Archive Page 15

Bog-Hubert’s Theory of Consciousness

Bog-Hubert shook the rain from his coat, entering the Fog Island Tavern. Seeing his friends Abbé Boulah and Renfroe at the bar, he approached them with a greeting and inquiry about current states of their well-being. To his consternation, Abbé Boulah did not respond at all, while Renfroe turned around with a helpless gesture, pointing at Abbé Boulah with his thumb and whispering: “Sumthin’s got to him — ben sittin’ there unconscious-like for better’n half an hour”.

But the shuffling and scraping of the barstool Bog-Hubert pulled up aroused Abbé Boulah from his strange mental state. He turned around and said: “Funny you’d mention that — I mean the consciousness bit. That was just what I was trying to figure out.”

Bog-hubert looked at him, while signaling to Vodçek the bartender for his usual, and asked: “Consciousness? when you seemed to Renfroe here to be — let’s say — out of it? What got you into that? Can you enlighten us?”

“Well” said Abbé Boulah, slowly. “It’s not that easy when I’m just trying to make sense of it myself. But all right. Here I was reading this exchange of comments by Artificial Intelligence experts on one of their hi-faluting internet forum networks, about this theory of conscience one of those experts had come up with.”

“What are those guys getting into theories of conscience for — Isn’t that a subject of , well, several different disciplines?” asked Bog-Hubert.

“True enough — but you know, one of the ambitions of those AI guys is to develop a system — say, a computer program, or even a robot, that has conscience just like a human being.”

“Ah, now I understand, yes. Then they need to know what this thing is, of course. Have a theory. Of consciousness. Makes sense. So this fellow had sprung such a theory on them? What about it? Weren’t they happy with it?”

“Well, there was a lively discussion — but I’m not sure it was a happy one. Frankly, I was surprised any of them really cared to get into a discussion about this particular theory — it seemed, let’s say, not very coherent to me. What do I know. But it got me thinking about consciousness.”

“What was the problem with that theory — I mean, you have some pretty clear ideas about what makes a viable theory, don’t you? This one didn’t live up to those standards? “

“I’ll let you make up your own mind about that — here’s the link to that file — he wrote a whole article, with references and and all. And yes, you might ask yourself whether it does what we expect of a good theory.”

“A good theory: what’s that?” asked Renfroe. “Aren’t all theories just that: theory — not practice, not reality? So what do you expect?”

“Well, it’s really not that complicated. A theory is just a collection of statements about something we want to know about, some aspect of reality. And while you can make up all kinds of stories about anything for yourself, if you want to communicate with somebody else about it, the statements must be understandable to that person. Usually, in general, they must be expressed in a language that person understands, satisfy the rules of grammar of that language, and use words that refer to concepts the other person understands, that is, they have to have the same meaning for both folks. To make sure of that, it usually takes a whole bunch of explanations and definitions at the beginning of any story or book or paper about a theory — because all that can’t be taken for granted. Then of course, the statements must be coherent, and support each other. That means that there should be some connection, some common elements, from one statement to the next. The whole thing must make sense. But then there are several levels of expectations, depending on what you want the theory to do.”

“Levels of expectations, huh? Sounds more complicated than what you said a while ago.”

“Relax, Renfroe. It’s not that difficult. See, a first expectation about anything we want to discuss is that the concepts and statements allow us to describe that part of reality we are talking about: which means that the statements of the theory actually, understandably — to you and me — describe what we are talking about. We need to name that, of course, distinguish it from other things so we don’t confuse matters, which usually means that we have to agree on some kind of definition: That thing over there, that’s what we are discussing. Give it a name, and agree that’s what we refer to when we use the name. Without such an agreement, it’s pretty hard to carry on a meaningful discussion — but it doesn’t mean that we can’t change our minds about that as we learn more. Then we can adjust the definition. But we got to start with one.”

“Makes sense, so far”

“Okay. In other words, the theory at this level must allow us to describe everything we know about that thing. So at this level, we are dealing with a ‘descriptive theory’, and a good theory at this level is one that covers all those concerns of description. Now, that’s usually not all we want from a theory, is it? What do you say, Bog-Hubert?”

“Well, uh. To me, a theory ought to give me some ideas about why and how things are the way they are and why things happen.”

“Right you are: what you are talking about is an ‘explanatory’ theory: one that explains why things happen the way they do. That mostly takes statements like those we call ‘laws of nature’ or laws of behavior. We make hypotheses about such laws and try to find out whether they are true: a good explanatory theory allows us to set up such statements that explain the relationships between things that happen.”

“How do we know if those explanations are any good? Not just wild speculations and nonsense?”

“Good question, Renfroe. That’s the task of science, to find out, or test, whether such theories are valid. To do that, they use the explanatiosn to make predictions: If we do so-and-so, and the theory — or rather the specific hypothesis of a given theory — is true, then we should see such and such happening. If Hypothesis that A causes B is true, and we do A, then we should expect to see B. So we perform such a test: we do A, and see if B happens. If it does, we have a better reason to think that the hypothesis is true — we can’t really be totally sure, because as the philosopher of science Karl Popper emphasized, the reasoning pattern
“If H is true then E must follow
Now E is true (we observe)
therefore H is true”
Is not a deductively valid argument — it just provides a bit more support (corroboration) for H than we had before, but no definitive proof. While the pattern
“If H is true then E must follow
E is not true
therefore H is not true”
is a valid and conclusive reasoning scheme: H is ‘refuted’ — and Popper emphasizes that this is really how science progresses: conjecturing hypotheses, then testing them by making predictions, trying as best we can to refute them — if they stand up to all the tests we can think of then we can be more comfortable accepting the hypothesis as ‘corroborated’ (not proved!) — until somebody comes up with a better one. So a theory is a good one to the extent is lets us make predictions we can test, and those tests turn out as predicted: it has ‘predictive power’. Popper turns this around to say that a theory that can’t be tested, at least in principle (even if it would be very difficult to actually carry out a test) simply is not a scientific theory”.

“Interesting. But why would those AI folks need all that — and for consciousness?”

“Good question, Bog-Hubert. But wait just a while — the question may become more clear after we clarify one more level of theory: the normative level.”

“What’s that?”

“Well, one major reason we want to know things, how things work, and so on, is because we want to do things in the world, make plans, solve problems. And now there are many statements that aim to tell us what to do and how to do it: those stories are what we call the normative level of theory. Not all theories go to that level, but that’s what we are always quarreling about in human life, isn’t it” what we ought to do. And of course, this is where science gets into trouble, because it has no way of etsting, and therefore no business setting up statements about that we ough to do. That’s a whole different topic. But you might use this brief rundown of levels of theories to look at this proposed theory of consciousness: I think you’ll see that it falls far short of the basic expectations even at the descriptive and explanatory level, offers no predictions anybody might test, but then jumps to a claim that it has implications of ethics, without any further justification or explanation. Have you read that paper?”

“Give me some time, I’ll go over it”

“So, what do you make of it?”

“Sorry, I don’t really understand it at all. The paper makes a bunch of audacious claims for which I can’t see the evidence or coherent arguments, so I can’t really comment on that. The audacity must be contagious though, it made me think I could come up with a theory of consciousness myself. One that’s much simpler. But of course I don’t know if it would be of any use for the kinds of things those AI researchers are trying to do with it.”

“Right. It brings us back to the question we sidestepped a while ago: what do the AI researchers need a theory of consciousness for?”

“Beats me. What I know about that is that they want to build things like robots to do things for people, machines that are smart enough to do things faster, better, more efficiently. Don’t know why consciousness has to be a part of that.”

“Maybe they think that to get them to be smart enough, intelligent enough, they need to not just do things, but have a sense of what they are doing and when to stop, or when it doesn’t make sense to begin or continue doing it?”

“Yeah, that’s just what I was thinking: they must be able to look at a situation, get the messages from their surroundings, and check them against the rules, the program that tells them what to do. But that still doesn’t need any consciousness as far as I can see. I’ve seen robots sweeping the floor; when they hit the wall, they stop or turn around. Are they conscious?”

You are getting closer here. — They ‘stop or turn around’, you say. That means that the thing, the machine or entity, whatever, makes choices. And that’s what requires that there’s something in it, — in the entity — that looks at not only the message from the outside, but also at itself, asking: is there something up my memory chip that could let me do something other than going on butting up against the wall, or stopping? Like turning around in a different direction?”

“ In other words; the thing, the entity — we’ll have to allow for both living things and machines here, right? — must have some internal representation not only of the outer world it operates in, but also a representation of itself. Then it receives messages from the outside, matches them against what it has on its representation board, and uses another program to decide what to do about them.”

“Wait a minute. That bit about the representation of the world outside and of itself makes sense to me. Are you saying that these representations are what we call consciousness? I could go along with that. But why do we need the responses, the action? Can’t a thing be conscious just sitting there taking it all in, but not responding — like you did when I came in a while ago?”

“Good observation, Bog-Hubert. But you are asking two different questions here, let’s take them one at a time. One is whether having such a representation already is equivalent to consciousness. And the other is whether the response, the action is a necessary part of that . The second one actually has to do with why the AI and the theory folks are having so much trouble with this: We could imagine something having consciousness just sitting there taking it all in, as you say. But how would we know about it if it doesn’t do anything that we can observe? I think that might explain all the complications in that paper as well: the questions about what such an entity might do that we could observe as a sign of consciousness, are getting all mixed up with the questions of what we can observe, and how we can interpret that, how we can know whether something, some reaction indicates consciousness or just a regular physical or chemical reactions — reactions that aren’t registered on some inetrnal representation board. But these issues don’t really have anything to do with what consciousness itself is, do they?”

“That would make things a little easier on the one hand, if we can cut all those reaction recognition and interpretation problems out. So, for the AI and robot folks, it would mean that giving a machine such representations both of what the outside world is like and what its own organization is like, that would meet their needs at least to some extent, wouldn’t it? They could say that they actually are simulating the effects of consciousness that way. — But it still leaves the question of whether having those kinds of representations really make for consciousness, doesn’t it?”

“Right. And you could say it makes that question even harder.”

“Why?”

“Because you have to admit that we don’t really know much about that representation. People try to make such artificial representations on computer chips and memory boards, to make computers behave like people as much as possible — as if they had consciousness, which tricks some folks into saying that our brains are like computers. But that’s as much nonsense as saying the brain is just like an abacus, or some other mechanical device. We don’t know how those representations are organized. And we can imagine many different ways they might be done, can’t we?”

“What you are saying is that there might be ways all kinds of things or entities can have such representations and therefore consciousness — even pet rocks? But we can’t know about them unless they start talking back somehow?”

“That’s what it boils down to, right. We have to keep an open mind about that, and refrain from judgments about things we can’t know. But I ‘m not sure yet that having just one representation already is consciousness. What if it takes another level of representation that looks at its representation — both of the outside reality and its own representation of it? And starts evaluating it: how it’s organized, whether there are gaps or contradictions in them, how the elements are related to one another, and so on. Doesn’t that sound more like ‘being conscious’: having a sense both of the outside world — as it is represented in one’s own system — and of the structure and quality of that entire representation?”

“Whoa! You are making me dizzy here — you realize that there’s no end to that line of thinking, don’t you? For who’s to say that in addition to the first level — A — of representation of the outside world A(w) including the representation of the entity itself A(s) , and the next level or representation B, of both A and its structure, which would be B(As&As), but in order to ‘inspect’ that system you’d need a third level C in which the structure and quality of B is represented and evaluated. And another one — D — to inspect C, and so on. There’s no end to that: you are falling into a bottomless pit. Or looking into that endless sequence of images in the opposing mirrors in the barbershop.”

“Now I see what they mean by ‘levels of consciousness’ — each one higher — or deeper in the pit — than the previous one.”

“Right, Renfroe. And the barbershop mirror image is an apt one: it shows us that we can’t really see the whole sequence: If the mirrors are truly parallel, our own first image gets in the way.”

“But it also explains the way you were sitting there, lost in contemplation: it seems that in order to inspect things at the higher (or lower) levels, we can’t pay attention to the messages coming in at the first level. Made it look like you’re unconscious. Scary, huh?”

“Yeah. Could plumb drive a fellow to drink.”

“Ah, Renfroe. Drink himself into unconsciousness?”

Some policy agenda items for discussion

There is a discussion about what govenrment should do to fix the economy. The economy cannon t easily be separated from other governance issues. Here is a list of tentative things for discussion that should be on the agenda — if not of the government then of groups who are thinking about how to get out of the various messes we are in — not yet in any order of importance (which should be the first item: to set priorities…) Should it not be considered Un-American to suggest that Americans cannot design themselves a government ‘of, for, by the people’ that actually works?

1. Discourse framework

The format and structure of the public discourse about public policy (not just elections) should be reorganized, with the aim of providing proposals, arguments and supporting evidence into concise focus and overview, de-emphasizing the repetition, partisan name-calling and degeneration into insults that characterize many of the discussion fora on the internet. Ideas for such a forum are available.

2. A dual system of governance and private enterprise

For all the rhetoric about ‘less government’ and ‘government is the problem’, it is clear that there must be some coherent collective organization to provide the groundwork of agreements, infrastructure, and conflict resolution mechanisms without which complex technological civilizations cannot function. But the discussion as to which tasks belong to this realm of common infrastructure, and how they should be provided, as opposed to things that could and should be done by private enterprise, is very necessary. For example, why not explore the possibility of a ‘dual system’ where every citizen is automatically an ‘employee’ of the government, which in turn provides the basic social network of security/protection, education. health insurance and infrastructure, financed not only through taxes but through civic / community work contributrions on the part of everybody. Everybody is also encouraged to work in the private sector, for competitive wages and profit. Private enterprise would be relieved from the burden of witholding taxes, providing insurance, pensions etc. since those functions will be taken over by government. Of course, everybody will be free to purchase enhancement packages to the basic insurance or education or retirement plans of the government system on the private market. The ratio of work in the public to private sector is automatically sliding: when business is good, more people will work in the private sector, government will purchase infrastructuyre services on the market and finance it through taxes; in times of crisis in the private sector, that ratio will automatically shift to public work — at wages that merely guarantee that nobody will suddenly go hungry, be homeless or without health care. Since everybody is already ‘in the system’, no cumbersome new programs and bureaucracies will have to be set up. The disruptions of economic ups and downs will be smoothed out if not entirely avoided.

3. Percentage Budgeting

Instead of the poisonous battles erupting whenever government revenues fall and budgets have to be trimmed, a simple expedient would be for legislatures to simply specify budgets in percentages of the actual revenues that will accrue, instead of actual dollar figures. The impact of budget cuts will then automatically be more evenly distributed — there will be fewer groups exposed to drastic losses while saving the fortunes of better protected groups. All departments in the system will have to make their own estimates as well as preparing strategies for dealing with the resulting uncertainty; and will arguably do this in more meaningful ways than what can be achieved in crude last-minute compromise amendments to legislative budgets prepared in overtime, that nobody will eb able to read before voting on them.

4. Percentage budget tax voting

As part of the voting process — instead of destructive and divisive referenda that target single issues — the possibility of having voters express — again, as percentages — their preferences as to how their taxes should be allocated to all the various government functions. This would then become guidance information for the budget preparation, and the basis for government / legislation performance evaluation.

5. No new bills without impact analysis

No new bills should be proposed and /or adopted without a reliable analysis, made public, as to the resulting impact of the legislation. This in itself would make the adding of last-minute unread amendments more difficult.

6. No laws affecting (or excluding) lawmakers and govbenrment officials

No laws should be allowed that affect (i.e. provide benefits for) lawmakers and government officials, that will not be available to the public; nor should laws be allowed that exclude lawmakers and government officials from the impact they will have on the public.

7. No laws or policy plans without a “what if we’re wrong” clause

No policies or laws should be adopted that do not have a component spelling out what actions will be necessary if the basic argument in favor of the plan turn out to be flawed — that is, if either one of its premises do no longer hold:
a) the goal or objective aimed for with the proposed means
b) the means will not achieve the desired goal or objective; or
c) the conditions under which a) or b) are valid, are no longer the case.

8. Research, discussion and adoption of better conflict resolution tools

At all levels — local, regional, national and especially international, better tools are needed for peaceful, cooperative conflict resolution.

9. Research, discussion, adoption of better sanctions for breaking laws / agreements

Again, at all governance levels, there is a need for better devices or mechanisms for preventing the breach of agreements, laws, and treaties. Especially, the imposition of (“painful”) sanctions by the application of greater force should be replaced as much as possible by mechanisms of sanctions triggered ‘automatically’ by the very act of breaking the agreement, law, or treaty. This can be achieved, for example, by the installation of ‘safety switches’ for crucial infrastructure systems of a party A in the very systems of party B that would be affected by the violation by A.
A low-level example: the devices that prevent activating the ignition of cars except by the key of authorized users could be enhanced with modules sensing whether that driver is inebrieated, and possibly record and automatically withdraw ‘civic credit points’ (earned through both respective competence tests and civic service) from the driver’s account — obviating the large costs currently devoted to preventing and prosecuting drunk driving.

10. Research, discussion, adoption of more meaningful ways of dealing with power

The issue of power is currently still dealt with in very inconsistent ways. It is allocated — delegated — to officials bot as a perquisite and as the necessary condition for executing official duties / enforcing policies, laws etc. It is obvious that power is sought as much for its own sake as it is for the sake of being able to perform public service. Is power a form of human need? It is also obvious that power — almost inevitably — leads to temptations to abuse: to just bend the rules a little, and then a little more. Is being able to break the rule the only proof of true freedom truly having power? — For if one has to abide by the rules, does one truly have power, freedom? Should power therefore be treated like any other human craving: paid for? Or a deposit (or money or civic credit points etc.) be required that will ‘automatically’ be lost upon violation?

11. Revision of current unquestioned socio-economic mantras — e.g. “growth”

It is an almost unquestioned principle — agreed upon by even fundamentally opposing political and economic philosophies — that a health economy is inevitably linked to growth. Governments like corporations are evaluated according to the rate of economic growth they achieve — even worse, measured in terms that do not necessarily account for real human well-being, but, like GDP, only transactions that involve money payments. This, when even the most superficial inspection of an exponential growth curve, together with the insight that some basic resources are inherently limited (land, water…) should tell us that indefinite growth is unsustainable and impossible for many if not most segments of the economy. The implications of this on e.g. fiscal policy are not clear, currently growth is the unquestioned goal and criterion. But one implication is increasingly evident: its indiscriminate dominance has led to the ever-growing income gap between the higher and lower groups in society: The simple example of the interest rate offered by banks for savings deposits (CD’s) — the higher, the higher the sum deposited — cannot by any stretch of rhetoric be justified with the greater skill, inventiveness, work ethic etc. of the higher sum depositor: it is fundamentally as inequitable and unjust as universally unquestioned and accepted. Should these fundamentals be subjected to critical revision? Should there be some mechanism of ‘diminishing marginal growth of profit rates’, for example, for corporate or individual incomes? That would be much easier an less controversial to implement and enforce that the after-the-fact (hurting) taxing of that income, which is then decried as ‘redistribution of wealth’ — (as if that wealth wasn’t inequitably distributed in the first place?). The discussion of these issues is very necessary, but the form, style and partisanship namecalling should be reduced (see above item#1).

The list can undoubtedly be expanded; it is just a starting exercise.

Abbé Boulah He Say:
The Stimulus doesn’t work? Let them give it back!

Robots and Emotions

Designing robots with true emotions — a topic I ran into on a different forum —
may be a matter of quibbling about semantics and definitions — e.g. if ‘true’ emotions are understood as reactions to attempts to satisfy human needs (success or failures to such attempts) then robots wouldn’t fall within that realm. I don’t want to enter that controversy, nor do I have anything to contribute from a programming / AI point of view, my programming competence being quite rudimentary as well as outdated. I feel that I can add some useful contributions from a design or planning perspective, however, that may help in overcoming one impoortant limitation of focus I have noticed there. That is the focus on emotions as reactions to events or processes related to physiological and survival needs. I am not denying the pertinence of that perspective, and am sure that pursuing it will produce interesting results. However, as an architect concerned about how the built environment produces not only satisfactory physiological conditions for survival and functioning of the human body but also emotions that seem unrelated to mere physiological mechanisms at least at first glance. Further investigations might clarify how proportions, rhythm, scale, composition of building form etc. produce physiological responses that contribute to our sense of well-being or displeasure, and therefore emotions. But I am convinced that there are additional factors involved that can only be classified as survival mechanisms with some procrustean difficulty. I see humans endowed with a need for defining themselves as individuals — that is, basically, being ‘different’ from others. This can include adopting some archetypal or culturally defined identity, a social role, a group identity based on age, work or career, philosophy, even fashion, life style, hobbies etc. I call this ‘image’ — of who we want to be. But the desire for ‘difference’ essentially ends up in a tendency or need for designing an identity — a ‘different’ one from any we have known before. And the images we humans adopt (the concept of ‘role model’ aims at this but misses the ‘design’ aspect of the need in presupposing a ‘model’ to imitate) can be quite contrary to the rationality of mere survival of body or species: it can include aspects of asceticism, of service to others, self-sacrifice, for example. Other criteria come into play here: criteria of ‘nobility’, of friendship, the good, beauty, for instance, that may appear ‘irrational’ to the survival-focused warrior.

The role of the built environment in this now becomes more clear: it can ‘match’ or reinforce that image of who we are or want to be. Or it can fail to do so: mismatch, conflict with our desired image. And that sense of match or mismatch is arguably an emotion that we as designers are crucially interested in. More importantly: If we recognize this human tendency or desire to ‘design’ / redesign ourselves according to a new image, to become individuals of our own choice, as a human right, we must ask ourselves how our building designs can help, assist people in this quest. This becomes the supreme responsibility of the architect. It cannot consist of merely expressing, asserting the creativity of the architect / designer (making design creativity a consumer item and thereby arguably cheapening it, even as we are asked to pay for fashionable design…) but should ask how it can help the user design, create that new identity, that new image. One might imagine that the image will first appear as a mental construct in the users’ mind, and then entices the person to actions that define the life that goes with it. That process may in reality be more interactive: the building may invite users to engage in occasions, activities, that define or are more in tune with a new image, which only becomes defined and recognized over time through the activities and design forms with which it is associated.

The pleasure or displeasure of this ‘matching’ or mismatching of built environment form and the imagery it evokes in users’ minds, with the images those users might want to adopt as their desired ‘way of life’ — something not just ‘chosen’ from a pre-established menu of societal options or opportunities, but actually created by the individual emerging as such in the very process of creating: those are the emotions we should be concerned about.

The question I have for the robot designers arising from this would be: How can robots be given an internal representation of such images against which to match external messages conveying (attempting to evoke) imagery? Can they be given image preferences for themselves, which would then be the basis for the emotions derived from the match or mismatch of internal image with external image messages? Can they ‘have’ their own image preferences? I assume they can be programmed with preferences if these can be adequately represented), but whose preferences would they be? Can they be programmed to ‘design’ new imagery against which to evaluate their environment? How? According to what criteria? And finally, should it not be clear that any robot lacking such capabilities but acting in the environment IS representing an image? Which may just be so ‘poor’ (in the sense of undefined) that we don’t even want to acknowledge it as such?

A related, equally interesting and potentially controversial issue is that of power. Being able to act according to a chosen ‘different’ image requires some degree of power: empowerment; the ability to creatively design and act upon new images guiding life even more so. The plans and activities arising from such efforts will likely influence, get in the way of the plans of other entities — human or otherwise. What provisions should be built into a being (human or otherwise) to ‘responsibly’ deal with the resulting conflicts? Just giving robots abilities commensurate with their mechanical power (that exceeds those of humans, which is the reason for their being designed) may not be enough. Is responsibility an emotion?

Precipitous exponential growth

The Black Swan Neck of the Exponential Growth Curve

One of the conundrums behind the current financial crisis is the puzzle concerning the exponential growth curve. Everybody looking at such a curve will concede that its application to many economic phenomena is unrealistic and unsustainable in the long run. For example, let’s assume a bank is offering an investor a 5% interest rate on a large deposit, say $1M. So in a year, the account will have $1.05M, the year after that $1. 1M, in three years $1.016M, and so on. Understanding this principle of compound interest is widely held to be one of the necessary aspects of basic financial intelligence.

Now the bank, in order to live up to its promise of paying back the deposit with interest, will have to earn that interest, plus, of course its own profit on doing so, from other people, who are borrowing money from the bank. So it must lend money at an interest rate that necessarily must be higher than the original 5%. If is only 1% more, the interest rate at which the ‘economy’ of the combined other borrowers must ‘grow’ per period, has to be at least 6%, just to be able to pay back the loans. But of course these people are doing that to make profit of their own as well, so that profit rate will have to be added to the necessary growth of the economy as a whole. This applies to every segment of that economy. But we also know that there are certain entities and resources in the economy that are inherently limited: the amount of land, or water, for example. Even to expect the production of food to grow at the same exponential rate year after year is patently impossible and unrealistic. This measn that in order to remain a responsibly viable participant in the economy, ( that is, for larger entities, to be acceptable investment vehicles on Wall Street) these sectors of the economy must raise their prices so as to ‘produce’ the expected growth rate, at least as much as is needed to cover the difference between the overall expected growth rate and the actual growth rate of their porduction. In other words, inflation. The expected , predicted inflation rate now becomes a factor in the interest rate expectation of our original $1M investor: the interest rate must rise to also cover inflation, otherwise such an investment would be less preferable that to spend the money on goods etc. at today’s prices. This means, that for an economy functioning according to these principles, a steady rise of inflation is a necessity. It is held in check only by the fact that there will be a number of ‘losers’ in the process, whose losses reduce the required rate of inflation. The regrettable fact of there having to be such losers is glossed over by the mantra that they ‘deserve’ this fate by being less industrious, or inventive, or sufficiently smart in marketing their services — all aspects that detract from the question of the true value of whatever they contribute. It is also demonstrably advantageous for the ‘winners’ or would-be-winners in this process to ever so subtly misprepresent the value of their ‘new, improved’ contributions and to persuade people that they realy really do need these things, and even to arrange legal and regulatory conditions inn favor of their products and services, by appropriately massaging the egos and pocketbooks of legislators.

The question — apart from those regarding fairness and justice and ethics, that may be dismissed with the old nugget of ‘buyer beware’ — is: why do serious economists and government officials incurring public debt in the expectation that future growth will pay for its expenditures, still continue to rely on the exponential growth expectation as a guide to policy? Why is it that even the highest experts profess to surprise as to that and how fast the collapse was happening — the prime example of a ‘black swan’ event that nobody expected?

Could it be that the answer may be found in the human tendency to consider only short term implications of policies and tactics? This is institutionalized in form of the common habit in the financial world, of evaluating economic performance (and stock market attractiveness, etc.) according to quarterly profit growth. What this does to the analyst (who ought to know better) is this:

Instead of the dizzying steep grade of an extended exponential growth curve after a number of time periods, it allows the analyst to ‘start from zero’ again each period: the value of the end of the previous period is moved to the point of origin in the new tracking chart, and the steepness of the curve looks perfectly benign: 5%, 6%, etc.: all close enough to the ‘normal’ horizontal steady state to allay any acrophobic fears. It hides the fact that one is already high up on the curve, leaning over precipitously from the vertical so as to perceive the current point as the horizontal starting point. This delusion can go on only for so long, of course: sooner or later, the perspective so gained will have to reveal itself as unsustainable, because leaning over so far from the safe true horizontal as to cause the viewer to lose all sense of what’s up or down, and lose balance. Followed by a sobering fall.

It would be satisfactory to be able to identify some culprits or villains in these machinations, to be appropriately pilloried in the public devastated marketplace. This would be missing the point, however. All indications are that just about everybody honestly believed in the appropriateness, validity and fairness of adopting this perspective of continued growth, of interest and profit, — from the lowliest holder of a measly savings account to the top managers on global banks, and government officials at all levels. An indication of this universally shared misconception is the current rash of government bailouts of the largest investment and insurance entities, which must be realistically seen as just moving the economy back to some previous point on the curve, one that wasn’t as close to the tipping point as to scare people from more and more lending and borrowing. It is a strategy that, given the mechanics of exponential growth, must inevitably, soone or later result in the same catastrophic collapse. Mitigating the progress toward such collapse by reining in certain accelerating follies — such as the selling and reselling of loans many times over (each time expecting more interest and profit, to the point where the combined earning expectation vastly exceeded even modest predictions of the actual growth of the real economy that ultimmately would have to pay for all those profits) will only slow down the inevitable repetition of the crisis.

Does the only realistic hope, as this little thought experiment suggests, for salvaging the economy lie in a fundamental reorientation of the basic expectations relative to growth in the economic system? The mantra of growth at any cost must give way to a more meaningful measure of the viability of economic policies. And the real basis for the widespread pessimism with respect to such a reorientation is that as far as can be seen in the public discourse, nobody — in the financing system or in government, nor in the media — is even raising this crucial question.

Abbé Boulah He Is Looking at the Stimulated Outrage

Abbé Boulah He Is Looking at the Stimulated Outrage at the Bank and AIG Bailouts and Bonuses.

And wonders mightlily at the number of split minds He can harbor about all this. For: yes, it does gall the peace-and-justice-loving soul to contemplate the injustice of big bonuses and payments to people whose foolish actions (or so it seems) have caused the downfall of the mighty institutions, and the loss of employment of untold workers not only in their own companies but in many other segments of the economy. It’s just not fair. Even though He does understand the alleged legal basis of such decisions, there being contracts involved that must be honored — the question of whether such contracts also would have to be honored if the people involved were also lai off? He is a bit more mystified at the argument that these people, being so knowledgeable about how they maneuvered the company into the current trouble, are so very much needed to get out of it: without any acknowledgement of just what the mistakes were or what new improved principles are now to be followed? Just get the money flowing again? He is not totally without understanding for those folks and even a smidgeon of compassion: they were faithfully following the glorious tenets of free enterprise and profit-maximizing they had been taught: growth, at all cost, beating the competition, even playing some little devious games with the accounting and promotion policies — after all, buyer beware, — but invest with confidence even if the fund managers turned out to be confidence men…
He does shake His head in incomprehension at the contradictory arguments regarding regulation: that is was the lack of regulation that allowed the misconduct, that the brave Republicans who even warned of such lack of regulation when the Democrats were — finally — beginning to cave in to the sustained onslaugth of Reaganesque (unsustainable) deregulation fervor, finally conceded that business was suffering from too much regulation. Huh? and Treble Huh? And He admits to being at a total loss when pondering the question why the role of beliefs in fundamental mantras and the role of power in all these events is not even brought up in any of the startling discussion revelations of having told us so long ago and we just didn’t pay no tuition? Such as the issue of growth. Has there been no MBA or economics professor ever showing these bonus-prone folks an exponential growth curve? And ever so slyly encouraging a question as to where that curve would end, if allowed to continue? But of course, in a culture of quarterly profit-orientation, such questions would be utterly incomprehensible. So if anyone in the employment of the institutions in question were to even contemplate questions of this nature, this had to be seen as potentially damaging to said quarterly profit growth but tendentially treasonous — heretical to the high principles of free trade and enterprise proclaimed by prophets like Milton Friedman? No, Abbé Boulah cannot really blame these people; the combined peer pressure and profit prospect would have been too much to resist for even the most virtuous of free traders. Nor can he really blame the government officials who, along with the much lower incomes than their former classmates now in the banking and insurance industries, finally caved in to incessant drum of demands that governments be run like a business, and accordingly adopted strategies akin to those so successfully demonstrated in business by hostile take-overs financed by future debt of the companies taken over: massive debt-financing of all kinds of government programs and wars, and now bank bailouts, relying on the very continued future growth that just had proven elusive in the business world?

Or regarding the role of power: having endured for decades the lamentations of the business leaders as to the deplorable temptations of power afflicting government leaders, He wonders why even timid questions about such afflictions were never raised about leaders in the business world? Or why the valiant efforts of the Constitution-framers to contain government power — by means of checks and balances, division of government into its various branches, time limits of appointments and the like, were not also applied to the business segment of the economy: because they still did not work well enough?

Left to ponder all these questions without guidance from either the business, government, or religious leaders much less the so-called free press that also has been subjected to the iron rule of Murdochian quarterly profits and line-toeing, Abbé Boulah is playing in His sandbox with his own heretical suspicions:

What if the measure of performance of both government and business were changed to something like ‘maximizing opportunity’ or maximizing occasion (i.e. life event) opportunity quality (for citizens and consumers, rather than pecuniary profit? To include equilibrium instead of growth? What if the marginal interest and profit rates were inverted from their current shapes all rising with higher deposits or investments (some even unsustainably exponentially?) to shapes of declining marginal increase as investments and sales volume increases? What if budgets of governments were not established in terms of dollar amounts but as percentages of whatever revenues will actually be received? What if power were recognized as just another human need, even addiction, for which those who wish to indulge in it would be asked to pay, rather that having all of us pay for it? With decisions likely to affect large numbers of people requiring a ‘deposit’ which will be forfeited if the decision turns out poorly, and a bonus if it succeeds — but only after establishing success? What if there were a ‘dual’ economic system? One public, in which everybody is a member — owner-employee — by virtue of being a citizen, and working in it for nominal wages or credits on common purpose projects that increase opportunity for everybody (infrastructure). The other private enterprise, with everybody encouraged to work there according to the ‘free trade’ and ‘free enterprise’ principles and higher earnings? But on a flexible sliding time scale– so that if either sector runs into trouble (as in the current housing-construction-financing crisis — people’s involvement in one or the other would be automatically adjusted, thus avoiding the massive layoffs that merely increase the problem? That would free the enterprise part from all kinds of burdensome paperwork, since basic taxes and insurance would be done by the public sector? (People of course being able to buy enhancements on the free market for other-than-basic coverage.) What if people would be able to indicate on their election ballots how much, in percent, of their taxes they would like to see designated for what programs and purposes?

Ah well. Too many questions and possibilities. He just wishes there were somebody He could discuss at least some of these with, over a glass of sustainably priced wine?

Bog-Hubert’s Cousin’s Solution

Bog-Hubert’s Black Sheep Cousin (some friends Abbé Boulah is hanging out with, it really makes you to wonder sometimes…) made this prediction — or suggestion? — in the Fog Island Tavern:

“Hey folks, let’s all take our stimulus money, buy some cheap property in one of those central American places they keep advertising, where we can live like lords on the cheap. Meanwhile, we’ll just open the borders, — save a ton of money — give everybody who wants to come in temporary residence for ten or fifteen or twenty years, whatever it will take for them to do the work, fix this country up, and pay the taxes that are needed to pay off the federal debt. Then we give’m the Central American places back — by then we’ll have screwed them up just like we did the Florida and California Coast — and move back…”

Did we see the senator in the tavern slink off with a very thoughtful frown on his face…?

Economic stimulus

The discussion for and against the ‘new’ economic stimulus package is heating up in a somewhat disturbing pattern that does not bode well for the concerted, cooperative efforts that will be needed to overcome the crisis. The positions are exaggerated and simplified to the degree of caricature, yet not conducive to merriment but rather increasing divisiveness: shrill accusations by supporters, that opponents ignore the plight of those affected, thereby making things worse by delaying action, countered by the other side with wild statements about the measures to be preparations for the wholesale deliverance of the country to socialism, being full of pork, doing nothing to solve the problem in the long run, etc.

Trying to sort out some of the issues, I have a few questions.

Is anybody fundamentally against the notion that there is a problem and that something needs to be done about it?

Is anybody opposed to the notion that there is a need for quick action? But that whatever action is taken, the remedy will have to be sustainable in the long term?

I don’t perceive that there is much disagreement there. So the contentious issues are about specifics. Some of these, about which I think there are legitimate questions, are :

1. Are the funds of the package going to the ‘right’ people and groups?
(‘Right’ as in ensuring the desired effect, as well as: group ‘deserving’ or ‘undeserving’ — e.g. because they may be the ones ‘responsible’ for the problem)

2. Will the funds be used for the appropriate activities, projects, programs?
(Other versions of this question will ask: Is there too much ‘pork’ in the package? And who will benefit versus who will suffer?)

3. Can and will the proper use of funds be effectively monitored?

4. Will the proposed measures ‘gain traction’ fast enough to prevent serious
damage until they do?

5. What are the expectations about how those funds
(which must be borrowed) can and will be repaid?
By whom? Over what period of time? At what cost?
Are those expectations reliable? realistic?

6. Will the package, and the programs to be funded with it, result in effective long term recovery? Or just in short term ‘band-aid’ fixes that

7. Are there viable alternatives to the proposed measures? What are they?
And are they being discussed? Considered? scrutinized?

It is interesting to note that so much of the ‘discussion’ is being conducted in rather simplifying and therefore divisive terms, and drawing from historical events that may be considered not entirely applicable to the current situation. The argument about the expected effectiveness, for example, uses almost exclusively material form the 1930’s depression, with one side claiming that the ‘New Deal’ programs kept the country afloat, saved the lives of millions, and produced infrastructure that remained useful for many years, while the other contends that the taxation necessitated by the government spending unnecessarily prolonged the crisis. This is usually combined with the simplistic ‘small government’, individual freedom and personal responsibility versus ‘big (bad) government and its ‘tax-and spend’ proclivities, welfare mothers and dependence (i.e. loss of freedom) on government handouts slogans. It can be argued, with ample recent evidence, that the reality of the current situation in many ways represents an effective inversion of many of these notions. So there is a legitimate need for in-depth scrutiny of these questions.

There are some serious questions that have not been raised, to my knowledge, much less received any in-depth discussion (I don’t count the screams about ‘turning the country over to socialism’ which has been ‘proven to fail everywhere esp. in the demise of the USSR, nor on the other side, the gleeful or anxious cries about the imminent ‘demise of capitalism’ as evidenced by its failure to solve the world’s problems since the collapse of socialism, and its recent crisis, as serious discussion). These are questions about the underlying structural reasons and mechanisms for the failures of both, that should be examined, remedied, or replaced with something better.

8. One of these issues is the effect of power in large systems. It applies to both forms of socio-political governance as well as large ‘private enterprise’ entities. It is ironic that defenders of US capitalism boast of the US being able to send folks to the moon but don’t seem to credit Americans with being able to develop a viable government. Some respectable efforts have been made to control and limit the unconstrained abuse of power in ‘democratic’ forms of government (term limits, checks and balances between several branches of government), which arguably are in need of improvement. The possibility that temptations to abuse of power also can occur in private enterprise, especially when these grow to near monopoly and global dimensions, has not been effectively discussed, except with sanctimonious deference to the power of shareholders and the ‘invisible hand’ of the markets as the only needed controls, on one side, and denigrations of ‘big corporations’ pointing to the evidence of the white collar Enron-style crime on the other. Which are dismissed by the defenders of capitalism as just the misdeeds of a few ‘bad apples’ which are justly being prosecuted — “see, they are serving jail time…” And therefore do not need consideration of structural change.

(I have discussed the relationship between freedom and power elsewhere, the temptation to realize freedom made possible by power (empowerment) consisting precisely in the ability to break or bend the rules: am I truly ‘free’ if I have to abide by the rules?)

9. Another fundamental question that also is not part of the current discussion is the role of growth in the economy. It is almost as impossible to even raise the question as it is to question motherhood and apple pie: the unquestioned mantra of governmental economics from the smallest municipalities to international trade and finance. It is manifested in the phenomenon of compound interest, and the associated expectation of profit and return on investment at all levels of economic activity. The concept, in its basic form as taught in the schools, is hard to argue with — the various warnings and prohibitions in religions throughout history notwithstanding. Did they know something we have forgotten? Might there be some good reasons for rethinking the way we deal with this?

One reason might be the indiscriminate application of growth-oriented policy (and growth-based criteria for economic decisions) to areas that are meaningfully capable of growth, and to resources that cannot grow, alike. The fact that some resources are limited by nature — land, shorelines, fresh water, even the fish in the ocean — but are treated just like phenomena that can more easily accommodate indefinite growth (might even those have some limits?) will result in imbalances in the economic system, to say the very least.

Another reason, I submit, might be the fact that the way growth and compound interest operate in the economic system will inevitably result in systemic shift in income and wealth distribution over time — regardless or even in conflict with the actual merit, productivity, innovation and hard work. It is no secret that small investment — the savings accounts of the low-income worker — will earn interest at very low rates in the banking systems of most countries today. Even if one were to invest $1000,- and $100,000 at the same interest rate, the ratio of the resulting fortunes after ten or twenty years will be quite disproprotionate. But in reality, the higher the deposits, the higher the earnings rate. So without any controls and assuming equal ‘merit’ of depositors, the one starting with the higher deposit will gain an ever-increasing advantage over the small investor.

To then suggest that e.g. taxes diminishing this handicap amount to ‘socialistic redistribution of wealth and the undisciplined, lazy masses just sponging off the rich’ is sounding a bit disingenuous. To attack institutions of ‘insurance’ such as Social Security or National health insurance ideas as concepts violating the American values of rugged individualism and individual responsibility is no less than adding insult to injury: the idea of insurance is based on the very responsible insight that accidents, illness, other calamities can strike anybody without regard to merit, and that we might reduce the painfulness for anyone hit by such might be lessened by our setting aside small funds that collectively can help out those who have suffered an event. Is this denial of individual responsibility, or the very embodiment of responsible stewardship of our families’ future well-being? By comparison, the notion that there should now be private enterprise agencies who should compete with one another in making profits from this — in effect, making profits from our misfortunes and our efforts to remedy them, this is supposed to be an American virtue and value? And the callousness of my home insurance to whom I have paid insurance premiums for decades, with which they have built gleaming office buildings and paid great CEO benefits and bonuses and parachutes, to suddenly cancel my insurance because they are no longer insuring properties in Florida – that is not just tolerated but praised as responsible business policy — so I should buy their stock for my retirement?

10. There is, finally an aspect to the interest / profit / growth conundrum that arguably has contributed more to the current crisis e.g. in the housing market than the alleged irresponsibility of homeowners buying more home than they can afford, of the few dishonest and even criminal ‘bad apples’ in the mortgage industry. It is the ‘pyramid’ effect of the financing system. Consider the building and financing of a house. Even before it is built, every contractor and subcontractor is taking out loans with their banks, to be able to buy the materials and equipment for their businesses, hire workers, etc. The general contractor, developer or owner takes out a construction loan to pay the contractors as the work is being completed. This means that even before the house is built, the bank will earn its interest — at a slightly higher than usual interest rate since the collateral is ‘just a hole in the ground’. In fact it has already, in, say, a year of construction period, earned, say 10 or 12% of the cost of the house. Then it finances the mortgage proper, with points and fees etc. And starts collecting interest on the owner’s loan. Another 5 or 6% a year. Of course, this may be too much trouble, so it ‘sells’ the mortgage to another company, a mortgage finance entity. The bank wouldn’t do this unless it could make some profit on that, would it? so that gets added to the ‘value’ of the thing it sells to the next higher entity. Which wouldn’t buy it unless they too could make a profit on it: one, by not having to go through the work involved with the initiation of the mortgage that your local bank had to do, but mostly because the mortgage is either so long-term that is expects to get safe income for a long time — income whose ‘present value’ is higher than what it paid for it — or because the mortgage is on whose interest rate can be jacked up in a year or two. If the sale and the expected profit have added another percentage for the bank and some more for the mortgage company, this will be charged as interest to the homeowner. But the owner’s income has not changed at the same rate in the meantime; he can’t pay the new mortgage payment. Fine, we’ll force him to sell the house. Only now so many people have gotten into the same fix that there aren’t enough folks around to buy the house at the price that now should cover all the profits added to it through the trades, plus of course the realtor’s 6% fee for finding a new buyer and organizing the sale. This means that someone is going to take a hit here: prices are forced down, the profit expectations are not met: bailout time. Who is getting blamed? The irresponsible homeowner, the bankers who sold those mortgages to people who couldn’t pay (how could they have foreseen that they would be laid off by their own bank in order to cover its losses?).

The blame game here is missing the point that the expectation of profit at every level was such an intrinsic part of the system that everybody involved had to buy into it. It wasn’t just the few bad apples: at every level, the economic agent had to comply with the requirement that a quarterly profit had to be demonstrated. Otherwise, the company would lose its standing on Wall street, lose its ability to borrow money cheap enough to finance more such deals. The pressure to divest themselves of questionable instruments, leading to the invention of ‘derivatives’ in which nobody could even begin to assess the true value of the basic commodity it represented, became ever greater. One did not have to be a dishonest banker to succumb to it — it was everyday practice, everybody had to play the game — anymore than every defaulting homeowner is an irresponsible bum.

I do not see in the proposed stimulus package nor in the discussion surrounding it much of an attempt to identify much less develop remedies for these intrinsic flaws in the system. I would love to be proven wrong on this; I am afraid that without such fundamental rethinking and corrections, we are just going to see more trouble of the same kind ahead.

Strangers in the Tavern

The regulars at the counter of the Fog Island Tavern were talking about Abbé Boulah — their mysterious but currently absent friend. Or was he really a friend? His name was often mentioned in their conversations — rambling discussions that roamed wildly across all territories of human knowledge, whether they actually knew much about a given subject or were just speculating or making up stuff. And their tales were spiked with quotations and sayings attributed to him — that often sounded as if they had made them up as well. Or the entire concept of Abbé Boulah. Not that he was portrayed as a man of superior wisdom or intellect, — at least some of these people did not display the reverence one would expect for such a figure. But it seemed that he had a distinctly different perspective on most of the subjects they had discussed — perhaps because of his origin, which was a matter of contention; nobody knew exactly where he was from — or his travels that exceeded that of most of the others. Not even travels by themselves, — some of the regulars had certainly visited more foreign countries. But they had done so as tourists, while Abbé Boulah, it seemed,  had been staying in many places while growing up, or as a refugee, or working for some time in one place or another.

Now the professor was launching a  theory about this.  “He’s a professional stranger. That’s why he likes to hang out here in this Tavern — not a golf course clubhouse, for example.  He’s not a member of the ‘in’ crowd anywhere.

–    “He’s a regular in here”  Renfroe objected.

–    “Yes, but he’s not what you’d call a ‘regular’ regular.”

–    “You don’t make sense, Al” said Renfroe. “How can he not be a regular when he’s a regular?”

–    “He’s a regular in the sense that he comes here quite a bit. And yes, we know him. But he’s still a stranger. I think the reason he feels comfortable here is that it’s a little like a sailor’s tavern in a seaport.”

–    “What difference does that make? A tavern is a tavern.”

–    “Oh, there are differences. Some taverns only accommodate regulars:  the place where ‘everybody knows your name’.  But seaport taverns are different. By definition, there, everybody is a stranger.  Sailors are strangers everywhere. And they seek out places where that’s okay.  Where it’s okay if you don’t know the subtle rules and conventions of the ‘proper’ people in each place,  the subtle clues about the social fabric of ‘society’ there — whether it’s nobility or well-to-do middle class, or a lowly miners or loggers’ community.  You come in without preconceptions about the people you’ll meet, and they have no preconceptions about you.”

–    “Does that mean  there are no rules you need to observe in these places?”

–    “No, no, quite the contrary!  There definitely are rules, things you do and other things you most certainly don’t do. But the rules are very different.  I’m not sure anybody has studied these unwritten rules properly, at least I’m not aware of any such studies.  But we know some of them instinctively, don’t we?”

–    “Do we?  Why don’t you give us some examples!”

–    “Well, some of them are quite obvious, aren’t they?  First of all, you don’t have a ‘regular’ place — you squeeze in wherever there’s room:  you can’t claim a specific territory.  The ‘regular’s table’ — which almost every tavern has, and it ‘s usually quite clear from its shape or position which one it is — that’s not where a stranger sits down when he first comes in. You don’t push anybody…”

–    “Unless you’re already drunk and there’s a crowd of drunken bullies with you…”

–    “Right. Even for those situations, there are unspoken rules, though.  For example, if you really want to settle a disagreement with a fight, you do it outside.  But such people usually are ‘regulars’ — they feel they have some superior rights in a place. Their turf. As a stranger, you don’t insult anybody — because you don’t know who you’re dealing with.  Any discussion or conversation is strictly neutral, nonpartisan:  the weather is the preferred startup subject everywhere because it’s so neutral, you can’t blame anybody for it, even inadvertently.”

–    “Yes, it would be interesting to write up the code of rules of taverns for strangers. But that can’t be why you’re saying Abbé Boulah is a stranger — he’s been here too often for that, hasn’t he? After a while he becomes a regular, won’t he?”

–    “No, I think you’re right. He is kinda strange sometimes” said Renfroe. “Not mean-like or anything, just weird, like he doesn’t have a clue of what’s going on, or he wants to put you on. I can’t tell the difference sometimes.”

–    “Could it be that some of the things people are saying could be understood in many different ways, from his point of view, perhaps they are really understood in different ways in the places he’s been;  so he’s really confused about what somebody is trying to say?  Don’t forget:  he didn’t go to high school with you guys. So all of those high school rituals and jargon and memories you are throwing around, he just doesn’t know what they mean. And then he gets back at you by pretending he’s taking it in some totally different way, like it might be seen in some other place. To make you as confused as you are?”

–    “Are you saying he does that on purpose?”

–    “I’m not sure. Sometimes it feels that way, yes. But I think it’s more of a defense mechanism. Which even can come across as cynical?”

–    “I think you are onto something” said Vodçek from behind the bar, polishing his glasses. “Yes, a stranger is often perceived as a little cynical — having seen many countries and listened to their national hymns, all of which proudly proclaim the unquestioned superiority of their turf and society above all others, he is not sure whether to feel sorry for all those folks and their ignorance or self-imposed blindness,  or for himself for not being able to share their enthusiasm for the patriotic cause.  He has been listening for too long to Georges Brassens singing about ‘les imbéçiles qui sont nés quelque part’ (the imbeciles that are born somewhere) and ‘je suis la mauvaise herbe, braves gens’ (I am the useless garden weed, you proper folks..)  and imagines a tavern where he could hear Georges sing. But even there, he would remain a stranger. That attitude makes him avoid engagement.  He will offer comments, advice, however tentative and noncommittal, but no commitment to place, cause, group. We’ll be gone soon, he thinks, don’t count on any long-term obligations, let’s just focus on making the present tolerable. Enjoy a little company before heading out again into solitude.

–    “He has made many efforts to become a part of something, some cause, some community. But every time something happened that set him apart:  some trace of an accent, some dumb question about a stupid idea that should have been accepted unquestioned, even little proposals for improvement that were just a little too unusual — and therefore strange, even though nobody could argue their merit — it’s just that they, well didn’t quite fit.  So he is making a career of it.”

–    “But that is really a form of chickening out, isn’t it?  Is that what he does?

–    “It can be seen that way. And the stranger knows this: the despicable refusal to make a commitment, to take responsibility for something. But it’s also a form of protection. The ability to not understand, or to pretend to not understand, lets him escape the blunders of the respective community whose strength of common purpose, their strength in numbers, blinds them to the stupidity of their aims. And he tries to  pre-empt the inevitable rejection that is sure to follow any attempt at joining such a cause for the sake of joining: it will be perceived as fraudulent, as insincere, even when the stranger has persuaded himself that this time, he will give it his best to become one of them.

–    “So the tavern where strangers can meet is where he feels comfortable. He will always feel awkward in formal occasions of any particular place:  he will not know the accepted manners and will commit many a faux-pas, and be embarrassed by this. He will not know the rituals these people engaged in during their high school years. An all this will inevitably reveal him as a stranger, as someone not to be completely trusted.”

–    “You are right; Now that I think about it,  I can’t really see Abbé Boulah at a black tie benefit for all the hi-falutin’ bigwigs in the country club. No matter how much they act as down-to-earth good ol’ boys.”

–    “No, Renfroe, the place for the stranger is the lowly tavern where the sailors come in to get drunk.  They drink to forget their homesickness — or to forget that the home they are pining for, also long ago has rejected them as strangers. The strangers will never talk about this openly, but they will sense and understand it as the undercurrent of all the boisterous stories they tell each other.”  Vodçek eyed his customers while polishing his glasses. “And I have heard some stories…”  He trailed off, lost in memories.

–    Then he recovered from his reveries, and concluded:  “The best tavern is the one run by somebody who is himself a stranger and who understands this. He understands that all these strangers now have several places for which they are homesick, and that these places never really were their home:  what they are homesick for are the dreams they once had that they might be at home there. Some of the drinks he serves are meant to vaguely remind them of those places. Or dreams.”

–    “You almost make me feel sorry for these folks, like they are victims of some unjust fate or something — but aren’t they really being that way intentionally?  Tricksters, stirring up trouble, meddling where they have no business getting involved?

–    “Perhaps they serve an important larger purpose — like the old court jesters:  making you look at things differently, questioning your assumptions, poking fun at your serious pompous, pretentious truths and principles?  Or just telling us not to take ourselves so seriously? “

–    “I’m not sure that’s Abbé Boulah, really — that last one reminds me more of our friend Bog-Hubert here, eh, Vodçek?”

–    “You’re right, Bog-Hubert doesn’t take things too seriously.”

–    “Hey,  speak for yourself, don’t put me in those labeled boxes.”

–    “Sorry, Bog-Hubert, don’t take it seriously.  But Abbé Boulah is serious, at least at some time. Too serious, often making people uncomfortable in the process.  Bog-Hubert does that too, but in a different way, at least he makes us laugh at him, and ourselves.  With Abbé Boulah, you never really know whether he’s serious or just trying to be funny like Bog-Hubert.”

–    “Oh yes, he’s serious most of the time, but he’s learning to use jest and humor for his serious purposes, and secretly laughing at himself all the while as he realizes how futile it all is.”

–    “Are you saying he thinks it’s futile, Bog-Hubert? You know him better than most of us? “

–    “Oh yeah. But he can’t let it go. Me, I gave up really trying to save the world long time ago. Now I just try to have a good time, and maybe helping others have a good time too, even if they have to be tricked into it.  But Abbé Boulah, I think he’s still like that old mythical Greek guy rolling the boulder up the hill.”

–    “You mean Sisyphus? “

–    “Right. Sisyphus, that’s the one. But Abbé Boulah, he’s laughing his head off when the boulder rolls down, scattering the goats and scaring the living daylight out of the pompous pathetic peripathetics strolling up the hillside paths admiring the view from above.  Before he goes down to roll it up again.”

Initiatives to ‘save the world’

Having gotten intrigued by the expression of all the well-intentioned goals of the “Global Marshall Plan” initiative — among other such efforts I looked at — I tried to investigate the basic charter and principles, organizational, operating and decision-making structure, only to find a somewhat confusing discussion about how that initiative should define itself and its mission. This is indicative of the essence of the problem: an organization that aims at helping the world overcome its problems gets bogged down in its own operating principles. Many concepts and terms that may be familiar to Europeans were mystifying to me, and the intentions expressed raised more questions in me than they answered. This is an attempt to sort out some of these questions, so as to ask them in a clearer, more specific way that might help develop more specific and useful answers.

Initiatives such as this one seem to be fueled by a sincere sense of concern about existing conditions and their extrapolation into the future, perhaps outrage or guilt, or both, about “our” (whoever the “we” might be) role in letting things deteriorate to this level of danger or misery.

They then appear to make some assumptions, consciously or unconsciously taken for granted:

– that some organized effort (‘initiative’) might be able to help remedy the problems,

– that these efforts should be guided by a ‘mission’, usually expressed in terms of the absence of the problems (e.g. eliminate hunger, disease, war, unfair economic conditions, injustice);

– that there are (known? already available or easy-to-perfect?) remedies: agreements, tools, forms of organization, actions, arrangements, or at least articles of good faith to which all powers of good faith should subscribe, that would result in elimination fo the problems, if accepted / adopted and applied;

– that the initiative might be able to achieve their adoption, by its activities supported by volunteer work and donations of funds, by then somehow inducing the actual decision-making entities (e.g govenrments) to adopt the respective policies and implement corresponding programs.

What is not or only rarely “made very explicit in such mission statements are specific answers, for example:

1. What, specifically, would these measures / remedies and activities be?

2. What is the evidence that they would be ‘superior’ (a claim made e.g. about the proposed “Eco-social Market Economy” or more preferable, efficient as remedies) than existing arrangements? (Beyond the well- intentioned claims of wanting to remedy problems?)

3. What are the reasons these arrangements have not been adopted / implemented yet (if they are so preferable)? What are the forces working against this?

4. What steps / actions are being considered to overcome such opposing forces? And the convictions about their superiority?

5. How can their ‘global’ implementation be achieved?
– through a ‘global treaty’? (Signed by whom? what if the treaty partners are just those opposing forces now preventing their adoption?)
– through decisions / decrees of a ‘global government’ of some kind? Global comprehensive (‘imposed?) implementation?
– by incremental introduction — either global but selective implementation on some partial aspect, to demonstrate both feasibility and desirability? If so: what aspect? How?
or ‘full / comprehensible’ implementation in a selected territory or place?

6. Regarding the ‘treaty’ approach (as in the ‘Global Marshall Plan’):
How would violations of the treaty agreements be dealt with? Sanctions? Imposed by what entity (that must be more powerful than any of the partner entities to be able to enforce them?

7 What would keep such a superior treaty-enforcement entity from falling victim to abuse of its power?

These questions seem to make it clear that some central mechanisms that would guarantee the success of such an initiative and world order simply are not available / worked out yet. Just relying on good intentions all around is clearly not sufficient; the concepts of what is fair, equitable, just, sustainable, culturally and spiritually acceptable are so different that they cannot be relied upon as conflict-resolution devices, being themselves the very sources of conflict. There is, to my knowledge, no convincing historical evidence for a central all-powerful government being immune to incompetence, flawed understanding of the problems they try to solve, insufficient information, bureaucratic calcification, or the temptations of abuse of power, — all of which would make resulting mistakes the more catastrophic, the larger, more powerful and all-encompassing that entity. This is why it is widely and understandably viewed with some suspicion.

For these reasons, I suggest that such efforts should focus much more specifically on finding and developing mechanisms for overcoming these fundamental obstacles. For example: the refinement of the concept of ‘balance of powers’ (checks and balances) — so far one of the most promising governance ideas humanity has produced, but which is still not working well enough; — the issue of whether such a global organization should unquestionably be based on traditional arrangement such as territorially defined treaty partners (‘nations’ etc.) especially when current globalization trends already show non-territorial forces and networks overlaying and overpowering the nation-based organizational structures. Or the primitive concept of democracy based on majority voting either by territorially defined groups or their representatives, also determined by majority voting (which by definition overpowers the minority).
Most of all, it would seem essential to develop better forms of ‘automatic’ triggering of sanctions for breaking agreements: mechanisms (to be agreed upon together with the respective treaty provisions) that automatically kick in upon, and triggered by, an act of violation of a treaty agreement. Such arrangements would obviate one of the major ‘justifications’ for a central all-powerful world government.

There are available embryonic suggestions for such solutions: these should be investigated, developed, discussed and tested, as the priority concerns of such organizations. Their current — apparent — reliance on existing organizations that currently are seen by many as not only incapable of dealing with the problems but even as contributing to them — is worrisome.

Some might consider these ideas as much wishful thinking as the reliance on universal good will to solve the world’s problems. But shouldn’t they then show us some alternative approaches we could discuss, refine, and get behind?