plans, to decide which one is best, or whether any of them should be implemented. You could start by looking at them and then make an offhand judgment, say ‘good’; ‘not good’. If there are several proposals, you may want to use a more detailed scale, for example one with seven points ranging from ‘couldn’t be worse = – 3, to ‘couldn’t be better’: +3, with a midpoint of zero meaning ‘don’t know’ or ‘so-so’. In a group you’ll have to agree on some common scale. Now somebody asks you why you rate proposal X so high, and solution Y so low, since they came up with very different ratings from yours. So you may want to talk about the reasons, the basis of your judgments, maybe you each know something the other doesn’t know or see, that should be considered in making the decision. What do you do? How do you explain what makes a solution good or bad, in your view?

– Well, you could look at the various costs and benefits, and how well the plan will work for what it is meant to do?

– And how good it looks, if its’ a building or some thing we are looking at or living in?

– Yes, Sophie.

– And don’t we also have to worry about those ‘unexpected side-and-after-effects’ of plans, that people always talk about but keep forgetting?

– Good point. Next we list all those considerations or ‘aspects’ and make sure that we all mean the same thing when we name them. But we can only consider what people bring up in the discourse, so it’s important to make sure that is organized so as to let everybody put in their views. Now you can give each plan a ‘goodness’ judgment score – on the same scale — for each of those aspects. Let’s call those ‘partial’ judgments – all together they make up your ‘overall’, whole judgment for each plan. You’ll then have to explain how exactly all of those scores make up the overall judgment.

– And looking at the different aspects, you may want to reconsider the first overall, offhand judgment you made?

– Good point, Vodçek. Deliberating already. Learning. Excellent. But to get to the criterion functions: You realize how an explanation of a judgment the goodness score always consists of showing how the judgment relates to something else. That something else can be another judgment – look at how Sophie suggested that her overall ‘goodness’ judgment of, say, a building, should depend in part on the beauty of that building – which of course would be another judgment, and people may have different opinions about that. But the relationship would be that of some ‘degree of beauty’ about which she would have to make another ‘goodness’ judgment to explain how it contributes to the overall building goodness judgment.

– That’s not much on an explanation though, is it?

– Right. So you could ask her what, in her mind, makes a building beautiful. What would be you answer, Sophie?

– Well, if I got the sense that he just wants to annoy me with all these questions – because I can see how each answer will just lead to another one, and where will that end – I could just say that if he can’t see it he just doesn’t understand beauty and tell him to get lost. But if I think he really wants to learn what I see as beautiful, I might suggest that it has to do with, say, its proportions.

– Ah. Now we are getting closer to the criterion issue. Because proportions are really measurement relations: in a rectangle, the length of the short side to the length of the longer one. The relationship is now something we can ‘objectively’ measure. Quantitative. And many people are really adamant about making our decisions based on objective ‘facts’ and measures. So would it satisfy those folks to show them a graph that has the ‘objective’ measure on one axis – the horizontal one, say, and our judgment scale on the vertical one: If you are convinced that the most beautiful proportion is the ‘golden ratio’ – 1:1.618… the graph would touch the + 3 line at that 1.618… point, and go down from there in both directions. Like this, for example: Down to 1:1 (the proportion of the square) on one side, and down to -3 for infinitely long rectangles: 1:∞

Fig 1. A criterion function for proportion judgments

– Hey, didn’t we look at that proportion thing a while back? But then we looked at both sides on the 1:1 point – if the right side is for ‘vertical’ rectangles, the left one continues past the 1:1 point for horizontal ones.

– And if I remember correctly, didn’t somebody point out that there are many people who feel that the square, or the one based on the diagonal of the square, the √2 relationship, is the most beautiful proportion?

– You’re right. But that was in another book, a fat one, if I recall? So let’s not get too distracted by the details here. But perhaps we should just remember that there are many different forms of such functions: the one where ‘zero’ on the variable represents -3 on the judgment scale, which goes on to approach +3 at infinity, its opposite that starts with +3 at zero on the criterion scale and approaches -3 at infinity, the opposite of the golden ratio curve that goes from -3 at some value of our criterion and rises towards +3 on both sides.

Fig. 2. Different criterion function types

– Can’t think of an example for that one though. Except perhaps weird ones like people’s appreciation for apartment levels going up towards the higher floors and +3 at the penthouse – but with a sudden drop to -3 at floor 13?

– Goes to show that people’s preferences can take strange contortions… But those are personal judgments. I guess they are entitled to hold those, privately. Now, what about collective decisions?

– Yes, Vodçek. That is the point where we left off when Renfroe came in. We can explain how our subjective goodness judgment relates to some objective measurement. And this is useful: I can ask somebody to make a decision on my behalf if I give him my criterion function to make a selection – even though I know that his criterion function likely has a different shape and the high +3 judgment score is in a different place. But the issue we started from was the idea that there should be measurements – expressing values – that everybody should agree on, so that collective decisions could be guided by those values and measurements. ‘Meta-values’?

– Yes, that notion seems to make perfect sense to many people – for example the feel that trying to stop climate change is so important for the survival of human civilization – that it is such a meta-value that everybody should agree on so that we can start taking more effective action. And that this is even an ethical, a moral duty. So they can’t understand why there are some people who don’t agree.

– Right. So we were trying to untangle the possible reasons why they don’t.

– Short of declaring them all just blindly indoctrinated by political or religious views or outright fraudulent misrepresentations, eh?

– Yes, let’s not go there. I guess there may have been some confusion because at first there was no distinction between the ‘meta-values – that were quite general and abstract – and the corresponding measures one would need to actually guide decisions: You can’t really argue against a concept like the Common Good as a guiding value – but when it comes to pin down just what that common good is, and how to get an ‘objective’ measure for it, history shows that there’s plenty of disagreement both about the ‘common’ part – my family, tribe, town, country, my religion, humanity, all life on the planet? And even more vicious: about the part what the ‘good’ might be.

– I agree; and the attempt to justify those different views have led to some pretty desperate contortions of moral guidelines for decisions to meet those good things: I remember the old ‘dulce et decorum est pro patria mori’ (‘sweet and decorous it is to die for one’s country’), or promising all kinds of heavenly rewards in the hereafter to those willing to fight and kill and die for religious ideas.

– Well, if your tribe or country or your faith is your ‘common’, and somebody is attacking it, what’s wrong with that?

– I guess it becomes questionable when these definitions lead to more of the good is ending up with some people – the fellows who are spouting these glorious quotes and values and then get to make the decisions ‘on behalf’ of everybody else, while many of the everybody else are doing the dying and sacrificing. If it becomes apparent that these value leaders and doers have actually been acting more on behalf of their own good, the trust in those values is eroded. No matter how they are justified: by philosophical theories, by divine revelations (mostly revealed only to some special prophets), by political theories, or scientific theories. Or systems thinking. Or holistic thinking and awareness.

– Even scientific and systemic investigations?

That’s the tragedy, right. You may argue that science and systems tools are our best available tools for guiding action, based on objective measurements and facts, and have all the evidence and replicable observations to support them: if they then are used by leaders, — governments or ‘movements’ — to postulate ‘meta values’ to guide actions ‘on behalf of’ others, they will run into the same trust issues as all the other attempts to do the same, — unless…

– Unless what?

Well: unless they can also offer guarantees that those leaders are not just acting on their own behalf. Even if Congress were full of scientists and systems thinkers: if they make laws to deprive people of health insurance while themselves enjoying the best insurance and health care, no matter what justification they offer for their actions, they would run into trust problems. So that would be one condition.

– One condition, Vodçek? Are there others?

– In theory, yes. Its’ actually part of the job of the legislature: isn’t it in the constitution, even, that they should make laws on behalf of their constituents. And the representative notion is, of course, that representatives should be part of the communities they represent and communicate with then so that they know what the community wants? And then go and vote for laws that realize those preferences.

– Which they should do even if they don’t agree with them? Even if they know better? Doesn’t the constitution also state that they should vote according to their own conscience?

– Right: there seems to be some contradiction there. And it’s leading to that constant tug-of-war between the principle of electing representatives whose judgment we trust — to vote in view of the common good – even if we don’t agree, — because we don’t have all the information? Or because we are suffering from doctrinaire blindness or stupidity, or ethical or moral depravity? And to the alternative of passing laws by referendum, regardless of what the representatives are saying.

– Well, there’s the practical issue: we can’t possibly make all laws by referendum, can we? And if we are too ignorant to give our representatives proper guidance about how to vote so they have to vote by their own better knowledge and information and conscience, should we be allowed to vote on laws?

– But we are allowed to vote for the representatives? Isn’t there an expectation that the representatives should provide enough information to their constituents to know and understand the best available basis of judgment for the needed actions and also be confident that the representatives’ basis of judgment is sound enough to let them vote according to their own judgment conscience if and when necessary?

– Right. Theory, perhaps; current practice of governance looks a bit different. But that’s where our question about the criterion functions come in, again: They are part of the process of not only making up our minds about what actions to take or to support, but also of explaining our basis of judgment to each other. In the extreme, so that we can trust somebody else to make judgments and take action on our behalf – because we have conveyed our mutual basis of judgment well enough, as well as made sure it does give adequate consideration to all available information and concerns.

– So what we are trying to clear up for ourselves is this question: Are there general or universal ‘meta-values’ that can give us adequate criteria to guide effective action — not only let leaders invoke those values without an way of checking whether they actually are served by the proposed actions? And how would those criteria / measures come to be identified and agreed upon?
– Even more specifically, whether those measures should be determined by objective measurement, and then used by some people who are able or entitled to initiate ‘effective action’ to not only do so, — on behalf of everybody else – but to claim that this is ethically and morally defensible and necessary.

– And to declare everybody who disagrees to be ethically misguided – really: to be ‘bad’ or ‘evil’ people.

– Do they come right out and say so?

– I think both sides are, in so many words, unfortunately. So the question of whether there are ‘meta-values’ with related performance measures that everybody should adopt and thus support the resulting actions, is an important one. The sticking part being, to support collective actions taken on our behalf, and perhaps compelling us to take certain everyday actions ourselves, in pursuit of those meta-values. Didn’t we say, a little while ago, that somebody can take action on my behalf if I have given him my criterion functions? – But now it looks like the suggestion is the other way around: that there are criterion functions people tell us we should adopt, to comply with the ethical demands of the Meta Values. So we are trying to understand what that really means.

– Okay: so, let us assume that we have persuaded the participants in the climate change debate to explain their basis of judgment to each other, as much as possible by use of criterion functions. Diagrams that explain how or subjective ‘goodness’ judgments g about proposed plans relate to some ‘objective’, measurable properties of climate change aspects. Take the example of the ‘evil’ CO2 that we are adding to the atmosphere. Assuming that there is some agreement about how much that matters – a different scientific question that also needs sorting out in many people’s minds. And assuming there’s some meaningful agreement about how and where those levels of CO2 will be measured.

– What do you mean – are agreements about CO2 needed? Isn’t that just a simple scientific fact?

– No, Sophie: It makes a difference whether you measure CO2 content in the atmosphere, and at what height, or in the oceans. All those things must be sorted out. Then: is the ‘amount’ or ‘percentage’ of CO2 a good choice of criterion for explaining our judgments about the quality of a plan to improve things?

+ Sure: Haven’t scientists found out, in may serious studies, that the amount of CO2, at the time when we began so see substantial human-based climate change, was some value ‘c*’? Whether you wish to use the actual measure of the amount of CO2 in the atmosphere or its percentage, does not really matter, at least for the sake of this question. Now, say a plan or policy P1 has been proposed to try to get things back in line, whatever that means. So a person tries to explain how her judgment score on some scale +U, to –U, say +3 to -3 depends on how close a proposed plan comes to that ‘goal’ of c*. Would you say that to get a ‘goodness score of +3 (meaning ‘couldn’t possibly get any better’, on a ‘goodness scale of +3 ‘couldn’t possibly get any better, to -3 meaning ‘couldn’t possibly get any worse’ with a midpoint of zero ‘’so-so’, do don’t know’), the plan would have to achieve a return to that value ‘c*’? So you’d draw up a criterion function with the top of the curve touching the +3 line at c*. But another person B thinks that a slightly higher level of CO2 would be OK given some measures in the plan to mitigate it faster. It looks like this:

Figure 3: Criterion functions of two persons, for a plan to return the CO2 value to a desirable CO2 level
It shows their different judgment basis regarding what that level c* should be, showing the CO2-measure on the x-axis and the judgment score on the y-axis. Any lower or higher than that would get a lower score.

 

– Okay; I see. And you are saying that in principle, every participant in the evaluation would be entitled to his or her own curve? Even one that doesn’t have the highest score at ‘c*’?

–  Now why would you – or anybody – put the highest score anywhere else?

– Well, aren’t you guys saying that having spewed so much CO2 into the atmosphere since it was at that benign level ‘c*’ has done a lot of damage already? So to repair that damage – to get the glaciers to grow back, for example, or to cool down the oceans, – it would be necessary to reduce the CO2 to a lower level than ‘c*’ – at least for a while? If you could calculate that level, that’s where a person B might put the +3 score. And give that score to another plan P2 that would achieve that level. Does that make sense?

Figure 4 – Criterion functions about assessment of CO2 levels relative to the ‘current state’
and the goal of ‘returning’ to a previous better state by temporarily lowering the target state below c*

– Wait a minute: wouldn’t it be better to look at the effectiveness of a plan to reduce the amount of CO2 – at least, as you say, for a while, until the effects of increased CO2 level have been ‘repaired’?

– Good question, at least for showing that even the choice of criterion is a controversial issue. You could say that it might be even better to look at how close to the ideal CO2 level a plan can get with its reduction effectiveness, and show how that relates to what would happen if nothing is done? Which is always an alternative ‘plan’?

– Good. But the question is really about whether the criterion of ‘c*’ or ‘c•’ is an appropriate one to base you judgment upon: Both plans are claiming to reach those values – claims that should be assessed for their plausibility, don’t forget – but at different points in time. So which one is ‘better’?

– I guess we should say: the plan that gets there ‘sooner’ – all other aspects being equal, for the sake of the argument.

– Yes, but doesn’t that mean you really have a different criterion? Specifically: the criterion of ‘time for the plan to get to c* — or c•? Which really is a different criterion, so which one are you going to use?

– Does it matter whether we use different levels of desirable c’s as long as we all come up with a goodness judgment g, and we each have explained what that judgment depends upon?

– If the outcome is that your judgment will support P1 while –‘s score will prefer P2 as the better plan – all else being equal, as you say: the problem isn’t really solved yet, is it?

      Figure 5 – Criterion function of plan effectiveness of reduction of CO2 in relation to the ideal ‘stable’ c* level
and to the plan alternative of ‘doing nothing’.

 

– Hey guys, aren’t you missing something essential here? Well, you did sort of stumble on it, – with your remark ‘at least for a while’.

– Huh? Explain, Vodçek. What’s missing?

– Time, of course. In your criterion functions so far, you seem to make an assumption that your plans P1 and P2 will somehow ‘achieve’ some level of CO2 one they got implemented, and that things would then stay that way? But come on, that’s not how things work, is it? Even a plan for this kind of issue would have to involve activities, policies, processes, all continuing over time. It can’t be a sudden magic spell to change things overnight. And then it would take time for the actual CO2 level to change back to whatever level you’d have in mind — if the plan works. But how long is that going to take? And is it going to stay at that level? Shouldn’t that be part of your systemic ‘due consideration’?

– You are right. So let me see – looks like we have to draw up a kind of three-dimensional criterion function, is that what you are implying?

– Right. If you are serious about this idea of ‘explaining how your subjective judgment relates to objective criteria’. Not everybody does…

– Okay, I see your point. So we draw the diagram like this: Time on the horizontal right-left axis, CO2 – level on the horizontal up-down axis y, and your judgment on the vertical axis z.

– And before you ask, I think Dexter would say simulation models to predict the track of the CO2 levels for each plan over time can and have been developed, given reliable data…

– But now, what’s your score for those plans? If the CO2 levels and judgments change all the time? By the way, wouldn’t you have to also include a simulated track for the ‘current’ state of affairs and its future track if nothing is done?

+ Right. So we have the time CO2 simulation with three tracks – like this?

Figure 6: Criterion function of criterion changes and corresponding judgments over time

–  Okay, what about instead looking at the difference between the desired targets and what the plans are actually achieving, over time? It would require looking at the total measure of those differences over time, and I agree that it would also require an agreement about the time frame we are willing to look at. People keep talking about the world we are going to leave for our grandchildren, from a more systemic and holistic perspective – but don’t offer any specifics about how we might distinguish one plan from another, or even from just doing nothing?

– I like your point about looking at the difference, the degree of improvement we can expect from a plan. What would that look like in your diagram?

– Well, the measure would have to be one like the area of the judgment ‘surface’ between two alternatives? Because we agree that in order to reach some kind of meaningful overall measure, it will have to be made up of judgment’ measures, right? But I’m sure that at least for individual judgment systems, ways can be found to calculate that, just as there are equations that describe the simple line functions in the previous examples. But for the time assessment, it will have to include some feature of ‘discounting’ the judgments over time – like calculating the ‘present’ value of a series of income or cost payments over time. Work to do, eh? Because you can see in the diagram that if a plan ‘works’, the improvement judgment area will get wider and wider over time – but after since the probabilities / plausibility judgments will also get more and more uncertain for long future time periods, they will become less and less important factors in the final overall judgment.

– I see what you mean. Not because we don’t care about future generations, mind you – but simply because we just can’t be certain about our predictions about the future.

– Right. Meanwhile, the discourse may become more productive if we threw more of these kinds of diagrams into the fray? Like this one about the judgment surfaces – I agree it needs discussion?

– So you may have to look at the actual results that those changes in CO2 will bring about, over time? Like: levels of ocean rise expected until the remedy sets in – will it actually recede if the plans are any good? I haven’t heard anybody even mention that yet… And provisions for what to do about sea level change until it stops rising?

Figure 7 – Criterion functions showing judgment surfaces of comparative improvement over time

 

– Coming to think of that – have there been any plans put out there with that kind of details?

– I admit, I haven’t been following all the reports on that controversy – but I am not aware of any.

– Hey, here’s a test for promoters of a plan: ask them whether they are willing to put up down payments for new ocean front real estate that will emerge if their plan works as intended?

– Renfroe… Ah well, maybe you’ve got something there. Get Al to put down money for property on the beach in front of Mar-a-Lago?

– You guys are giving me a headache. How are we ever going to get moving on the problem if you keep analyzing things to death and wasting time with stupid pranks?

– Well, who was claiming and boasting about taking a more systemic and holistic look at these problems, and of making decisions based on objective facts? It may be useful to turn that big talk down a notch, and focus on the painful nitty-gritty aspects of how to make these decisions. So that people can agree on something specific instead of calling each other names, and resisting plans because of distrust – deserved or not – about what the promoters for plan P1 or P2 are really after? Like power? The next election? More profit for one industry rather than another? That lack of trust may be the real reason why people keep resisting plans to do something about problems. But can’t talk about them because those suspected motives or their lack of them aren’t being part of the discourse?

– Ah: the discourse. Yes. How to talk about all that without starting to call each other names or throwing rocks at each other and storefronts… What does that take? Where’s Abbé Boulah?
oooo